This article will examine the risk versus reward potential of all the prospective northern​ offensives that Russia could run in Ukraine. It will then come to a conclusion as to the most likely.

Offensive One
Direction  – Driving south from Belorussia along the Polish border, taking or encircling Lviv then following the Dniester River valley to seal off the Romanian border and the Moldavian border north of Transdniestria.

Rewards – The purpose of this offensive would be to cut Ukraine off from Western supplies. Given that Hungary, Slovakia and Transnistria are not allowing military supplies to cross their borders into Ukraine then it is only the Polish border, the Romanian border and a small section of Moldavian border north of Transnistria where supplies are making it into Ukraine (The flow of goods from the Romanian border south of Transnistria has been blocked by the destruction of two strategic bridges). Without supplies from its allies, Ukraine would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. So if this offensive was successful it would mean a quick and decisive end to the war. Added benefits for Russia would be that most of the fighting and consequent destruction and death would take place in the extreme west of the country, which is the most anti-Russian part of the country, leaving the more pro-Russian East and Centre with less damage.

Risks – The danger with this thrust, though, is that the Russian right flank would be extremely vulnerable to an attack across the Polish border by the very well-armed and highly motivated Poles. With fighting right on the Polish border it runs the risk of some munitions straying across the border and giving Poland an excuse to cross the border in retaliation. Such a move would be the more likely as, if the Russians had an extended offensive pushing south from Belorussia, it would be very tempting for the Poles to enter the fray, cutting the salient off from Belorussia in the north and thereby surrounding the attacking army in one relatively easy move. That would be a disaster for the Russians. Further more, it would be very difficult for the Russians to take Lviv quickly a major city with perhaps the greatest anti-Russian, pro-war sentiment in Ukraine.

Conclusion – Whilst the rewards of this plan are enormous. The potential for a disaster is too high a risk for the Russians. This is not the strategy they will employ at this time.
 

Offensive Two
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia, beginning at a point midway between the Polish border and the Dneiper river, then heading south to make contact with the northern border of the Russian ally, Transnistria.

Rewards – Similar to Offensive One, the purpose of this offensive would be to cut off Kiev and the great majority of Ukraine from Western supplies. 

Risks – Unlike Offensive One, though, the Russians do not have the difficult task of taking Lviv indeed there are no major urban areas standing in the way of this offensive reaching its desired goal. This thrust would also be far enough away from the Polish border that the fighting has little chance of spilling over, and if the Poles decide to intervene anyway, then the Russians will have some time to prepare to face them as they will need to cross some 60 to 100 kilometres of Ukrainian held territory before encountering the Russian flank. Not being right up against the Polish border, however, will mean, though, that there will be a significant slab of Ukrainian territory on the Russians’ western flank with the major city of Lviv at its core and that even if the rest of Ukraine is cut off this western region would be well set up to carry on the fight.
Being a salient striking down between Ukraine’s two primary military logistics hubs of Lviv and Kiev, this Offensive also has the potential to see an attacking Russian army cut off from its support and encircled. Though that possibility is reduced by the less likely intervention of the Poles.
 
Conclusion – There is a lot to recommend this offensive plan. Particularly, when it may well be the case that Putin does not want Lviv and was intending for it to be the capital of a rump Ukrainian state, which would be useful to him as somewhere for all the die hard Ukrainian nationalists to go to, rather than staying in the conquered part of Ukraine and causing the Russian administration headaches.
I do not think the Russians will undertake this offensive at this time. They are currently winning in the East (if only marginally) and at the moment the momentum of the war is turning in their favour. They appear to be getting stronger while the Ukrainians appear to be weakening. Given this situation they will be reluctant to do anything risky that could turn momentum and morale against them. Better to pursue safer courses of action even if their gains are only small rather than give the Ukrainians a chance to have a big win and undo all of the positive momentum. As one analyst has said ‘Right now, the Ukrainians only hope of victory is through a Russian mistake.’ I think the Russians would assess that they need to avoid the possibility of a ‘mistake’ at all costs, so their up-coming offensive will be, I think, one that risks little.
If the Russians are successful in taking the East bank of the Dnieper. It will be after that when they will endeavour to launch this offensive, not now.
 

