This article will examine the risk versus reward potential of all the prospective northern​ offensives that Russia could run in Ukraine. It will then come to a conclusion as to the most likely.

Offensive One
Direction  – Driving south from Belorussia along the Polish border, taking or encircling Lviv then following the Dniester River valley to seal off the Romanian border and the Moldavian border north of Transdniestria.

Rewards – The purpose of this offensive would be to cut Ukraine off from Western supplies. Given that Hungary, Slovakia and Transnistria are not allowing military supplies to cross their borders into Ukraine then it is only the Polish border, the Romanian border and a small section of Moldavian border north of Transnistria where supplies are making it into Ukraine (The flow of goods from the Romanian border south of Transnistria has been blocked by the destruction of two strategic bridges). Without supplies from its allies, Ukraine would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. So if this offensive was successful it would mean a quick and decisive end to the war. Added benefits for Russia would be that most of the fighting and consequent destruction and death would take place in the extreme west of the country, which is the most anti-Russian part of the country, leaving the more pro-Russian East and Centre with less damage.

Risks – The danger with this thrust, though, is that the Russian right flank would be extremely vulnerable to an attack across the Polish border by the very well-armed and highly motivated Poles. With fighting right on the Polish border it runs the risk of some munitions straying across the border and giving Poland an excuse to cross the border in retaliation. Such a move would be the more likely as, if the Russians had an extended offensive pushing south from Belorussia, it would be very tempting for the Poles to enter the fray, cutting the salient off from Belorussia in the north and thereby surrounding the attacking army in one relatively easy move. That would be a disaster for the Russians. Further more, it would be very difficult for the Russians to take Lviv quickly a major city with perhaps the greatest anti-Russian, pro-war sentiment in Ukraine.

Conclusion – Whilst the rewards of this plan are enormous. The potential for a disaster is too high a risk for the Russians. This is not the strategy they will employ at this time.
 

Offensive Two
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia, beginning at a point midway between the Polish border and the Dneiper river, then heading south to make contact with the northern border of the Russian ally, Transnistria.

Rewards – Similar to Offensive One, the purpose of this offensive would be to cut off Kiev and the great majority of Ukraine from Western supplies. 

Risks – Unlike Offensive One, though, the Russians do not have the difficult task of taking Lviv indeed there are no major urban areas standing in the way of this offensive reaching its desired goal. This thrust would also be far enough away from the Polish border that the fighting has little chance of spilling over, and if the Poles decide to intervene anyway, then the Russians will have some time to prepare to face them as they will need to cross some 60 to 100 kilometres of Ukrainian held territory before encountering the Russian flank. Not being right up against the Polish border, however, will mean, though, that there will be a significant slab of Ukrainian territory on the Russians’ western flank with the major city of Lviv at its core and that even if the rest of Ukraine is cut off this western region would be well set up to carry on the fight.
Being a salient striking down between Ukraine’s two primary military logistics hubs of Lviv and Kiev, this Offensive also has the potential to see an attacking Russian army cut off from its support and encircled. Though that possibility is reduced by the less likely intervention of the Poles.
 
Conclusion – There is a lot to recommend this offensive plan. Particularly, when it may well be the case that Putin does not want Lviv and was intending for it to be the capital of a rump Ukrainian state, which would be useful to him as somewhere for all the die hard Ukrainian nationalists to go to, rather than staying in the conquered part of Ukraine and causing the Russian administration headaches.
I do not think the Russians will undertake this offensive at this time. They are currently winning in the East (if only marginally) and at the moment the momentum of the war is turning in their favour. They appear to be getting stronger while the Ukrainians appear to be weakening. Given this situation they will be reluctant to do anything risky that could turn momentum and morale against them. Better to pursue safer courses of action even if their gains are only small rather than give the Ukrainians a chance to have a big win and undo all of the positive momentum. As one analyst has said ‘Right now, the Ukrainians only hope of victory is through a Russian mistake.’ I think the Russians would assess that they need to avoid the possibility of a ‘mistake’ at all costs, so their up-coming offensive will be, I think, one that risks little.
If the Russians are successful in taking the East bank of the Dnieper. It will be after that when they will endeavour to launch this offensive, not now.
 

Offensive Three
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia straight at Kiev.

Rewards – Taking the capital of Ukraine.

Risks – Destroying the city which was the medieval capital of Russia for 600 years. A very difficult and costly fight through Ukraine’s largest city. Making enemies and warriors of many civilians who might not otherwise have been wanting to resist the Russian takeover.
Despite the great cost to achieve, it would not necessarily bring the war to an end even on the East bank of the Dniepr.

Conclusion – Not going to happen. My guess is that Putin does not want to see sustained fighting in Kiev. The initial attack on Kiev was conducted in the hope of scaring Ukraine into submission. Once it was clear that sustained fighting would be needed to take the city, Putin withdrew.
 

Offensive Four
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia along the East bank of the Dneipr River, taking Chernihiv, taking or encircling the Eastern suburbs of Kiev, pushing on along the Dneipr to meet up with another Russian army pushing north along the eastern bank of the Dniepr from Zhaprizhia or a Russian army pushing west toward the Dneipr from a starting point between Sumy and Kharkiv.

Rewards – Cutting off Eastern Ukraine from all supplies from the West which would mean any Ukrainian forces in the East would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. This offensive would also make Kiev a frontline town subject to artillery fire from the Russian forces. This would have a significant psychological impact on the Ukrainians. Also reducing the ability of their largest city to function productively and in all likelihood forcing a withdrawal of the central government to the West, probably to Lviv.
 
Risks – As with all salient attacks there is the risk of being cut off and encircled. An attack along the east bank of the Dneipr to Chernihiv was attempted at the beginning of the war and failed to take Chernihiv, so it is known that Chernihiv will not be easy to take. Making deep attacks from two or three directions requires a lot of manpower, firepower and logistics in an environment where mobile warfare has proven difficult, so far. Given all of this it is possible that these offensive thrusts will become stalled before meeting up. Offensive thrusts that fail to meet their goals will cause reputational/morale damage to the Russian army.
 
Conclusion – This strategy will be employed in parts. The pushing south along the east bank of the Dneipr will be held off for now but attempts to attack north from Zhaporizia along the Dneipr and West from between Kharkiv and Sumy will be made. If both, or even just one, of these attacks goes exceptionally well then a thrust from the north will eventually be made.
Part of the reason why I am confident the Zhaporizhia and Sumy/Kharkiv thrusts will be made is because these attacks have multiple success points. On the Zhaporizhia front if they just move the front forward a few kilometres; it is a success; if they take or encircle Eastern Zhaprizhia City – they have taken control of a vital Dneipr crossing; big success; if they make it all the way to Dnipro; they have blocked two key Dneipr crossings; outstanding success. From the border between Sumy and Kharkiv, if they simply take some Ukrainian territory then they have succeeded in creating a buffer zone along the border; success; if they push in 30 kilometres between Sumy and Kharkiv, then they have put themselves in a position to encirlcle either city or drive toward the Dneipr, thus putting the enemy in doubt and forcing them to divide their forces or leave one or more options open; big success; from there the outstanding success of encircling Kharkiv or Sumy or driving to the Dneipr is possible. If the later option is achieved then an attempt to meet that thrust with an army coming up from Zhaporizhia or down from Chernihiv would be a next step.
 
Ultimate Conclusion
So, I am predicting that if the war plays out in the Russian favour, but the Ukrainians continue to fight, then first we will see offensive four put into action and then after that offensive two. Of course, as outlined in the previous blog, I would see the partial implementation of Offensive Four being conducted in tandem with attempts to advance on all existing fronts in order to stretch Ukraine's strategic reserves to the maximum.
 

