This article will examine the risk versus reward potential of all the prospective northern​ offensives that Russia could run in Ukraine. It will then come to a conclusion as to the most likely.

Offensive One
Direction  – Driving south from Belorussia along the Polish border, taking or encircling Lviv then following the Dniester River valley to seal off the Romanian border and the Moldavian border north of Transdniestria.

Rewards – The purpose of this offensive would be to cut Ukraine off from Western supplies. Given that Hungary, Slovakia and Transnistria are not allowing military supplies to cross their borders into Ukraine then it is only the Polish border, the Romanian border and a small section of Moldavian border north of Transnistria where supplies are making it into Ukraine (The flow of goods from the Romanian border south of Transnistria has been blocked by the destruction of two strategic bridges). Without supplies from its allies, Ukraine would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. So if this offensive was successful it would mean a quick and decisive end to the war. Added benefits for Russia would be that most of the fighting and consequent destruction and death would take place in the extreme west of the country, which is the most anti-Russian part of the country, leaving the more pro-Russian East and Centre with less damage.

Risks – The danger with this thrust, though, is that the Russian right flank would be extremely vulnerable to an attack across the Polish border by the very well-armed and highly motivated Poles. With fighting right on the Polish border it runs the risk of some munitions straying across the border and giving Poland an excuse to cross the border in retaliation. Such a move would be the more likely as, if the Russians had an extended offensive pushing south from Belorussia, it would be very tempting for the Poles to enter the fray, cutting the salient off from Belorussia in the north and thereby surrounding the attacking army in one relatively easy move. That would be a disaster for the Russians. Further more, it would be very difficult for the Russians to take Lviv quickly a major city with perhaps the greatest anti-Russian, pro-war sentiment in Ukraine.

Conclusion – Whilst the rewards of this plan are enormous. The potential for a disaster is too high a risk for the Russians. This is not the strategy they will employ at this time.
 

Offensive Two
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia, beginning at a point midway between the Polish border and the Dneiper river, then heading south to make contact with the northern border of the Russian ally, Transnistria.

Rewards – Similar to Offensive One, the purpose of this offensive would be to cut off Kiev and the great majority of Ukraine from Western supplies. 

Risks – Unlike Offensive One, though, the Russians do not have the difficult task of taking Lviv indeed there are no major urban areas standing in the way of this offensive reaching its desired goal. This thrust would also be far enough away from the Polish border that the fighting has little chance of spilling over, and if the Poles decide to intervene anyway, then the Russians will have some time to prepare to face them as they will need to cross some 60 to 100 kilometres of Ukrainian held territory before encountering the Russian flank. Not being right up against the Polish border, however, will mean, though, that there will be a significant slab of Ukrainian territory on the Russians’ western flank with the major city of Lviv at its core and that even if the rest of Ukraine is cut off this western region would be well set up to carry on the fight.
Being a salient striking down between Ukraine’s two primary military logistics hubs of Lviv and Kiev, this Offensive also has the potential to see an attacking Russian army cut off from its support and encircled. Though that possibility is reduced by the less likely intervention of the Poles.
 
Conclusion – There is a lot to recommend this offensive plan. Particularly, when it may well be the case that Putin does not want Lviv and was intending for it to be the capital of a rump Ukrainian state, which would be useful to him as somewhere for all the die hard Ukrainian nationalists to go to, rather than staying in the conquered part of Ukraine and causing the Russian administration headaches.
I do not think the Russians will undertake this offensive at this time. They are currently winning in the East (if only marginally) and at the moment the momentum of the war is turning in their favour. They appear to be getting stronger while the Ukrainians appear to be weakening. Given this situation they will be reluctant to do anything risky that could turn momentum and morale against them. Better to pursue safer courses of action even if their gains are only small rather than give the Ukrainians a chance to have a big win and undo all of the positive momentum. As one analyst has said ‘Right now, the Ukrainians only hope of victory is through a Russian mistake.’ I think the Russians would assess that they need to avoid the possibility of a ‘mistake’ at all costs, so their up-coming offensive will be, I think, one that risks little.
If the Russians are successful in taking the East bank of the Dnieper. It will be after that when they will endeavour to launch this offensive, not now.
 

Offensive Three
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia straight at Kiev.

Rewards – Taking the capital of Ukraine.

Risks – Destroying the city which was the medieval capital of Russia for 600 years. A very difficult and costly fight through Ukraine’s largest city. Making enemies and warriors of many civilians who might not otherwise have been wanting to resist the Russian takeover.
Despite the great cost to achieve, it would not necessarily bring the war to an end even on the East bank of the Dniepr.

Conclusion – Not going to happen. My guess is that Putin does not want to see sustained fighting in Kiev. The initial attack on Kiev was conducted in the hope of scaring Ukraine into submission. Once it was clear that sustained fighting would be needed to take the city, Putin withdrew.
 