Offensive Three
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia straight at Kiev.

Rewards – Taking the capital of Ukraine.

Risks – Destroying the city which was the medieval capital of Russia for 600 years. A very difficult and costly fight through Ukraine’s largest city. Making enemies and warriors of many civilians who might not otherwise have been wanting to resist the Russian takeover.
Despite the great cost to achieve, it would not necessarily bring the war to an end even on the East bank of the Dniepr.

Conclusion – Not going to happen. My guess is that Putin does not want to see sustained fighting in Kiev. The initial attack on Kiev was conducted in the hope of scaring Ukraine into submission. Once it was clear that sustained fighting would be needed to take the city, Putin withdrew.
 

Offensive Four
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia along the East bank of the Dneipr River, taking Chernihiv, taking or encircling the Eastern suburbs of Kiev, pushing on along the Dneipr to meet up with another Russian army pushing north along the eastern bank of the Dniepr from Zhaprizhia or a Russian army pushing west toward the Dneipr from a starting point between Sumy and Kharkiv.

Rewards – Cutting off Eastern Ukraine from all supplies from the West which would mean any Ukrainian forces in the East would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. This offensive would also make Kiev a frontline town subject to artillery fire from the Russian forces. This would have a significant psychological impact on the Ukrainians. Also reducing the ability of their largest city to function productively and in all likelihood forcing a withdrawal of the central government to the West, probably to Lviv.
 
Risks – As with all salient attacks there is the risk of being cut off and encircled. An attack along the east bank of the Dneipr to Chernihiv was attempted at the beginning of the war and failed to take Chernihiv, so it is known that Chernihiv will not be easy to take. Making deep attacks from two or three directions requires a lot of manpower, firepower and logistics in an environment where mobile warfare has proven difficult, so far. Given all of this it is possible that these offensive thrusts will become stalled before meeting up. Offensive thrusts that fail to meet their goals will cause reputational/morale damage to the Russian army.
 
Conclusion – This strategy will be employed in parts. The pushing south along the east bank of the Dneipr will be held off for now but attempts to attack north from Zhaporizia along the Dneipr and West from between Kharkiv and Sumy will be made. If both, or even just one, of these attacks goes exceptionally well then a thrust from the north will eventually be made.
Part of the reason why I am confident the Zhaporizhia and Sumy/Kharkiv thrusts will be made is because these attacks have multiple success points. On the Zhaporizhia front if they just move the front forward a few kilometres; it is a success; if they take or encircle Eastern Zhaprizhia City – they have taken control of a vital Dneipr crossing; big success; if they make it all the way to Dnipro; they have blocked two key Dneipr crossings; outstanding success. From the border between Sumy and Kharkiv, if they simply take some Ukrainian territory then they have succeeded in creating a buffer zone along the border; success; if they push in 30 kilometres between Sumy and Kharkiv, then they have put themselves in a position to encirlcle either city or drive toward the Dneipr, thus putting the enemy in doubt and forcing them to divide their forces or leave one or more options open; big success; from there the outstanding success of encircling Kharkiv or Sumy or driving to the Dneipr is possible. If the later option is achieved then an attempt to meet that thrust with an army coming up from Zhaporizhia or down from Chernihiv would be a next step.
 
Ultimate Conclusion
So, I am predicting that if the war plays out in the Russian favour, but the Ukrainians continue to fight, then first we will see offensive four put into action and then after that offensive two. Of course, as outlined in the previous blog, I would see the partial implementation of Offensive Four being conducted in tandem with attempts to advance on all existing fronts in order to stretch Ukraine's strategic reserves to the maximum.
 

So, my predictions for the Russian offensive.
I need to preface this though by saying that I do not know the situation on the ground in Ukraine anywhere near as well as the Russian Military Commanders. There is much information before them that I do not have. My guesses are simply based on widely publicized information about the situation on the ground. They may suffer from a lack of critical information. That said, my predictions, based on my limited knowledge, are as follows: 