So, my predictions for the Russian offensive.
I need to preface this though by saying that I do not know the situation on the ground in Ukraine anywhere near as well as the Russian Military Commanders. There is much information before them that I do not have. My guesses are simply based on widely publicized information about the situation on the ground. They may suffer from a lack of critical information. That said, my predictions, based on my limited knowledge, are as follows: 

1. The Russians will attack in all new and existing frontlines simultaneously in order to exceed Ukraine’s ability to throw effective reserves at each attack, thereby giving the best opportunity that at least one direction of attack should make a breakthrough.
2. The main new front/axis of attack will be entering the Kharkiv region between Kupiansk and Vovchansk (the Donets River). They will push south hoping to envelop the Ukranian lines that are facing the Russians in Luhansk Oblast. They will be seeking to use the Siversky Donets river as a protection on their western flank while the eastern flank attacks the Ukrainian positions. The role of the Russian forces in Ukraine will be to pressure the Ukrainians from the East, but the main attack will come from the west. Any attack from the East will have to overcome well established defensive positions and then if they make it to the Oskil river the Ukrainians have prepared positions waiting to help them defend the West bank of this river. So, it will be much better to attack from the west, attacking the Ukrainian defenses from behind and then being able to use those self-same defenses to hold the Oskil river line against the Ukrainians trapped between its eastern bank and the Russian lines further east. Of course, the Ukrainians will know that this move could trap all of their forces on the Luhansk Front so they will do their best to stop the Russians on, or near, the northern border. I think, however, that this is the direction to which the Russians will devote their best resources. Why? Because destroying the Ukrainian Army is more important than taking large grabs of territory. If the Russians can destroy the Ukrainian Army then they can take as much territory as they wish. If they take a big grab of poorly defended territory but leave the Ukrainian Army largely intact then they risk having that territory and others removed from them later in the war. Destroying the Ukrainian Army will therefore be priority number one and the attack with the greatest potential to deal it a severe blow is the one outlined above, so I think the Russians will invest many forces into it despite its predictability. Also, if it does not come off then they can claim that they were just trying to create a buffer zone along the border as they have previously stated they would. So they can claim a sort of victory even if they only make it a few kilometres across the border.
3. The second area of focus will be the Donetsk Front. Here they will attack almost everywhere. If destroying the Ukrainian Army is the goal, here is where it is most concentrated. Liberating Donetsk though has long been a stated goal of ‘The Special Military Operation’ so politically any ground taken in Donetsk Oblast is a public relations win. Within the oblast, though, I do not think they are planning a frontal assault of Vulehdar. They have lost too many troops trying that previously. Vulehdar will definitely be a key target, but my thinking is that they will try to surround it by moving north from Pavlivka, Shevchenko and/or Novomaiorske to block its western flank and moving west from Solodke and Novomykhailivka to cut it off from the north. It also seems unlikely that they will attack Niu York and Toretsk directly as the contact line facing these two urban centres was first established in 2014 and has probably been built up over the years to be extremely difficult to fight through. It is far more likely that they will endeavour to take these areas by encirclement, pushing north from Avdivka and west from Bakmut/Artemovsk.
4. The third region of attack will be between Kharkhiv and Sumy. Such an attack, if it pushes deep could threaten either city with encirclement and so give the Russians options. If the Ukrainians look like they have Kharkhiv too well defended then the Russians can potentially swing north and grab Sumy. Naturally though, Kharkhiv, as Ukraine’s second largest city and former capital, would be the preferred target. If the attack does not make much ground, once again, the Russians will be able to claim that they were just intending to create a buffer zone along the northern section of the Kharkhiv border, so once again they will be able to claim victory with just a few kilometres captured.
5. Finally, the Zhaporizhia front will also be a direction of attack. The Russians will endeavour to dash forward from Robotyne to Orikhiv and will also attempt to drive up through Stepnohirsk to Zhaporizhia City. This attack is likely to be the least resourced and the least sustained. If the initial push succeeds, and a breakthrough is made, then the Russians may well send more resources to Zhaporizhia, but if the initial charge is unsuccessful then it is likely the Russians will be content to simply retake any land lost to the Ukrainian offensive and then sit on their hands. The reason being that they have established very strong defensive lines where they are and that as the next Ukrainian Offensive, if there is one, is likely to want to head through the land bridge to the sea, they might prefer to present the same tested and successful defenses rather pushing forward at great cost only to occupy less defensible positions when the expected assault comes and losing yet more troops as a result.

 
Northern Attack Routes
It seems unlikely at this stage that the Russians would also attack from the northern Ukrainian border in the next few months, so I will save analysis of these prospective invasion routes for a later blog.

I find it highly likely that before the Ukraine war is over the Poles will put troops on the ground. Historically, when The Ukraine and Belarus have not been Russian territory, then they have most likely been Polish territory. The Poles, naturally, would like to regain some of their 'lost' eastern lands. Consequently, the current conflict in Ukraine is far too good an opportunity for them to miss. Taking land requires deploying troops so expect to see the Poles on the ground in The Ukraine. Poland's recent orders of massive amounts of military equipment, including 1000 K2 tanks from Korea, indicate the line of their thinking.
Ideally, the Poles would hope to send their troops in with the consent of Ukrainians. Arriving as the saviours when the war had got to the point that Ukraine was on the verge of total defeat. Although self-interested, it would still be a brave move to stand face-to-face with the Russians, but the Poles do have an ace up their sleeve. They can offer the Russians a complete end to the war in return for dividing Ukrainian territory between them; afterall, even today, if Poland suddenly closed its border to any trans-shipment of armaments then the Ukraine War would be over. The Hungarians are already closed to arms shipments. Moldavia is blocked from shipping arms by the fact that its border with The Ukraine is controlled by the breakaway republic of Transniestria which is strongly pro-Russian, to the extent of having a Russian base on its soil. And the Romanians have only some small roads through the thick of the Carpathian mountains to use after the Russians destroyed the bridges on the lower Dniestr River. That leaves tiny Slovakia as their only significant import route and Slovakia's main opposition party is already campaigning against their involvement in the war.
And then, of course, the Poles might be able to win the backing of the USA for their move. That would constitute another huge Ace.
Apparently, the former Polish foreign minister has said that it has been discussed at high levels whether if Ukraine became a Polish 'Protectorate' it would be covered by Article 5 of the NATO constitution requiring all NATO members to come to its defense.
Of course, talk of Polish protectorates only makes sense if the Ukrainians are losing the war and badly. If Ukraine looks like being the eventual winner then look out for the Poles finding reasons to move into Belarus. Were Belarus to send troops into Ukraine the Poles might consider it enough of a justification for them to attack Belarus. The Belarussians may not be simply looking for excuses not to enter Ukraine when they tell the Russians they need their troops to guard their own borders with the West. Putin, too, might well be deliberately wanting to keep Belarus out of harm's way, in order not to give the Poles an excuse to get involved.
Indeed, the only outcome where I do not see Polish troops on the ground, is if something like the current stalemate continues, where Ukraine is still strong enough to defend itself, but the Russians are not destroyed either. If such a stalemate is quickly followed by a ceasefire agreement then the Poles might miss their chance. I use the word 'quickly' deliberately, because it seems unlikely that a stalemate could go on for many years, eventually one side or the other should gain the upper hand as they are too dis-similar in capabilities. So it seems likely that the Poles will get their chance and if the Americans and Ukrainians aren't willing to negotiate with the Russians, the Poles, I suspect will be happy to, as for them a negotiation over Ukraine will not be zero sum; but rather win: win.