Offensive Four
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia along the East bank of the Dneipr River, taking Chernihiv, taking or encircling the Eastern suburbs of Kiev, pushing on along the Dneipr to meet up with another Russian army pushing north along the eastern bank of the Dniepr from Zhaprizhia or a Russian army pushing west toward the Dneipr from a starting point between Sumy and Kharkiv.

Rewards – Cutting off Eastern Ukraine from all supplies from the West which would mean any Ukrainian forces in the East would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. This offensive would also make Kiev a frontline town subject to artillery fire from the Russian forces. This would have a significant psychological impact on the Ukrainians. Also reducing the ability of their largest city to function productively and in all likelihood forcing a withdrawal of the central government to the West, probably to Lviv.
 
Risks – As with all salient attacks there is the risk of being cut off and encircled. An attack along the east bank of the Dneipr to Chernihiv was attempted at the beginning of the war and failed to take Chernihiv, so it is known that Chernihiv will not be easy to take. Making deep attacks from two or three directions requires a lot of manpower, firepower and logistics in an environment where mobile warfare has proven difficult, so far. Given all of this it is possible that these offensive thrusts will become stalled before meeting up. Offensive thrusts that fail to meet their goals will cause reputational/morale damage to the Russian army.
 
Conclusion – This strategy will be employed in parts. The pushing south along the east bank of the Dneipr will be held off for now but attempts to attack north from Zhaporizia along the Dneipr and West from between Kharkiv and Sumy will be made. If both, or even just one, of these attacks goes exceptionally well then a thrust from the north will eventually be made.
Part of the reason why I am confident the Zhaporizhia and Sumy/Kharkiv thrusts will be made is because these attacks have multiple success points. On the Zhaporizhia front if they just move the front forward a few kilometres; it is a success; if they take or encircle Eastern Zhaprizhia City – they have taken control of a vital Dneipr crossing; big success; if they make it all the way to Dnipro; they have blocked two key Dneipr crossings; outstanding success. From the border between Sumy and Kharkiv, if they simply take some Ukrainian territory then they have succeeded in creating a buffer zone along the border; success; if they push in 30 kilometres between Sumy and Kharkiv, then they have put themselves in a position to encirlcle either city or drive toward the Dneipr, thus putting the enemy in doubt and forcing them to divide their forces or leave one or more options open; big success; from there the outstanding success of encircling Kharkiv or Sumy or driving to the Dneipr is possible. If the later option is achieved then an attempt to meet that thrust with an army coming up from Zhaporizhia or down from Chernihiv would be a next step.
 
Ultimate Conclusion
So, I am predicting that if the war plays out in the Russian favour, but the Ukrainians continue to fight, then first we will see offensive four put into action and then after that offensive two. Of course, as outlined in the previous blog, I would see the partial implementation of Offensive Four being conducted in tandem with attempts to advance on all existing fronts in order to stretch Ukraine's strategic reserves to the maximum.
 

So, my predictions for the Russian offensive.
I need to preface this though by saying that I do not know the situation on the ground in Ukraine anywhere near as well as the Russian Military Commanders. There is much information before them that I do not have. My guesses are simply based on widely publicized information about the situation on the ground. They may suffer from a lack of critical information. That said, my predictions, based on my limited knowledge, are as follows: 

