The Ukraine War - A short-term prediction

The talk is that the Russians are about to launch an offensive. The question is, 'Where will it be?'
I am neither a military expert nor well-informed about the battlefield dispositions of either side, however, I am prepared to make a few predictions.
The offensive is about to happen ostensibly because the ground in The Ukraine is finally frozen hard enough to support tank movement. Therefore, one can deduce that the offensive will seek to use tanks and that the time period of the offensive, with a duration determined by the vagaries of the weather, could well be very short. That the Russians might be desiring to use their tanks to maximum effect is also suggested by the fact that we know the West has promised to send a considerable number of tanks to The Ukraine before the summer offensive season (When the ground is once again hard enough not to bog the heavy tanks) so the Russians are likely to want to attempt mobile tank warfare now before all those new tanks arrive to bolster the Ukrainian's mobile warfare capabilities. Given these preconditions we are looking for an area of the frontline where mobile tank warfare is most useful and where something meaningful can be achieved in a time period which might be as short as two weeks. By deduction this suggests that the Russians are probably going to attack on the Luhansk Front. The Donetsk Front is still in many places the same frontline as has been the border between The Donbas and Ukraine for the last six to seven years. It is deeply entrenched, heavily fortified, and frequently urban and not at all ideal for mobile tank warfare. The Zhaporizhia Front is open terrain which has fortifications and trenches only dating from May, which means they are not likely to be as comprehensive as on the Donetsk Front. The Zhaporizhia Front is a possible tank attack site, but the Luhansk Front is preferable as it too is open terrain, with a Frontline only established in September and which appears to be far less fortified and entrenched than the Zhaporizhia Front to judge by the constant reports of relatively mobile warfare that has gone on along that front since September. Additionally, on the Luhansk Front the Russians would not have to push the Ukrainians back very far to push them entirely out of Luhansk Oblast and into Kharkhiv Oblast so the politically significant claim of 'liberating' all of Luhansk Oblast would be able to be made as soon as that was done. Furthermore, just outside the borders of Luhansk Oblast flows the Oskil River, which runs from north to south in a relatively straight line (unlike the very meandering Siversky Donets River) and would make an ideal defensive line to anchor on while offensive action moved elsewhere. Given all of these factors I am predicting that 'liberating' or 'occupying' the entireity of Luhansk Oblast will be the minimum objective of the Russian's winter offensive and that if they fail to achieve even that much then their offensive would likely be deemed a failure.

Why Bhakmut and Vuhledar?
There has been much questioning in the mainstream Western media about why the Russians are trying so hard to capture Bhakmut. I would say that for the context of the war, as it is currently poised, Bhakmut is very strategically located. The Donetsk Front as I have stated above is an old frontline that is extremely heavily fortified and entrenched. Frontal assaults all along this front are likely to be extremely costly in terms of lives lost and success will only get you to the next line of fortifications. Consequently, ideally, the Russians would like to 'outflank' these fortifications and come at them from behind. Bhakmut guards the northern flank of this frontline. If they take Bhakmut they can then push South-West cutting off frontline urban strongholds like Toretsk from behind. Bhakmut also has the advantage of being on the road to the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk further to the North-West, so an element of doubt is introduced about in which direction the Russians are heading from Bhakmut as Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are the largest cities remaining in Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast and are also significant prizes that they will need to protect. My guess is that if the Russians take Bhakmut while the ground is still hard enough to support tanks then they will swing south and try to cut off all of those frontline, fortified, urban areas while they can. They can perform the slow attritional war of street-to-street fighting in cities like Kramatorsk when the fields are muddy.
Vuhledar, similarly, is the first fortress on the way to outflanking the fortified Ukrainian frontline from the south. This is why the Russians have risked and lost so many troops trying to take this small village.

So much for the plans of sweeping tactical gains thought up while pouring over the maps in the military head quarters.
While they are hoping that these plans come off, it is likely that the Russians will employ a simpler strategy that they know they can execute. One of, while they have the men in reserve, increasing the pressure all along the frontline, and if they find a weak point, throwing everything at it in the attempt to make a break-through.