The talk is that the Russians are about to launch an offensive. The question is, 'Where will it be?'
I am neither a military expert nor well-informed about the battlefield dispositions of either side, however, I am prepared to make a few predictions.
The offensive is about to happen ostensibly because the ground in The Ukraine is finally frozen hard enough to support tank movement. Therefore, one can deduce that the offensive will seek to use tanks and that the time period of the offensive, with a duration determined by the vagaries of the weather, could well be very short. That the Russians might be desiring to use their tanks to maximum effect is also suggested by the fact that we know the West has promised to send a considerable number of tanks to The Ukraine before the summer offensive season (When the ground is once again hard enough not to bog the heavy tanks) so the Russians are likely to want to attempt mobile tank warfare now before all those new tanks arrive to bolster the Ukrainian's mobile warfare capabilities. Given these preconditions we are looking for an area of the frontline where mobile tank warfare is most useful and where something meaningful can be achieved in a time period which might be as short as two weeks. By deduction this suggests that the Russians are probably going to attack on the Luhansk Front. The Donetsk Front is still in many places the same frontline as has been the border between The Donbas and Ukraine for the last six to seven years. It is deeply entrenched, heavily fortified, and frequently urban and not at all ideal for mobile tank warfare. The Zhaporizhia Front is open terrain which has fortifications and trenches only dating from May, which means they are not likely to be as comprehensive as on the Donetsk Front. The Zhaporizhia Front is a possible tank attack site, but the Luhansk Front is preferable as it too is open terrain, with a Frontline only established in September and which appears to be far less fortified and entrenched than the Zhaporizhia Front to judge by the constant reports of relatively mobile warfare that has gone on along that front since September. Additionally, on the Luhansk Front the Russians would not have to push the Ukrainians back very far to push them entirely out of Luhansk Oblast and into Kharkhiv Oblast so the politically significant claim of 'liberating' all of Luhansk Oblast would be able to be made as soon as that was done. Furthermore, just outside the borders of Luhansk Oblast flows the Oskil River, which runs from north to south in a relatively straight line (unlike the very meandering Siversky Donets River) and would make an ideal defensive line to anchor on while offensive action moved elsewhere. Given all of these factors I am predicting that 'liberating' or 'occupying' the entireity of Luhansk Oblast will be the minimum objective of the Russian's winter offensive and that if they fail to achieve even that much then their offensive would likely be deemed a failure.

Why Bhakmut and Vuhledar?
There has been much questioning in the mainstream Western media about why the Russians are trying so hard to capture Bhakmut. I would say that for the context of the war, as it is currently poised, Bhakmut is very strategically located. The Donetsk Front as I have stated above is an old frontline that is extremely heavily fortified and entrenched. Frontal assaults all along this front are likely to be extremely costly in terms of lives lost and success will only get you to the next line of fortifications. Consequently, ideally, the Russians would like to 'outflank' these fortifications and come at them from behind. Bhakmut guards the northern flank of this frontline. If they take Bhakmut they can then push South-West cutting off frontline urban strongholds like Toretsk from behind. Bhakmut also has the advantage of being on the road to the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk further to the North-West, so an element of doubt is introduced about in which direction the Russians are heading from Bhakmut as Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are the largest cities remaining in Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast and are also significant prizes that they will need to protect. My guess is that if the Russians take Bhakmut while the ground is still hard enough to support tanks then they will swing south and try to cut off all of those frontline, fortified, urban areas while they can. They can perform the slow attritional war of street-to-street fighting in cities like Kramatorsk when the fields are muddy.
Vuhledar, similarly, is the first fortress on the way to outflanking the fortified Ukrainian frontline from the south. This is why the Russians have risked and lost so many troops trying to take this small village.

So much for the plans of sweeping tactical gains thought up while pouring over the maps in the military head quarters.
While they are hoping that these plans come off, it is likely that the Russians will employ a simpler strategy that they know they can execute. One of, while they have the men in reserve, increasing the pressure all along the frontline, and if they find a weak point, throwing everything at it in the attempt to make a break-through.

It would seem to me that if Russia is intending to install its own government in Ukraine then the man they would choose to lead it would ideally be Viktor Yanucovich. Viktor Yanukovich is the democratically elected leader of Ukraine who was ousted in a coup in 2014. He has been living in Russia ever since. If he is the man that they put in charge of whatever is left of Ukraine at the end of this war, then it would allow the Russians to undercut all of the criticisms that have been leveled at them in terms of an 'unprovoked attack'. If they can claim that they are restoring a democratically elected leader then it would certainly give their invasion legitimacy in many eyes.
The greatest problem with this strategy, however, may well be Viktor Yanukovich himself, I have no knowledge of whether he would agree to be re-installed as President of the Ukraine. Particularly, if it is over a partitioned Ukraine. I believe he has previously spoken of trying to get Russia to return The Crimea, so he may not be willing to go along with what may be Putin's current plans for the Ukraine.
Further evidence that the re-installation of Yanukovich is unlikely is the fact that we have not heard Russia saying that this is what it is doing. This might, however, be because they wanted to keep their real intentions unknown to this point, or it could be that Putin is waiting to see how well his invasion goes before choosing his end goal and he is not yet sure that he will choose the one in which Yanukovich would be helpful.

Some Carrots in the Pot.
There were many notable things about Putin's speech yesterday (Australian East Coast Time) which ended in his recognition of the independence of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk(see attached link www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrGLhhTtxFU). One of the things which struck me though is that when he spoke about how the Bolsheviks, when they created the Soviet state of Ukraine, were too generous with its borders, he not only says that 'historically Russian lands' were given to it, but also that 'historically Hungarian' and historically Polish' lands were also given to it. Such an admission leaves the door open to future negotiations with Hungary and Poland about a future carve-up of current Ukrainian territory. Indeed, I would guess that the Hungarians have long had their eye on just such a redrawing of their border with Ukraine and their pro-Russian attitudes over recent years have been, at least in part, a preparing of the ground for just such a negotiation, where they barter their support for Russian moves into Ukraine in return for a renegotiation of their border with The Ukraine, in the event that Russia does come to control it. Given that the Hungarian speaking section of Ukraine is only a small sliver of territory immediately adjacent to the current border and on the western side of the Carpathian mountains it would seem to be an exchange that Putin may well be willing to contemplate.

Hungary is already in the Russian camp. Poland, however, is completely another matter. Poland has led the European resistance to Russian actions in The Ukraine and they have been The Ukraine's strongest supporter. They have also done their best to pull Belarus away from its links to Russia, and they have worked to block Russian influence in Lithuania and increase their own.

This advocacy is not entirely based on a fear of Russia, as some claim. Poland also has an historical claim on all of these states having ruled them during the 15th and 16th centuries. As well as during a brief period in the 20th century, between the world wars.  Poland is a true historical competitor to Russia in these territories and as such it would seem unlikely that their hostility to Russia could be altered. However, Putin's recent reference to 'historically Polish lands' suggests that he might be amenable to giving some of Ukraine 'back' to Poland, if he gained control of it, and that thought will now be firmly lodged in the back of many Polish nationalists minds. Perhaps in the future, Polish resistance to the Russian occupation of The Ukraine might be turned to support by the negotiated return of some 'historically Polish lands'. And I am sure, if such negotiations ever did take place then Poland's leaving NATO and signing a security treaty with Russia would also be on the table.

Putin's potential undermining of NATO did not stop there, however, at the same time as talking about Polish lands being given to Ukraine he also spoke of 'historically German lands' being given to Poland. What if Putin told Poland that he would give them their 'historical lands' only if they agreed to give half as much land area back to Germany. Would this be enough to lure an already wobbly Germany out of NATO?

Putin's speech has already shaken Europe for reasons not mentioned here. However, Putin chooses his words carefully, and various nationalist leaders in Hungary, Poland and Germany will have heard the suggestion that some of their dearly held goals might be achieved through an alliance with Russia.

Over the past several months, Putin has been gathering his ingredients. Today he threw in the salt. Now he will slowly bring the pot to the boil.

​This may not be a very professional sounding analysis, but it is what is in my mind.