1. The Russians will attack in all new and existing frontlines simultaneously in order to exceed Ukraine’s ability to throw effective reserves at each attack, thereby giving the best opportunity that at least one direction of attack should make a breakthrough.
2. The main new front/axis of attack will be entering the Kharkiv region between Kupiansk and Vovchansk (the Donets River). They will push south hoping to envelop the Ukranian lines that are facing the Russians in Luhansk Oblast. They will be seeking to use the Siversky Donets river as a protection on their western flank while the eastern flank attacks the Ukrainian positions. The role of the Russian forces in Ukraine will be to pressure the Ukrainians from the East, but the main attack will come from the west. Any attack from the East will have to overcome well established defensive positions and then if they make it to the Oskil river the Ukrainians have prepared positions waiting to help them defend the West bank of this river. So, it will be much better to attack from the west, attacking the Ukrainian defenses from behind and then being able to use those self-same defenses to hold the Oskil river line against the Ukrainians trapped between its eastern bank and the Russian lines further east. Of course, the Ukrainians will know that this move could trap all of their forces on the Luhansk Front so they will do their best to stop the Russians on, or near, the northern border. I think, however, that this is the direction to which the Russians will devote their best resources. Why? Because destroying the Ukrainian Army is more important than taking large grabs of territory. If the Russians can destroy the Ukrainian Army then they can take as much territory as they wish. If they take a big grab of poorly defended territory but leave the Ukrainian Army largely intact then they risk having that territory and others removed from them later in the war. Destroying the Ukrainian Army will therefore be priority number one and the attack with the greatest potential to deal it a severe blow is the one outlined above, so I think the Russians will invest many forces into it despite its predictability. Also, if it does not come off then they can claim that they were just trying to create a buffer zone along the border as they have previously stated they would. So they can claim a sort of victory even if they only make it a few kilometres across the border.
3. The second area of focus will be the Donetsk Front. Here they will attack almost everywhere. If destroying the Ukrainian Army is the goal, here is where it is most concentrated. Liberating Donetsk though has long been a stated goal of ‘The Special Military Operation’ so politically any ground taken in Donetsk Oblast is a public relations win. Within the oblast, though, I do not think they are planning a frontal assault of Vulehdar. They have lost too many troops trying that previously. Vulehdar will definitely be a key target, but my thinking is that they will try to surround it by moving north from Pavlivka, Shevchenko and/or Novomaiorske to block its western flank and moving west from Solodke and Novomykhailivka to cut it off from the north. It also seems unlikely that they will attack Niu York and Toretsk directly as the contact line facing these two urban centres was first established in 2014 and has probably been built up over the years to be extremely difficult to fight through. It is far more likely that they will endeavour to take these areas by encirclement, pushing north from Avdivka and west from Bakmut/Artemovsk.
4. The third region of attack will be between Kharkhiv and Sumy. Such an attack, if it pushes deep could threaten either city with encirclement and so give the Russians options. If the Ukrainians look like they have Kharkhiv too well defended then the Russians can potentially swing north and grab Sumy. Naturally though, Kharkhiv, as Ukraine’s second largest city and former capital, would be the preferred target. If the attack does not make much ground, once again, the Russians will be able to claim that they were just intending to create a buffer zone along the northern section of the Kharkhiv border, so once again they will be able to claim victory with just a few kilometres captured.
5. Finally, the Zhaporizhia front will also be a direction of attack. The Russians will endeavour to dash forward from Robotyne to Orikhiv and will also attempt to drive up through Stepnohirsk to Zhaporizhia City. This attack is likely to be the least resourced and the least sustained. If the initial push succeeds, and a breakthrough is made, then the Russians may well send more resources to Zhaporizhia, but if the initial charge is unsuccessful then it is likely the Russians will be content to simply retake any land lost to the Ukrainian offensive and then sit on their hands. The reason being that they have established very strong defensive lines where they are and that as the next Ukrainian Offensive, if there is one, is likely to want to head through the land bridge to the sea, they might prefer to present the same tested and successful defenses rather pushing forward at great cost only to occupy less defensible positions when the expected assault comes and losing yet more troops as a result.

 
Northern Attack Routes
It seems unlikely at this stage that the Russians would also attack from the northern Ukrainian border in the next few months, so I will save analysis of these prospective invasion routes for a later blog.

I find it highly likely that before the Ukraine war is over the Poles will put troops on the ground. Historically, when The Ukraine and Belarus have not been Russian territory, then they have most likely been Polish territory. The Poles, naturally, would like to regain some of their 'lost' eastern lands. Consequently, the current conflict in Ukraine is far too good an opportunity for them to miss. Taking land requires deploying troops so expect to see the Poles on the ground in The Ukraine. Poland's recent orders of massive amounts of military equipment, including 1000 K2 tanks from Korea, indicate the line of their thinking.
Ideally, the Poles would hope to send their troops in with the consent of Ukrainians. Arriving as the saviours when the war had got to the point that Ukraine was on the verge of total defeat. Although self-interested, it would still be a brave move to stand face-to-face with the Russians, but the Poles do have an ace up their sleeve. They can offer the Russians a complete end to the war in return for dividing Ukrainian territory between them; afterall, even today, if Poland suddenly closed its border to any trans-shipment of armaments then the Ukraine War would be over. The Hungarians are already closed to arms shipments. Moldavia is blocked from shipping arms by the fact that its border with The Ukraine is controlled by the breakaway republic of Transniestria which is strongly pro-Russian, to the extent of having a Russian base on its soil. And the Romanians have only some small roads through the thick of the Carpathian mountains to use after the Russians destroyed the bridges on the lower Dniestr River. That leaves tiny Slovakia as their only significant import route and Slovakia's main opposition party is already campaigning against their involvement in the war.
And then, of course, the Poles might be able to win the backing of the USA for their move. That would constitute another huge Ace.
Apparently, the former Polish foreign minister has said that it has been discussed at high levels whether if Ukraine became a Polish 'Protectorate' it would be covered by Article 5 of the NATO constitution requiring all NATO members to come to its defense.
Of course, talk of Polish protectorates only makes sense if the Ukrainians are losing the war and badly. If Ukraine looks like being the eventual winner then look out for the Poles finding reasons to move into Belarus. Were Belarus to send troops into Ukraine the Poles might consider it enough of a justification for them to attack Belarus. The Belarussians may not be simply looking for excuses not to enter Ukraine when they tell the Russians they need their troops to guard their own borders with the West. Putin, too, might well be deliberately wanting to keep Belarus out of harm's way, in order not to give the Poles an excuse to get involved.
Indeed, the only outcome where I do not see Polish troops on the ground, is if something like the current stalemate continues, where Ukraine is still strong enough to defend itself, but the Russians are not destroyed either. If such a stalemate is quickly followed by a ceasefire agreement then the Poles might miss their chance. I use the word 'quickly' deliberately, because it seems unlikely that a stalemate could go on for many years, eventually one side or the other should gain the upper hand as they are too dis-similar in capabilities. So it seems likely that the Poles will get their chance and if the Americans and Ukrainians aren't willing to negotiate with the Russians, the Poles, I suspect will be happy to, as for them a negotiation over Ukraine will not be zero sum; but rather win: win.