1. The Russians will attack in all new and existing frontlines simultaneously in order to exceed Ukraine’s ability to throw effective reserves at each attack, thereby giving the best opportunity that at least one direction of attack should make a breakthrough.
2. The main new front/axis of attack will be entering the Kharkiv region between Kupiansk and Vovchansk (the Donets River). They will push south hoping to envelop the Ukranian lines that are facing the Russians in Luhansk Oblast. They will be seeking to use the Siversky Donets river as a protection on their western flank while the eastern flank attacks the Ukrainian positions. The role of the Russian forces in Ukraine will be to pressure the Ukrainians from the East, but the main attack will come from the west. Any attack from the East will have to overcome well established defensive positions and then if they make it to the Oskil river the Ukrainians have prepared positions waiting to help them defend the West bank of this river. So, it will be much better to attack from the west, attacking the Ukrainian defenses from behind and then being able to use those self-same defenses to hold the Oskil river line against the Ukrainians trapped between its eastern bank and the Russian lines further east. Of course, the Ukrainians will know that this move could trap all of their forces on the Luhansk Front so they will do their best to stop the Russians on, or near, the northern border. I think, however, that this is the direction to which the Russians will devote their best resources. Why? Because destroying the Ukrainian Army is more important than taking large grabs of territory. If the Russians can destroy the Ukrainian Army then they can take as much territory as they wish. If they take a big grab of poorly defended territory but leave the Ukrainian Army largely intact then they risk having that territory and others removed from them later in the war. Destroying the Ukrainian Army will therefore be priority number one and the attack with the greatest potential to deal it a severe blow is the one outlined above, so I think the Russians will invest many forces into it despite its predictability. Also, if it does not come off then they can claim that they were just trying to create a buffer zone along the border as they have previously stated they would. So they can claim a sort of victory even if they only make it a few kilometres across the border.
3. The second area of focus will be the Donetsk Front. Here they will attack almost everywhere. If destroying the Ukrainian Army is the goal, here is where it is most concentrated. Liberating Donetsk though has long been a stated goal of ‘The Special Military Operation’ so politically any ground taken in Donetsk Oblast is a public relations win. Within the oblast, though, I do not think they are planning a frontal assault of Vulehdar. They have lost too many troops trying that previously. Vulehdar will definitely be a key target, but my thinking is that they will try to surround it by moving north from Pavlivka, Shevchenko and/or Novomaiorske to block its western flank and moving west from Solodke and Novomykhailivka to cut it off from the north. It also seems unlikely that they will attack Niu York and Toretsk directly as the contact line facing these two urban centres was first established in 2014 and has probably been built up over the years to be extremely difficult to fight through. It is far more likely that they will endeavour to take these areas by encirclement, pushing north from Avdivka and west from Bakmut/Artemovsk.
4. The third region of attack will be between Kharkhiv and Sumy. Such an attack, if it pushes deep could threaten either city with encirclement and so give the Russians options. If the Ukrainians look like they have Kharkhiv too well defended then the Russians can potentially swing north and grab Sumy. Naturally though, Kharkhiv, as Ukraine’s second largest city and former capital, would be the preferred target. If the attack does not make much ground, once again, the Russians will be able to claim that they were just intending to create a buffer zone along the northern section of the Kharkhiv border, so once again they will be able to claim victory with just a few kilometres captured.
5. Finally, the Zhaporizhia front will also be a direction of attack. The Russians will endeavour to dash forward from Robotyne to Orikhiv and will also attempt to drive up through Stepnohirsk to Zhaporizhia City. This attack is likely to be the least resourced and the least sustained. If the initial push succeeds, and a breakthrough is made, then the Russians may well send more resources to Zhaporizhia, but if the initial charge is unsuccessful then it is likely the Russians will be content to simply retake any land lost to the Ukrainian offensive and then sit on their hands. The reason being that they have established very strong defensive lines where they are and that as the next Ukrainian Offensive, if there is one, is likely to want to head through the land bridge to the sea, they might prefer to present the same tested and successful defenses rather pushing forward at great cost only to occupy less defensible positions when the expected assault comes and losing yet more troops as a result.

 
Northern Attack Routes
It seems unlikely at this stage that the Russians would also attack from the northern Ukrainian border in the next few months, so I will save analysis of these prospective invasion routes for a later blog.