So, in my last hurried post I said I would explain my reasoning for why I think Putin will go into Ukraine. I have left it late enough, so I had better explain myself now before events overtake the need for any prediction.
Now, I am by no means a military expert, so my predictions are based on political calculations rather than any specialised knowledge of troop deployments and such like.
So, some reasons why I think Putin will go into The Ukraine:
Firstly, it is not primarily about NATO. If his stated demands were met, Putin would probably be happy and might put off the invasion for now, but I think that primarily his goal in going into The Ukraine would be the hope of reuniting the Russians. Putin considers Ukrainians to be Russians. Kiev was the capital of the first Russian state. Most of the Ukraine has been part of Russia for hundreds of years and the only reason it was part of a different state to Russia under the Soviet Union, in Putin's thinking, I presume, was because the Russians wanted to make the Soviet Union look like it was an International Union rather than just a Greater Russia, so they generously gave a bit of Russian territory to create some states like Belarus, which had never previously existed and The Ukraine, which had only existed when the Nazi's had control of the territory. The Russians had thought that Belarus and The Ukraine would always be under the control of the Soviet Politburo so there was no problem with calling these regions independent states. They had never imagined that their creations might actually become independent !! They even added the Crimea to The Ukraine in 1954. Thinking like this you can see that Putin, a strong nationalist, might want to correct the 'geopolitical tragedy' of the collapse of the Soviet Union and bring at least these, formerly Russian, states back into Russia. In Belarus it appears Putin has achieved this aim relatively peacefully (There is a 'Union State' agreement by which Russia and Belarus  are essentially merging). He must have thought he was on the way to achieving the same with the Ukraine when Viktor Yanukovych was elected President. He was hoping to get The Crimea back into Russia even more quickly with Yanukovych scheduling a referendum to be held in Crimea in 2014 to let the Crimea decide between the Ukraine, Russia and Independence. When Yanukovych was undemocratically overthrown Putin's strategy for peacefully reintegrating The Ukraine took a significant hit, though, I would assume. 
So, Putin's sense of grievance over The Ukraine is pretty strong. He believes The West underhandedly stole The Ukraine away from him by overthrowing a democratically elected President. He would also see an invasion as a noble effort to reunite his people. So his motivations to take control of the Ukraine are far stronger than some concerns about an aggressive foreign alliance structure. Geo-strategically there is a lot to gain as well, many analysts talk about Russia's declining population, extremely long borders, and open, easy-to-invade geography. Adding the Ukraine to Russia would add 40 plus million people while shortening their border and putting that border on an easily defensible mountain chain.
So, Putin has a lot to gain from bringing Ukraine back into the Russian fold. Not to mention, entry into the pantheon of Russian greats, if he pulls it off. And the greater the gain; the greater the risk one is willing to take to obtain it.

So, why now? Why during this particular standoff?
Well:

• Given that the West has started arming Ukraine, if he backs off now he will have incurred a price for his build up of troops (the better arming of Ukraine and the uniting of NATO) without having achieved any gain. Given that a price has already been paid Putin will not want to walk away.
• If Putin waits till next year Ukraine will only be better armed
• Right now, many European countries have a large dependency on Russian gas and oil and so are not very motivated to stop trading with Russia. In a year's time these countries might have diversified their economies away from Russian commodities.
• Right now, many in the American administration see China as America's biggest concern and so their attention is divided. In a year's time, China might have been laid low by a financial crises, causing the US administration to start rating Russia as their strongest competitor.
• Given that the US has at no point said they will help defend Ukraine militarily, the one card that might really dissuade Putin has not been played.

Given all of the above, it is my prediction that Putin will act rather than back down.
One way or the other, we will soon know.

Well, this blog is meant to be about geopolitical predictions, so here is a big one:
Russia will go into The Ukraine again and this time they will go in big.
Why big?
Because the international reaction to them taking the rest of Donbas would be the same as if they invaded the entire country. So if they go in they should go in for everything they want.
In addition, the more audacious their gambit, the stronger the impression they will make on their neighbors and the world.
Why would they go in at all?
I will have to save my reasoning for a later post.

Many news reports are saying that there are more than 100,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border. Some news reports are saying around 90,000.

So, does this mean an invasion of The Ukraine is imminent?

I would say: certainly not. The Russians are positioning themselves to take advantage of possible opportunities. Russian troops moving into the Ukraine, en masse, is certainly more likely than it was a year ago, but it may not come in the form of an invasion and will not happen at all unless global and local conditions present a compelling opportunity.

First: The Why?
Why would Russia want to take possession of The Ukraine?

Because in many Russian minds, and almost certainly in Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s mind, The Ukraine is Russian territory. The very first historical mentions of a Russian people and state come from tales of the ‘Kievan Rus’. Kiev was the first capital of the Russians. Today, Kiev is the capital of The Ukraine. Many Russian’s don’t see The Ukraine as just a lost province; they see it as their historical heartland. They strongly desire to see The Ukraine re-united with the rest of Russia.

Second: The Why Now?
Why is it far more likely that the Russians might make a play for taking back The Ukraine now, rather than a year ago?

Because they have finished the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which means that they can now pump natural gas direct to Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Previously, their gas, which provides an enormous income stream, had to pass through The Ukraine to reach Western Europe. So, naturally, the fear was that any aggressive moves toward The Ukraine could see the Ukrainians shut down the gas pipelines and hamstring the Russian economy from the very beginning of the war. Now, the Ukrainians can no longer play this card. So, the price the Russians would have to pay for aggression against The Ukraine has been substantially lowered. Not only that, but the Russians now have leverage over many of the European nations who might otherwise have supported The Ukraine against Russia. Now, the Germans, for example, know that if they support The Ukraine against Russia, they risk losing the natural gas upon which their economy currently depends. Previously, the Germans would have lost the gas immediately that the war started so the Russians could not have used the restriction of supply as a threat to keep them out of the conflict.

So, the Russians are highly motivated to regain The Ukraine and they have already created infrastructure and political levers that would significantly lower the expected cost of an invasion of The Ukraine. So why wouldn’t they go ahead and invade?

The main reason why the Russians would limit military actions against The Ukraine as much as possible is precisely because they see themselves as the one people. They would like to re-unify the country peacefully if they can. Many think that the Ukrainian identity is weak and does not have deep historical roots for many Ukrainian citizens, they hope that a well-managed crisis might bring many Ukrainian citizens around to wanting to re-integrate with Russia. President Putin is also surely aware that a brutal invasion may well be something which could inspire a stronger sense of Ukrainian identity than that which already exists. To draw an historical example, one might say that the inhabitants of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor had no strong sense of a national identity at the time when the Portuguese abandoned that colony, however, after a brutal Indonesian invasion, the East Timorese identity became extremely strong.
So, the Russians are hoping that The Ukraine will soon find itself in such economic or governmental difficulties that a re-unification with ‘Greater Russia’ will be welcomed by the populace. Of course, now that the Ukrainian government can no longer stop them exporting gas to Western Europe the Russians are able to tighten the economic screws on The Ukraine in a way they never have before. They have already banned exports of coal to The Ukraine, it remains to be seen if they are going to shut off the oil and gas as well this winter. There are various ways that the Russians can manipulate circumstances within The Ukraine to try and bring on a crisis. It is not the purpose of this article to try to detail them all. What I would like to emphasize, however, is that there are some potential global events which Russia might be watching or even waiting for.
Imagine, for example, that China began implementing its plans to take control of Taiwan. Such activity, whether it be a blockade or a military assault, would likely take a great deal of American attention. Would that not present a perfect opportunity for an old-fashioned military invasion of The Ukraine? Is it not possible that there might not already be a deal between China and Russia such that if China begins an attack on Taiwan then Russia should attack The Ukraine, to divide the attention and resources of America and its allies? Certainly, such a deal would make perfect sense. Indeed, the deal might even go the other way. It might read that ‘if Russia attacks The Ukraine then China should begin its attack on Taiwan.
Remember, such attacks would not be seen by either country as an act of aggression against a sovereign state. China would see an attack on Taiwan as simply the final chapter in a long-running civil war. Certainly, that civil war has been cold for many decades now, but, nonetheless, Taiwan is the last holdout of the Chinese Communist Party’s opponents in the battle to control China. Taking control of Taiwan would be for them an act of national reunification. For the Russians, with The Ukraine, it is the same. They too would see an invasion of The Ukraine as an attempt to reunify their country. Both Russia and China are very conscious, however, that the USA and the West would represent their actions differently and are worried about what they would do against them. Seen from this vantage point it would seem strange if there is not a deal between these two countries to co-ordinate their attacks on Taiwan and The Ukraine.