The talk is that the Russians are about to launch an offensive. The question is, 'Where will it be?'
I am neither a military expert nor well-informed about the battlefield dispositions of either side, however, I am prepared to make a few predictions.
The offensive is about to happen ostensibly because the ground in The Ukraine is finally frozen hard enough to support tank movement. Therefore, one can deduce that the offensive will seek to use tanks and that the time period of the offensive, with a duration determined by the vagaries of the weather, could well be very short. That the Russians might be desiring to use their tanks to maximum effect is also suggested by the fact that we know the West has promised to send a considerable number of tanks to The Ukraine before the summer offensive season (When the ground is once again hard enough not to bog the heavy tanks) so the Russians are likely to want to attempt mobile tank warfare now before all those new tanks arrive to bolster the Ukrainian's mobile warfare capabilities. Given these preconditions we are looking for an area of the frontline where mobile tank warfare is most useful and where something meaningful can be achieved in a time period which might be as short as two weeks. By deduction this suggests that the Russians are probably going to attack on the Luhansk Front. The Donetsk Front is still in many places the same frontline as has been the border between The Donbas and Ukraine for the last six to seven years. It is deeply entrenched, heavily fortified, and frequently urban and not at all ideal for mobile tank warfare. The Zhaporizhia Front is open terrain which has fortifications and trenches only dating from May, which means they are not likely to be as comprehensive as on the Donetsk Front. The Zhaporizhia Front is a possible tank attack site, but the Luhansk Front is preferable as it too is open terrain, with a Frontline only established in September and which appears to be far less fortified and entrenched than the Zhaporizhia Front to judge by the constant reports of relatively mobile warfare that has gone on along that front since September. Additionally, on the Luhansk Front the Russians would not have to push the Ukrainians back very far to push them entirely out of Luhansk Oblast and into Kharkhiv Oblast so the politically significant claim of 'liberating' all of Luhansk Oblast would be able to be made as soon as that was done. Furthermore, just outside the borders of Luhansk Oblast flows the Oskil River, which runs from north to south in a relatively straight line (unlike the very meandering Siversky Donets River) and would make an ideal defensive line to anchor on while offensive action moved elsewhere. Given all of these factors I am predicting that 'liberating' or 'occupying' the entireity of Luhansk Oblast will be the minimum objective of the Russian's winter offensive and that if they fail to achieve even that much then their offensive would likely be deemed a failure.

Why Bhakmut and Vuhledar?
There has been much questioning in the mainstream Western media about why the Russians are trying so hard to capture Bhakmut. I would say that for the context of the war, as it is currently poised, Bhakmut is very strategically located. The Donetsk Front as I have stated above is an old frontline that is extremely heavily fortified and entrenched. Frontal assaults all along this front are likely to be extremely costly in terms of lives lost and success will only get you to the next line of fortifications. Consequently, ideally, the Russians would like to 'outflank' these fortifications and come at them from behind. Bhakmut guards the northern flank of this frontline. If they take Bhakmut they can then push South-West cutting off frontline urban strongholds like Toretsk from behind. Bhakmut also has the advantage of being on the road to the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk further to the North-West, so an element of doubt is introduced about in which direction the Russians are heading from Bhakmut as Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are the largest cities remaining in Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast and are also significant prizes that they will need to protect. My guess is that if the Russians take Bhakmut while the ground is still hard enough to support tanks then they will swing south and try to cut off all of those frontline, fortified, urban areas while they can. They can perform the slow attritional war of street-to-street fighting in cities like Kramatorsk when the fields are muddy.
Vuhledar, similarly, is the first fortress on the way to outflanking the fortified Ukrainian frontline from the south. This is why the Russians have risked and lost so many troops trying to take this small village.

So much for the plans of sweeping tactical gains thought up while pouring over the maps in the military head quarters.
While they are hoping that these plans come off, it is likely that the Russians will employ a simpler strategy that they know they can execute. One of, while they have the men in reserve, increasing the pressure all along the frontline, and if they find a weak point, throwing everything at it in the attempt to make a break-through.