So ...

Right now, the Russians are in a strong position to move on The Ukraine; they have removed their economic vulnerability; global fossil fuel prices are high, boosting their economic strength and making their customers less likely to want to seek other suppliers; they have a strong leader with good domestic support and the US administration is focused on China and domestic discord and the American people are tired of foreign engagements. If an opportunity appears, the Russians may well move on The Ukraine.

However ...

For the Chinese, the current moment does not appear so compelling. The US is watching them closely and they do not want to get into a hot war with the Americans. However, their hand might be forced. My feeling is that the Chinese will continue to keep trading with the US for as long as they can, and the American administration will go along with this for as long as it can too. However, American domestic opinion might eventually force the administration to cease engagement with China. Just on the 2nd of December, 2021, the World Tennis Association has ceased any engagement with China over the Peng Shuai affair. One can imagine that outrage over what is reportedly happening in Sinkiang (Xinxiang) might shortly follow. At some point trade between China and The West might come to an abrupt halt and at that point China might feel it has much less to lose by attacking Taiwan. Indeed, attacking Taiwan might become a necessary, even the only, face-saving move left to a Chinese leader who is faced with the West’s anti-Chinese actions.

So, if Russia chose to make moves on The Ukraine this winter, it is quite likely that Chinese would not act on Taiwan but rather choose to wait till their own circumstances were more compelling. However, if China does move on Taiwan this northern winter then I think it very likely that Russia would initiate some actions against the sovereignty of The Ukraine.
 
Summary:
Russia is presently very well set up to intervene in The Ukraine, more so than at any period since The Ukraine Crisis began back in 2013-2014 with the toppling of a democratically elected pro-Russian government. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has made Russia far less vulnerable to Ukrainian economic retaliation and simultaneously given the Russians more economic control of several Western European countries (most significantly, Germany). Consequently, the Russians are far more likely to intervene in the Ukraine than they have been previously, and they have stationed their military in a manner that would allow them to intervene very quickly should an opportunity arise. The Russians are probably working to manufacture such an opportunity, with moves like banning coal exports to The Ukraine, but other opportunities could arise without their meddling, an example of such being a Chinese play for Taiwan. Other opportunities, though, can be imagined, such as a poor response to the pandemic within The Ukraine causing  economic or administrative failure. Despite their strong position a Russian invasion is not a given, however, as the Russians would like to avoid alienating the majority of Ukrainians. They would prefer to intervene in the country in a situation where their intervention would be welcomed by, at least, a significant number of Ukrainians. However, if something like an invasion of Taiwan was begun by the Chinese the Russians may well think that the international circumstances were so favorable that they should take advantage of the situations and launch an invasion of The Ukraine regardless.
​Such are the precarious circumstances in which we find ourselves at the moment.

I have not been watching the world for a while. Having been buried in my own personal projects, family and occupation I only now put my head up and look around at the world.
So what do I see?

1. I see that oil prices are high and have been that way for a while.
2. I see that Turkey, is finally flexing its military muscles and is slowly, carefully and quietly conquering parts of northern Syria.
3. I see that there are moves being made within Saudi Arabia to purge any possible sources of opposition to the king and the crown prince.
4. I see that neither the EU nor the Eurozone have collapsed, but the governments and politicians that oppose it seem to be gaining influence not losing it.
5. I see that President Xi of China is gathering enormous powers to himself.
6. I see that Donald Trump is meeting the President of North Korea in Singapore.
7. I see that Russia is hosting a World Cup, a bare four years after hosting a Winter Olympics

So what do I make of it all?

1. That with the rebound in oil prices Russia and Saudi Arabia are doing much better than many expected two years ago.
2. With Turkey moving into Arab territory there is an extra incentive for Arabs to unify and that there will be support for a strong Arab leader if one emerges.
3. Saudi Arabia could be strengthening itself internally in preparation for taking on a more aggressive role in its region.
4. The EU is already fraying politically. There is no need for it to disappear; countries can just stop doing what it says and it will simply become less and less important. Hungary and Poland are already flouting its directives, and they are flouting their flouting. The Eurozone can’t simply fade away. It will either continue to function more-or-less as-is or countries will leave it. I think some countries will eventually choose to leave.
5. The fact that 6. Is occurring despite 5. Suggests that Xi is extremely concerned by China’s relative strength vis-à-vis USA and is willing to be very nice to the USA and help them with North Korea so as to dissuade the USA from totally devastating the Chinese economy as they could do if they launched a trade war.
6. I see the American President’s meeting with the North Korean President as more of a reflection of the state of mind of the Chinese President than anything else.
7. Having weathered western sanctions and now showing an expected budget surplus for this year, Russia will be able to use the World Cup to show the world that reports of its imminent demise were vastly premature.

Extra observations:
The USA has recently started taking steps to act in its own economic interests and despite some bad press has found the process less politically painful than many expected. As their first small steps succeed, their appetite for putting America first will probably increase.
It has become clear to me that Russia has probably offered the US a grand bargain/threat on Ukraine, which would run something like ‘Ukraine stays out of NATO and the EU and you stay out of Ukraine or we let the tanks role.’ The Donbas Republics are key to this strategy because if Ukraine joined NATO and Russia attacked then all of NATO would be duty bound to go to war with Russia – and they probably would in the case of such a clear attack. If, however, Ukraine joined NATO and then the Donbas Republics suddenly had some extremely successful offensive thrusts in their on-going civil war, then technically no NATO members would be ‘duty bound’ to intervene. This would explain why so little has been done for Ukraine by the West since its ouster of the pro-Russian government.

The Twentieth Century was a Slavic century
The Slavs won the last two world wars and their tide is still rising.
 