It would seem to me that if Russia is intending to install its own government in Ukraine then the man they would choose to lead it would ideally be Viktor Yanucovich. Viktor Yanukovich is the democratically elected leader of Ukraine who was ousted in a coup in 2014. He has been living in Russia ever since. If he is the man that they put in charge of whatever is left of Ukraine at the end of this war, then it would allow the Russians to undercut all of the criticisms that have been leveled at them in terms of an 'unprovoked attack'. If they can claim that they are restoring a democratically elected leader then it would certainly give their invasion legitimacy in many eyes.
The greatest problem with this strategy, however, may well be Viktor Yanukovich himself, I have no knowledge of whether he would agree to be re-installed as President of the Ukraine. Particularly, if it is over a partitioned Ukraine. I believe he has previously spoken of trying to get Russia to return The Crimea, so he may not be willing to go along with what may be Putin's current plans for the Ukraine.
Further evidence that the re-installation of Yanukovich is unlikely is the fact that we have not heard Russia saying that this is what it is doing. This might, however, be because they wanted to keep their real intentions unknown to this point, or it could be that Putin is waiting to see how well his invasion goes before choosing his end goal and he is not yet sure that he will choose the one in which Yanukovich would be helpful.

Over the past several months, Putin has been gathering his ingredients. Today he threw in the salt. Now he will slowly bring the pot to the boil.

​This may not be a very professional sounding analysis, but it is what is in my mind.

So, in my last hurried post I said I would explain my reasoning for why I think Putin will go into Ukraine. I have left it late enough, so I had better explain myself now before events overtake the need for any prediction.
Now, I am by no means a military expert, so my predictions are based on political calculations rather than any specialised knowledge of troop deployments and such like.
So, some reasons why I think Putin will go into The Ukraine:
Firstly, it is not primarily about NATO. If his stated demands were met, Putin would probably be happy and might put off the invasion for now, but I think that primarily his goal in going into The Ukraine would be the hope of reuniting the Russians. Putin considers Ukrainians to be Russians. Kiev was the capital of the first Russian state. Most of the Ukraine has been part of Russia for hundreds of years and the only reason it was part of a different state to Russia under the Soviet Union, in Putin's thinking, I presume, was because the Russians wanted to make the Soviet Union look like it was an International Union rather than just a Greater Russia, so they generously gave a bit of Russian territory to create some states like Belarus, which had never previously existed and The Ukraine, which had only existed when the Nazi's had control of the territory. The Russians had thought that Belarus and The Ukraine would always be under the control of the Soviet Politburo so there was no problem with calling these regions independent states. They had never imagined that their creations might actually become independent !! They even added the Crimea to The Ukraine in 1954. Thinking like this you can see that Putin, a strong nationalist, might want to correct the 'geopolitical tragedy' of the collapse of the Soviet Union and bring at least these, formerly Russian, states back into Russia. In Belarus it appears Putin has achieved this aim relatively peacefully (There is a 'Union State' agreement by which Russia and Belarus  are essentially merging). He must have thought he was on the way to achieving the same with the Ukraine when Viktor Yanukovych was elected President. He was hoping to get The Crimea back into Russia even more quickly with Yanukovych scheduling a referendum to be held in Crimea in 2014 to let the Crimea decide between the Ukraine, Russia and Independence. When Yanukovych was undemocratically overthrown Putin's strategy for peacefully reintegrating The Ukraine took a significant hit, though, I would assume. 
So, Putin's sense of grievance over The Ukraine is pretty strong. He believes The West underhandedly stole The Ukraine away from him by overthrowing a democratically elected President. He would also see an invasion as a noble effort to reunite his people. So his motivations to take control of the Ukraine are far stronger than some concerns about an aggressive foreign alliance structure. Geo-strategically there is a lot to gain as well, many analysts talk about Russia's declining population, extremely long borders, and open, easy-to-invade geography. Adding the Ukraine to Russia would add 40 plus million people while shortening their border and putting that border on an easily defensible mountain chain.
So, Putin has a lot to gain from bringing Ukraine back into the Russian fold. Not to mention, entry into the pantheon of Russian greats, if he pulls it off. And the greater the gain; the greater the risk one is willing to take to obtain it.

So, why now? Why during this particular standoff?
Well:

• Given that the West has started arming Ukraine, if he backs off now he will have incurred a price for his build up of troops (the better arming of Ukraine and the uniting of NATO) without having achieved any gain. Given that a price has already been paid Putin will not want to walk away.
• If Putin waits till next year Ukraine will only be better armed
• Right now, many European countries have a large dependency on Russian gas and oil and so are not very motivated to stop trading with Russia. In a year's time these countries might have diversified their economies away from Russian commodities.
• Right now, many in the American administration see China as America's biggest concern and so their attention is divided. In a year's time, China might have been laid low by a financial crises, causing the US administration to start rating Russia as their strongest competitor.
• Given that the US has at no point said they will help defend Ukraine militarily, the one card that might really dissuade Putin has not been played.

Given all of the above, it is my prediction that Putin will act rather than back down.
One way or the other, we will soon know.

Well, this blog is meant to be about geopolitical predictions, so here is a big one:
Russia will go into The Ukraine again and this time they will go in big.
Why big?
Because the international reaction to them taking the rest of Donbas would be the same as if they invaded the entire country. So if they go in they should go in for everything they want.
In addition, the more audacious their gambit, the stronger the impression they will make on their neighbors and the world.
Why would they go in at all?
I will have to save my reasoning for a later post.

Many news reports are saying that there are more than 100,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border. Some news reports are saying around 90,000.

So, does this mean an invasion of The Ukraine is imminent?

I would say: certainly not. The Russians are positioning themselves to take advantage of possible opportunities. Russian troops moving into the Ukraine, en masse, is certainly more likely than it was a year ago, but it may not come in the form of an invasion and will not happen at all unless global and local conditions present a compelling opportunity.

First: The Why?
Why would Russia want to take possession of The Ukraine?

Because in many Russian minds, and almost certainly in Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s mind, The Ukraine is Russian territory. The very first historical mentions of a Russian people and state come from tales of the ‘Kievan Rus’. Kiev was the first capital of the Russians. Today, Kiev is the capital of The Ukraine. Many Russian’s don’t see The Ukraine as just a lost province; they see it as their historical heartland. They strongly desire to see The Ukraine re-united with the rest of Russia.

Second: The Why Now?
Why is it far more likely that the Russians might make a play for taking back The Ukraine now, rather than a year ago?

Because they have finished the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which means that they can now pump natural gas direct to Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Previously, their gas, which provides an enormous income stream, had to pass through The Ukraine to reach Western Europe. So, naturally, the fear was that any aggressive moves toward The Ukraine could see the Ukrainians shut down the gas pipelines and hamstring the Russian economy from the very beginning of the war. Now, the Ukrainians can no longer play this card. So, the price the Russians would have to pay for aggression against The Ukraine has been substantially lowered. Not only that, but the Russians now have leverage over many of the European nations who might otherwise have supported The Ukraine against Russia. Now, the Germans, for example, know that if they support The Ukraine against Russia, they risk losing the natural gas upon which their economy currently depends. Previously, the Germans would have lost the gas immediately that the war started so the Russians could not have used the restriction of supply as a threat to keep them out of the conflict.

So, the Russians are highly motivated to regain The Ukraine and they have already created infrastructure and political levers that would significantly lower the expected cost of an invasion of The Ukraine. So why wouldn’t they go ahead and invade?

The main reason why the Russians would limit military actions against The Ukraine as much as possible is precisely because they see themselves as the one people. They would like to re-unify the country peacefully if they can. Many think that the Ukrainian identity is weak and does not have deep historical roots for many Ukrainian citizens, they hope that a well-managed crisis might bring many Ukrainian citizens around to wanting to re-integrate with Russia. President Putin is also surely aware that a brutal invasion may well be something which could inspire a stronger sense of Ukrainian identity than that which already exists. To draw an historical example, one might say that the inhabitants of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor had no strong sense of a national identity at the time when the Portuguese abandoned that colony, however, after a brutal Indonesian invasion, the East Timorese identity became extremely strong.
So, the Russians are hoping that The Ukraine will soon find itself in such economic or governmental difficulties that a re-unification with ‘Greater Russia’ will be welcomed by the populace. Of course, now that the Ukrainian government can no longer stop them exporting gas to Western Europe the Russians are able to tighten the economic screws on The Ukraine in a way they never have before. They have already banned exports of coal to The Ukraine, it remains to be seen if they are going to shut off the oil and gas as well this winter. There are various ways that the Russians can manipulate circumstances within The Ukraine to try and bring on a crisis. It is not the purpose of this article to try to detail them all. What I would like to emphasize, however, is that there are some potential global events which Russia might be watching or even waiting for.
Imagine, for example, that China began implementing its plans to take control of Taiwan. Such activity, whether it be a blockade or a military assault, would likely take a great deal of American attention. Would that not present a perfect opportunity for an old-fashioned military invasion of The Ukraine? Is it not possible that there might not already be a deal between China and Russia such that if China begins an attack on Taiwan then Russia should attack The Ukraine, to divide the attention and resources of America and its allies? Certainly, such a deal would make perfect sense. Indeed, the deal might even go the other way. It might read that ‘if Russia attacks The Ukraine then China should begin its attack on Taiwan.
Remember, such attacks would not be seen by either country as an act of aggression against a sovereign state. China would see an attack on Taiwan as simply the final chapter in a long-running civil war. Certainly, that civil war has been cold for many decades now, but, nonetheless, Taiwan is the last holdout of the Chinese Communist Party’s opponents in the battle to control China. Taking control of Taiwan would be for them an act of national reunification. For the Russians, with The Ukraine, it is the same. They too would see an invasion of The Ukraine as an attempt to reunify their country. Both Russia and China are very conscious, however, that the USA and the West would represent their actions differently and are worried about what they would do against them. Seen from this vantage point it would seem strange if there is not a deal between these two countries to co-ordinate their attacks on Taiwan and The Ukraine.

So ...

Right now, the Russians are in a strong position to move on The Ukraine; they have removed their economic vulnerability; global fossil fuel prices are high, boosting their economic strength and making their customers less likely to want to seek other suppliers; they have a strong leader with good domestic support and the US administration is focused on China and domestic discord and the American people are tired of foreign engagements. If an opportunity appears, the Russians may well move on The Ukraine.