I love historical maps. If you look at a series of historical maps over a period of a thousand or even thousands of years you can see the rise and fall of nations and empires simply by viewing the changes in the territory they control. If you apply this very simple analysis to maps that are both pre- and post- both of the world wars you will see that the Slavic people were very clearly the winners of both. Prior to the First World War much of Central and Eastern Europe was controlled by two large German run empires, the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. By the end of the war the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been replaced by the Slav controlled states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland (plus Austria and Hungary) and the German Empire had also ceded some territory to the newly recreated Poland. By the end of the Second World War Poland had taken over even more, formerly German, territory.
In future centuries I have no doubt that some historians looking back will say that in Europe the story of the 20th century was the story of the Slavs. They were the people whose power was steadily growing through the century. And if you think ‘Well the maps are misleading, the Slavs were just the accidental beneficiaries of historical circumstance,’ then I would draw your attention to the Russian revolution; the event whose intellectual, philosophical, and political repercussions virtually shaped the history of every other nation of the world through the rest of that century. Need I point out that the Russian revolution took place in a Slavic state.
Indeed, the true accidental beneficiaries of history in the 20th century are the Americans and the Anglosphere. They have leapt forward while the ‘Great Tussle’ was going on elsewhere. And the great tussle of the twentieth century, by the way, was not between the Soviet Union and the USA so much as it was between the Slavic and Germanic peoples.
The Slavic territorial advances of the twentieth century were just the most recent chapters in a struggle that had been going on for centuries. The Slavs were the dominant people of Eastern and Central Europe by the 6th century AD having spread west in the wake of the westward moving Germans, but the German’s made many attempts to push back to the East over the intervening centuries. Charlemagne’s campaigns are one famous early example; and the activities of the Teutonic knights form another. In general, though, the Germans were not able to shift the Slavs from the territory they had settled on, although with the advantages of their more advanced civilisation they often did come to control them. Hence, the appearance of so many Slavic states in place of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War was not on account of a sudden mass migration of Slavs into the area, but rather a removal of German overlordship from a population that was already Slavic. The humiliated Germans pushed back again after their losses in the First World War. They managed to gain control of a great deal of the German inhabited regions of Czechoslovakia and then launched the invasion of Poland which precipitated the Second World War. Eventually, though, they were repelled and lost even more territory to the Slavs. The end of the Second World War also included the removal of large ethnic German populations from many regions of both Poland and Czechoslovakia thus increasing the proportion of Europe inhabited by Slavs. During the Cold War, Slavic control extended even further than their settled populations with the virtual Russian control of East Germany marking the historical high point of Slavic power within Europe for the last 800 years. Since then, with the reunification of Germany, Slavic control has receded, although Slav inhabited territory has not.
Not only were the most significant territorial wars of the Twentieth Century conducted between Germans and Slavs, one might even say that all of the intellectual running in the twentieth century was carried on between Russia and Germany as well. Marx, after all was a German, so the German’s also have a claim to originating that great intellectual tussle of the Twentieth Century: the foment around the ideas of communism.
 
 
As Germany has this century resurfaced as the most powerful economy in Europe and Russia is struggling to deal with American hostility and low oil prices what makes you think Slavic power will trend up rather than down in the near future?
 
It is important to remember that Slavic power is not synonymous with Russian power. There are other Slavic countries in Europe, and it is in their policies that I see the source of their continuing rise. It is generally known that many Slavic countries have done well since the end of the Cold War. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia stand out as having become countries with a good standard of living and education. The largest of these, Poland, has even become very significant politically and is charting its own independent course between the major regional powers of Germany, Russia and the USA. The Slavic countries, led by Poland, can already be seen to have the self-confidence to stand up to the European Union. Their refusal to accept hordes of refugees from very different cultures is a prime example of this. For many of these nations, having only recently gained control of a sovereign country for their people they are understandably reluctant to share it with others. In most cases these countries have a degree of cultural homogeneity that the Western European countries have already lost. That homogeneity therefore is a point of difference with the West and one that the Eastern European countries could well benefit from. Cultural homogeneity makes nation building a much easier task and with national pride comes a willingness to make sacrifices for the benefit of the country. Such national feeling has in the past made certain nations more formidable in war than other countries, it also leads to stronger community feelings between individuals with all of the intendant, though difficult to quantify, benefits which that entails. 
As an example of the benefits of strong nationalism, the Russia of today can be used. Russia appears to be surviving sanctions and economic difficulties with very little political unrest, and this appears to be the result of the peoples’ gratitude for what the Putin led government has done for Russia and Russian pride since the beginning of the century.
So, their attachment to nationalism, though it may well cause frictions and even war in some areas will, I think, be of overall benefit to Eastern Europe in the years ahead.
 
Another element of growing Slavic power will be their continuance of their westward push. The Slavs have been gradually pushing west for centuries and I see the hordes of Slav workers who poured into Britain and other Western countries at the start of this century as a continuation of the same trend. Consequently, politicians in Britain, France and Germany know that they have to consider the views of significant Polish minorities while politicians in Warsaw have no such concerns. Overall, this increases the relative power of the Slavic populations in Europe.
 
The downfall of Russia should also not be taken as a downfall of Slavic power. I am not at all convinced that Russia is about to deteriorate from its present position, but even if it did most of the likely beneficiaries of such an event would be Slavic states. And, in the event, they would probably be Slavic states with a great deal of support from the United States behind them. If one thinks about the reconstruction of Japan and Western Germany after the Second World War; a Poland or Ukraine with such backing could quickly become very influential.
 
Climate change is also a phenomenon which appears to be working in favour of the Slavs.
If the Earth is warming, and the North Pole is warming at the fastest rate, then this could significantly improve agricultural yields in Russia and increase the percentage of land where human habitation is viable. As Russia has more land above the Arctic Circle, and immediately adjacent to it, than any other country; it is the country, of all the countries on Earth, which stands to gain the most from a warmer climate. Less ice in the Arctic Ocean could also open up Russia’s northern coast to more maritime trade making that coast more economically productive, and militarily strategic, as well.
Poland too stands to benefit from a warming Northern Hemisphere. With a coastline on the Baltic, a sea which often freezes over in winter, Poland could gain all-year round maritime access and even an increased beach-tourism industry, not to mention longer growing seasons for its already fertile plains.
 
In conclusion
I feel that the facts on the ground indicate that the Slavs are quietly improving their position in Europe while the West is concerning itself with other matters. The presence of large numbers of Slavs in many of Western Europe’s major cities, where not so long ago they were almost non-existent, is an indicator of their growing influence. In similar vein, the fact that Slavs are now noticeable as tourists in places like Australia and South-East Asia also speaks to the fact that incomes and living standards in their home countries are improving to positions where they are comparable with Western countries. The evidence of the map is also telling, in that it shows that Slavic governments control a greater portion of Europe than at any time (with the exception of the Cold War period) since the 11th century. The map also shows that Russia is the biggest country in the world and has increased in size recently with the addition of Crimea. There is talk of the possibility of Russia losing territory in Europe in the next decade, but even if this were to occur, the beneficiaries of such a collapse would most likely be other Slavic states. Global warming is of geo-strategic benefit to the Slavs, as well.
Lastly, the fact that large numbers of Slavic migrants are settling in Western Europe, yet the Slavic nations keep their own countries migrant free and culturally homogeneous suggests that Slavs will have a voice amongst the many divergent cultures in Western countries in the future whilst those countries will have no voice in the culturally harmonious Slav homelands. All these trends suggest to me that Slavic influence and power in Europe is set to increase in the coming decade, rather than the reverse.
 
Before leaving off …
I would also like to point out that almost everything that has been said here about the Slavic countries, applies as well to most other non-Slav countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania do, for the most part, possess the same advantages and attitudes as their Slavic neighbours and they therefore have the potential to benefit in the same way. Indeed, the similarity in their attitude to nationalism has led the governments of Hungary and Poland to become virtual brothers-in-arms on certain issues within the European Union, and they, along with Putin’s Russia, are now looked to as examples of how countries should be run by many nationalist groups throughout the West and the rest of the world; a clarifying example of how these countries are already gaining influence in the world while the attention of the West’s governments remains focused elsewhere.

The US Congress has just increased sanctions on Russia by overwhelming majorities in both the House of Representatives (419-3) and the Senate (98-2). On the face of it these sanctions may just seem like a patriotic backlash against the Russian for interfering, or trying to interfere in the US election. And for some congressmen that may indeed be the primary motivation for voting for them. The instigators of this bill for new sanctions though had more on their minds than anything related to the last election. The primary target of these sanctions is the Nord Stream 2 project. Nord Stream 2 would see a pipeline laid under the Baltic Sea which would be large enough to supply northern Europe with all of the Russian gas which currently gets to northern Europe via pipelines through Ukraine. The drafters of this new sanctions bill are worried that if Nord Stream 2 is built then Russia will be able to turn off the gas to Ukraine without having to lose its business in northern Europe. This naturally would massively increase Russia’s ability to influence events in Ukraine and possibly even inspire a popular revolt against its current pro-western government (freezing through a couple of Ukrainian winters without heating might just convince a majority of Ukrainians that their government’s anti-Russian stance was not in their own personal interests). Alternately, if peaceful pressure did not suffice then with Nord Stream 2 operating, Russia would also be able to heat up the Donbas conflict and intervene militarily in the Ukraine without jeopardising its main source of foreign income. Given these possibilities it is no surprise that certain segments of the US administration are worried about Nord Stream 2. For sure they want to stop it, so these sanctions cleverly target companies who would do business with Russian energy companies. The US legislators are hoping to stop Nord Stream 2 from the German end by applying pain to any company that would work with the Russians to make Nord Stream 2 a reality. It is a clever strategy and we wait to see if it will work. The Russians have offered the criticism that the US is just trying to drive European nations toward more expensive American energy suppliers. It is a valid point that American companies will be winners if these sanctions have their desired effect. And surely many Europeans are aware that if in addition to making the Russians poorer these sanctions make Europe less energy secure and more dependent on the Americans then that will be just another reason why they will be thought a good idea by some American strategists.
We now wait to see if the sanctions will have their desired effect upon the Nord Stream 2 project. Several factions within Germany clearly don’t like this use of American power to interfere with their own energy security. The German foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, has spoken out against the sanctions bill. What Angela Merkel will say and do we have yet to see.
It is possible that rather than stopping Nord Stream 2 these sanctions might inspire a backlash of their own which will see the Germans choose Russia over the US in this case. The bill’s drafters would argue that without the sanctions the Germans would have agreed to Nord Stream 2 anyway. So at least the sanctions will make them think twice and then reveal how deep their alignment with the US really is.
Coming on the back of Trump’s visit to Europe recently convincing Angela Merkel that Germany needed to provide for its own defence it might look like there is currently a concerted US campaign to push the Germans away from them. If there is though it is interesting to note that the sanctions bill did not originate with the president’s team and it is probable that he personally would not favour it. Given its overwhelming support however it is hard to see President Trump not signing the bill (though he could use the excuse that he does not want to antagonise the US’s valued ally, Germany).
If, in the end, President Trump does sign the bill it will make an interesting example of how the US can be governed (and I mean quite literally governed; eg: ruled/administered) by forces outside the Presidency. Whether those forces will succeed in inserting a wedge between Russia and Germany or will in fact push them closer together is something that we will watch with close attention. Either way, it is safe to say, that the latest sanctions bill illuminates certain aspects of both US foreign policy and the functioning of the US administration at this point in time, and the response to it could illuminate even more about the state of international relations within Europe

In the conflict between Russia and the US the next big play to look out for will take place in the Caucuses, that little band of mountainous countries that lie between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

On the 2nd of April, amidst heavy fighting, Azerbaijan suddenly seized some of the territory formerly held by Armenians in the long frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. This outbreak of violence between these two small countries should set alarm bells ringing for anyone who is watching the greater conflict between Russia and The West.
Ever since the US and Russia fell out over Ukraine, The West has been trying to damage Russia's economy and a key component of this has been trying to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas and oil. One arm of this effort has involved trying to locate an alternative source for oil and gas pipelines into Europe, and the new source which was found was Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has large reserves of cheaply acquirable oil and gas and is close enough to Europe to make pipelines to Europe feasible. Even better, Azerbaijan was formerly part of the Soviet Union, so if The West could draw it into its alliance it would be another thorn in the side of Russia.
Naturally, Russia has an interest in seeing that The West does not succeed in its aims.
Azerbaijan already has some pipelines running to the west. They pass through Georgia, another former member of the Soviet Union that has been drawn to The West. Russia no longer controls Georgia, but they do have troops in the breakaway region of South Ossetia whose territory points like a dagger from the north into the heart of the Georgian state. The southern border of South Ossetia lies not far from where the oil and gas pipelines run. Recently the border posts on the southern border of South Ossetia moved further south, effectively adding extra territory to South Ossetia and bringing the border so close to the oil and gas pipelines that they could now be easily shelled by artillery stationed in South Ossetian territory. Obviously, a cynical observer might conclude that this border shifting is part of a move by Russia and its ally to exert influence over Azerbaijan's ability to export its hydrocarbons to Europe. Specifically it lets the Europeans know that Russia has the ability to stop those pipelines at any moment by having the South Ossetians reignite their frozen conflict with the Georgian state.
That is all well and good for Russia, but pipelines can be moved further south. It would be much better for Russia if it could actually exert enough influence in its former satellites to control the flow of Azerbaijani hydrocarbons entirely. 

Russia has the military might to invade either of its two tiny neighbours Georgia or Azerbaijan, but Russia's reputation in the world would be damaged if it invaded a neighbour for purely economic/geopolitical reasons. Really, Russia would need a more acceptable reason before it could send its troops into a neighbour.
But wouldn't it be good fortune for Russia if such a reason did suddenly appear?

If warfare broke out between Azerbaijan and Russia's strategic ally Armenia then that would constitute a viable reason for Russia to intervene in Azerbaijan.  Who could blame Russia for defending her ally, particularly if Azerbaijan was the country to attack first?

So now we have a situation which has suddenly arisen where Azerbaijan has seized some territory from Armenian forces, what will happen now?
Will the conflict escalate and lead to Russia regaining control of its hydrocarbon rich former satellite by military means?
Or will a more subtle game be played where Russia achieves its control over Azerbaijan's hydrocarbons by threats and promises or is even defeated in securing its interests by a combination of other players and its own weaknesses? Or will nothing much happen, allowing things to go back to the status quo which existed before the attack?

Indicators that the Russians have been manouvering to make a play in the Caucuses:
One might say the Russians won't attack the Azerbaijanis; on the contrary the Russians have been particularly friendly to the Azerbaijani's of late. I would reply to this that one way for the Russians to get the Azerbaijanis to make the error of attacking Armenia is to let them think that the Russians were now better friends with them than the Armenians. One could reference the good relations between Iraq and the US which are said to have encouraged Saddam Hussein into thinking that the Americans would not defend Kuwait if he invaded it.

I would also point out that until 2nd April one might have been wondering why the Russians had decided to suddenly draw down in Syria, when everything was going so well for them there. They were leading their side to victory and making the United States appear ineffectual. One might also have wondered why they did not make greater overtures to the Kurds who would have seemed their natural allies.

Well here we have a good answer to both questions.
The Russians may have decided to start withdrawing from Syria so that they would be ready to focus their forces on Azerbaijan if needed. And they may not have played the Kurdish card in Syria because they wanted to keep it in reserve as a threat against Turkey to keep them from coming to the defence of their ethnic cousins in Azerbaijan.

Predicting what will happen in the Caucuses over the coming months is not the aim of this article. All that this article wishes to do is draw attention to the fact that the conditions have been set up for a big Russian move in the Caucuses, and what may seem like an insignificant sideshow at the moment could become a crucial test in the ongoing Russia/US face off.

Does anyone else get the feeling that there could be a deal on between Turkey and Saudi Arabia for the division of Syria? And that their troops might be on the ground in Syria sooner rather than later?
The likely deal would involve Turkey getting control of a slice of northern Syria extending 100-150 kilometres south from its own border. Saudi Arabia would take all the remaining lands occupied by IS.
​The benefits of this deal for Turkey would be that it gets control of the Kurdish region in which the YPG is setting too good an example to Turkey's own restive Kurds of what an independent Kurdish state might look like.
The benefits to Saudia Arabia have been covered in earlier blogs and can be read below.