However ...

For the Chinese, the current moment does not appear so compelling. The US is watching them closely and they do not want to get into a hot war with the Americans. However, their hand might be forced. My feeling is that the Chinese will continue to keep trading with the US for as long as they can, and the American administration will go along with this for as long as it can too. However, American domestic opinion might eventually force the administration to cease engagement with China. Just on the 2nd of December, 2021, the World Tennis Association has ceased any engagement with China over the Peng Shuai affair. One can imagine that outrage over what is reportedly happening in Sinkiang (Xinxiang) might shortly follow. At some point trade between China and The West might come to an abrupt halt and at that point China might feel it has much less to lose by attacking Taiwan. Indeed, attacking Taiwan might become a necessary, even the only, face-saving move left to a Chinese leader who is faced with the West’s anti-Chinese actions.

So, if Russia chose to make moves on The Ukraine this winter, it is quite likely that Chinese would not act on Taiwan but rather choose to wait till their own circumstances were more compelling. However, if China does move on Taiwan this northern winter then I think it very likely that Russia would initiate some actions against the sovereignty of The Ukraine.
 
Summary:
Russia is presently very well set up to intervene in The Ukraine, more so than at any period since The Ukraine Crisis began back in 2013-2014 with the toppling of a democratically elected pro-Russian government. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has made Russia far less vulnerable to Ukrainian economic retaliation and simultaneously given the Russians more economic control of several Western European countries (most significantly, Germany). Consequently, the Russians are far more likely to intervene in the Ukraine than they have been previously, and they have stationed their military in a manner that would allow them to intervene very quickly should an opportunity arise. The Russians are probably working to manufacture such an opportunity, with moves like banning coal exports to The Ukraine, but other opportunities could arise without their meddling, an example of such being a Chinese play for Taiwan. Other opportunities, though, can be imagined, such as a poor response to the pandemic within The Ukraine causing  economic or administrative failure. Despite their strong position a Russian invasion is not a given, however, as the Russians would like to avoid alienating the majority of Ukrainians. They would prefer to intervene in the country in a situation where their intervention would be welcomed by, at least, a significant number of Ukrainians. However, if something like an invasion of Taiwan was begun by the Chinese the Russians may well think that the international circumstances were so favorable that they should take advantage of the situations and launch an invasion of The Ukraine regardless.
​Such are the precarious circumstances in which we find ourselves at the moment.

I have not been watching the world for a while. Having been buried in my own personal projects, family and occupation I only now put my head up and look around at the world.
So what do I see?

1. I see that oil prices are high and have been that way for a while.
2. I see that Turkey, is finally flexing its military muscles and is slowly, carefully and quietly conquering parts of northern Syria.
3. I see that there are moves being made within Saudi Arabia to purge any possible sources of opposition to the king and the crown prince.
4. I see that neither the EU nor the Eurozone have collapsed, but the governments and politicians that oppose it seem to be gaining influence not losing it.
5. I see that President Xi of China is gathering enormous powers to himself.
6. I see that Donald Trump is meeting the President of North Korea in Singapore.
7. I see that Russia is hosting a World Cup, a bare four years after hosting a Winter Olympics

So what do I make of it all?

1. That with the rebound in oil prices Russia and Saudi Arabia are doing much better than many expected two years ago.
2. With Turkey moving into Arab territory there is an extra incentive for Arabs to unify and that there will be support for a strong Arab leader if one emerges.
3. Saudi Arabia could be strengthening itself internally in preparation for taking on a more aggressive role in its region.
4. The EU is already fraying politically. There is no need for it to disappear; countries can just stop doing what it says and it will simply become less and less important. Hungary and Poland are already flouting its directives, and they are flouting their flouting. The Eurozone can’t simply fade away. It will either continue to function more-or-less as-is or countries will leave it. I think some countries will eventually choose to leave.
5. The fact that 6. Is occurring despite 5. Suggests that Xi is extremely concerned by China’s relative strength vis-à-vis USA and is willing to be very nice to the USA and help them with North Korea so as to dissuade the USA from totally devastating the Chinese economy as they could do if they launched a trade war.
6. I see the American President’s meeting with the North Korean President as more of a reflection of the state of mind of the Chinese President than anything else.
7. Having weathered western sanctions and now showing an expected budget surplus for this year, Russia will be able to use the World Cup to show the world that reports of its imminent demise were vastly premature.

Extra observations:
The USA has recently started taking steps to act in its own economic interests and despite some bad press has found the process less politically painful than many expected. As their first small steps succeed, their appetite for putting America first will probably increase.
It has become clear to me that Russia has probably offered the US a grand bargain/threat on Ukraine, which would run something like ‘Ukraine stays out of NATO and the EU and you stay out of Ukraine or we let the tanks role.’ The Donbas Republics are key to this strategy because if Ukraine joined NATO and Russia attacked then all of NATO would be duty bound to go to war with Russia – and they probably would in the case of such a clear attack. If, however, Ukraine joined NATO and then the Donbas Republics suddenly had some extremely successful offensive thrusts in their on-going civil war, then technically no NATO members would be ‘duty bound’ to intervene. This would explain why so little has been done for Ukraine by the West since its ouster of the pro-Russian government.