Why sooner rather than later?
Because of the Russians.
Saudi Arabia might have always had a long term plan to put troops on the ground in Syria, but until recently there was no rush. The longer the civil war in Syria dragged on and the more horrible and intractable it became the more likely it was that a Saudi intervention would be seen as a blessing.
Now that the Russians have rejuvenated the Assad loyalists, however, and there is talk of them re-taking Raqqa, the Saudi's need to get involved while there is still some Islamic State territory left for them to liberate.
Ideally the Saudi's would like to take Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, before they put boots on the ground inside Islamic state territory, but with their troops approaching the outskirts of Sanaa as this article is written, and the campaign for Sanaa generally progressing well for the Saudi's, it seems likely that they have decided that they need to seize their moment and will commit to fighting in two theatres.
The Turks, are also no doubt wanting to put a stop to the possible linking up of the two Kurdish controlled regions of northern Syria, a scenario which becomes increasingly likely as the continued aerial bombardment of IS makes them less able to fend off the Kurdish YPG advances.
Turkey was particularly concerned by the YPG's recent seizure of territory on the western bank of the Euphrates: which put the YPG one step closer to linking up their two bodies of territory along the Turkish border.
Another concern for both Turkey and Saudi Arabia is the prospect of a deal being struck between Assad and the Kurds. It would be advantageous for them both to act before such a deal came into being and further strengthened the Assad regime's reviving claims to be the legitimate, and still ruling, government of Syria. 

If the Turks get the North and the Saudis take the South who gets the East and the coast of Syria?
This is a good question.
With Russia giving the Assad regime considerable support one would have to say at this stage that the Assad regime is likely to retain control of the territory they already have and may well takeover most of the rebel areas which are not either Kurdish or IS. This would leave Syria divided into three spheres of power with Assad on the coast and in the coastal mountains, the Turks in the North and the Saudis controlling the remaining, mostly desert regions, to the South and South-East. 
With Russia having become so invested in supporting the Assad regime it is natural that the Turks and the Saudis would be very wary of trying to extend their intervention to the coast, but if both of these countries had their armies in the field and the tacit backing of the United States then they may well dare to take the fight to Assad and the Russians.
Then again, Russia's main concerns at the moment are with its Eastern European border and it could well be bought out of the fight in Syria if the US were to allow it significant gains in Ukraine, for example.

It's all about the Russians
The Russians, the Assad regime and even the Iranians have begun sabre rattling in response to the Turkish and Saudi announcements that they are willing to put troops on the ground in Syria. Naturally, it would be disastrous for the Russians, the Assad regime and Iran if either Turkey or Saudi Arabia or both intervened in Syria. Therefore they will be willing to go to lengths to prevent such interventions. Consequently, all of these parties are now engaged in a sabre rattling face-off.
Much will depend on the disposition of the US and the European Union in negotiations conducted far from the Syrian battlefields.
​Perhaps the Russians will succeed in staring down one or both threats.
If they do it will be a significant victory for Putin, leaving the Russian backed regime as the most likely final victor of the Syrian civil war.
Will the US allow this to happen?
The Syrian civil war could be about to enter a new phase of significant foreign intervention.

In stepping up its involvement in the Syrian conflict to include airstrikes and actual troops on the ground Russia has several ways that it can gain a geopolitical advantage.
To begin with, however, a reminder of the basics. For the moment, for Russia, everything is about The Ukraine.
So how does getting involved with Syria influence events in the Ukraine?
There are several potential positive answers to this question for Russia.
Firstly, if they make it impossible for Assad to be overthrown while they are supporting him, then they raise the possibility that the US and the Europeans will have to do a deal with Russia in order to get the outcomes they want in Syria, and, of course, that means that Russia can negotiate for the outcomes they desire in The Ukraine.
Secondly, if the US want to maintain a hard line against Russia and Assad, it is possible that the Europeans or Turkey might start to see the Americans as standing in the way of a settlement, and Russia consequently gains by dividing its opponents (in the Ukrainian context).

Of course, on entering the Syrian civil war the Russians could not know which way the cards would fall as events played out.
It was possible that the US would hold its allies in line through the sheer strength of its global influence, but even if it did so, the Russians would lose nothing by this. Putin's calculation must surely have been that there was little to lose by intervening in Syria and much to gain if things went well.
So far, the Syrian intervention is playing well for the Russians.
In a much publicized UN speech Putin put forward strong arguments for backing the Assad regime as being the shortest way to end the civil war and eradicate the Islamic State. In doing so he managed to make the US look like they are pursuing a foolish policy in trying to fight (almost) all sides at once; a diplomatic coop for Putin

Since then, the massive increase in Syrian refugees trying to find asylum in Europe has further played into the Russians' hands.
In trying to deal with the asylum seekers, the European countries are now being impacted by events in Syria and, regardless of whether they are closing borders or opening arms, they would much rather they didn't have too. Consequently, the Europeans are now much more eager for a quick settlement of the Syrian civil war, and the US must worry that if they don't provide their allies with some prospect of a resolution to the asylum seeker problem soon then the Europeans may well go behind their backs and deal with the Russians independently in an attempt to end the Syrian crisis. This, of course, is all good news for the Russians, their relative influence vis-a-vis the US is strengthening.

Now, with the atrocities which have occurred in France, we have a major European country wishing to do something decisive toward the destruction of the Islamic State. On the face of it, one would have to think that this new impetus toward action in Syria can only improve the Russian position further.

It will be interesting to see in what ways (or even if) the new French resolve (as stated by their president) can alter events on the ground in Syria.

Greece has found some cards to play.
It is no secret that the world has been watching Greece since the beginning of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC).  'Can they avoid falling out of the  Euro?' has been the question everyone has been watching to see answered.  Initially the European Union (EU) put all efforts into keeping  them in, but as the years have ground by and the EU has built greater resilience into its financial institutions (or at least believes it has) the efforts have gradually changed to trying not to let the Greeks get away with too much unearned credit.  It was a story which promised dramatic events, but had become a rather slow and repetitive melodrama.
With the recent election to government of a 'non-establishment' party, however, Greece has once again become more interesting.  The new government, no longer bound by the old establishment alliances, has found that despite the country's dire situation they have some cards to play.

CARD ONE - THE ACE - RUSSIA
The overthrow of the Ukrainian Government and the subsequent developments, including sanctions against Russia, have made Greece far more strategically important to Russia now than it was at the start of the GFC.  Now, with Russia looking to break the unanimity of EU sanctions against it and also to break the unanimity of the NATO alliance, they would be willing to pay a high price for the defection of Greece, most probably including the economic support of the country after a default on its debts to western nations.  The EU and the Americans are well aware of the political consequences of a Greek re-alliance with Moscow and so this is a strong card to play in getting further concessions from them.  If this card alone is not good enough to convince the Europeans to bail out the Greeks then it could indicate that many Europeans are less worried about the political consequences of a  Grexit at this point than the Americans.

CARD TWO - THE JOKER - NAZI COMPENSATION
Another card that the Greek Government has suddenly played is the claim for compensation for the Nazi occupation.  Predictably, this request has met with a cold reception from many in Germany who cite previous payments as appropriate compensation, but there is a considerable portion of the German Bundestag which is viewing the claim more favourably than many would have predicted.  
In the negative, some are arguing that if they grant this claim to Greece then they will be left open to claims from other formerly occupied countries.  This is true, but if the EU just bails out Greece to keep it in the Euro then they (read mostly Germany) will be opening the door to all of the other indebted EU countries.
At this point in time the compensation for Nazi occupation would amount to a smaller sum than the GFC debts.  Notably, Spain, Portugal and Ireland were never occupied by the Nazi's and Italy, although briefly occupied, was originally an ally of the Nazi's so any claim made by them would be in a different category.
The Germans might just find it expedient to pay Greece's compensation claim and consequently bail it out in a way which will not let the other major GFC debtor nations off the hook.

In conclusion, a Nazi occupation compensation payment could well be a blessing in disguise for the Germans.  However, the Germans may yet weigh their interests and decide that the Euro has outlived its usefulness, or that they are not that scared of the Russians.
What is sure, though, is that Greece is once again an interesting country to watch.