The US Congress has just increased sanctions on Russia by overwhelming majorities in both the House of Representatives (419-3) and the Senate (98-2). On the face of it these sanctions may just seem like a patriotic backlash against the Russian for interfering, or trying to interfere in the US election. And for some congressmen that may indeed be the primary motivation for voting for them. The instigators of this bill for new sanctions though had more on their minds than anything related to the last election. The primary target of these sanctions is the Nord Stream 2 project. Nord Stream 2 would see a pipeline laid under the Baltic Sea which would be large enough to supply northern Europe with all of the Russian gas which currently gets to northern Europe via pipelines through Ukraine. The drafters of this new sanctions bill are worried that if Nord Stream 2 is built then Russia will be able to turn off the gas to Ukraine without having to lose its business in northern Europe. This naturally would massively increase Russia’s ability to influence events in Ukraine and possibly even inspire a popular revolt against its current pro-western government (freezing through a couple of Ukrainian winters without heating might just convince a majority of Ukrainians that their government’s anti-Russian stance was not in their own personal interests). Alternately, if peaceful pressure did not suffice then with Nord Stream 2 operating, Russia would also be able to heat up the Donbas conflict and intervene militarily in the Ukraine without jeopardising its main source of foreign income. Given these possibilities it is no surprise that certain segments of the US administration are worried about Nord Stream 2. For sure they want to stop it, so these sanctions cleverly target companies who would do business with Russian energy companies. The US legislators are hoping to stop Nord Stream 2 from the German end by applying pain to any company that would work with the Russians to make Nord Stream 2 a reality. It is a clever strategy and we wait to see if it will work. The Russians have offered the criticism that the US is just trying to drive European nations toward more expensive American energy suppliers. It is a valid point that American companies will be winners if these sanctions have their desired effect. And surely many Europeans are aware that if in addition to making the Russians poorer these sanctions make Europe less energy secure and more dependent on the Americans then that will be just another reason why they will be thought a good idea by some American strategists.
We now wait to see if the sanctions will have their desired effect upon the Nord Stream 2 project. Several factions within Germany clearly don’t like this use of American power to interfere with their own energy security. The German foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, has spoken out against the sanctions bill. What Angela Merkel will say and do we have yet to see.
It is possible that rather than stopping Nord Stream 2 these sanctions might inspire a backlash of their own which will see the Germans choose Russia over the US in this case. The bill’s drafters would argue that without the sanctions the Germans would have agreed to Nord Stream 2 anyway. So at least the sanctions will make them think twice and then reveal how deep their alignment with the US really is.
Coming on the back of Trump’s visit to Europe recently convincing Angela Merkel that Germany needed to provide for its own defence it might look like there is currently a concerted US campaign to push the Germans away from them. If there is though it is interesting to note that the sanctions bill did not originate with the president’s team and it is probable that he personally would not favour it. Given its overwhelming support however it is hard to see President Trump not signing the bill (though he could use the excuse that he does not want to antagonise the US’s valued ally, Germany).
If, in the end, President Trump does sign the bill it will make an interesting example of how the US can be governed (and I mean quite literally governed; eg: ruled/administered) by forces outside the Presidency. Whether those forces will succeed in inserting a wedge between Russia and Germany or will in fact push them closer together is something that we will watch with close attention. Either way, it is safe to say, that the latest sanctions bill illuminates certain aspects of both US foreign policy and the functioning of the US administration at this point in time, and the response to it could illuminate even more about the state of international relations within Europe

26-3-2015 
It has been an interesting day for two reasons.
1. Events in Yemen.
Suddenly the Al-Houthi's supported by forces loyal to the former President appear to be on the verge of taking control of Aden the former Capital of South Yemen.  Given that many pundit have been predicting the imminent break up of Yemen into its former independent parts of North Yemen and South Yemen this is a very significant development.  Particularly significant is the involvement of the former unifying president Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Now, while I do not put myself forward as an expert on Ali Abdullah Saleh, I will say that in unifying North and South Yemen to create one  nation Saleh achieved a feat which makes him one of the most successful national leaders of the twentieth century.  I note that Yemen's current troubles started while Saleh was seriously ill.  If Saleh is back in control of himself, and today's events suggest to me that he is, then those who are saying that 'there is no one who can pull Yemen back together,' might find that they are mistaken.  
Though if Saleh comes back to influence through the aid of his former adversaries, the Houthi's it could well spell worrying times for Saudi Arabia.
2. The Ukrainian President has sacked the powerful oligarch Igor Kolomoisky from the post of Governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region.  Given that Kolomoisky is seen as the man who was most influential in ensuring that Dnipropetrovsk did not join the pro-Russian separatist movement this rift between himself and the Ukrainian government presided over by fellow/rival oligarch Petro Poroschenko is very significant indeed.