It would seem to me that if Russia is intending to install its own government in Ukraine then the man they would choose to lead it would ideally be Viktor Yanucovich. Viktor Yanukovich is the democratically elected leader of Ukraine who was ousted in a coup in 2014. He has been living in Russia ever since. If he is the man that they put in charge of whatever is left of Ukraine at the end of this war, then it would allow the Russians to undercut all of the criticisms that have been leveled at them in terms of an 'unprovoked attack'. If they can claim that they are restoring a democratically elected leader then it would certainly give their invasion legitimacy in many eyes.
The greatest problem with this strategy, however, may well be Viktor Yanukovich himself, I have no knowledge of whether he would agree to be re-installed as President of the Ukraine. Particularly, if it is over a partitioned Ukraine. I believe he has previously spoken of trying to get Russia to return The Crimea, so he may not be willing to go along with what may be Putin's current plans for the Ukraine.
Further evidence that the re-installation of Yanukovich is unlikely is the fact that we have not heard Russia saying that this is what it is doing. This might, however, be because they wanted to keep their real intentions unknown to this point, or it could be that Putin is waiting to see how well his invasion goes before choosing his end goal and he is not yet sure that he will choose the one in which Yanukovich would be helpful.

Some Carrots in the Pot.
There were many notable things about Putin's speech yesterday (Australian East Coast Time) which ended in his recognition of the independence of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk(see attached link www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrGLhhTtxFU). One of the things which struck me though is that when he spoke about how the Bolsheviks, when they created the Soviet state of Ukraine, were too generous with its borders, he not only says that 'historically Russian lands' were given to it, but also that 'historically Hungarian' and historically Polish' lands were also given to it. Such an admission leaves the door open to future negotiations with Hungary and Poland about a future carve-up of current Ukrainian territory. Indeed, I would guess that the Hungarians have long had their eye on just such a redrawing of their border with Ukraine and their pro-Russian attitudes over recent years have been, at least in part, a preparing of the ground for just such a negotiation, where they barter their support for Russian moves into Ukraine in return for a renegotiation of their border with The Ukraine, in the event that Russia does come to control it. Given that the Hungarian speaking section of Ukraine is only a small sliver of territory immediately adjacent to the current border and on the western side of the Carpathian mountains it would seem to be an exchange that Putin may well be willing to contemplate.

Hungary is already in the Russian camp. Poland, however, is completely another matter. Poland has led the European resistance to Russian actions in The Ukraine and they have been The Ukraine's strongest supporter. They have also done their best to pull Belarus away from its links to Russia, and they have worked to block Russian influence in Lithuania and increase their own.

This advocacy is not entirely based on a fear of Russia, as some claim. Poland also has an historical claim on all of these states having ruled them during the 15th and 16th centuries. As well as during a brief period in the 20th century, between the world wars.  Poland is a true historical competitor to Russia in these territories and as such it would seem unlikely that their hostility to Russia could be altered. However, Putin's recent reference to 'historically Polish lands' suggests that he might be amenable to giving some of Ukraine 'back' to Poland, if he gained control of it, and that thought will now be firmly lodged in the back of many Polish nationalists minds. Perhaps in the future, Polish resistance to the Russian occupation of The Ukraine might be turned to support by the negotiated return of some 'historically Polish lands'. And I am sure, if such negotiations ever did take place then Poland's leaving NATO and signing a security treaty with Russia would also be on the table.

Putin's potential undermining of NATO did not stop there, however, at the same time as talking about Polish lands being given to Ukraine he also spoke of 'historically German lands' being given to Poland. What if Putin told Poland that he would give them their 'historical lands' only if they agreed to give half as much land area back to Germany. Would this be enough to lure an already wobbly Germany out of NATO?

Putin's speech has already shaken Europe for reasons not mentioned here. However, Putin chooses his words carefully, and various nationalist leaders in Hungary, Poland and Germany will have heard the suggestion that some of their dearly held goals might be achieved through an alliance with Russia.

Over the past several months, Putin has been gathering his ingredients. Today he threw in the salt. Now he will slowly bring the pot to the boil.

​This may not be a very professional sounding analysis, but it is what is in my mind.

So, in my last hurried post I said I would explain my reasoning for why I think Putin will go into Ukraine. I have left it late enough, so I had better explain myself now before events overtake the need for any prediction.
Now, I am by no means a military expert, so my predictions are based on political calculations rather than any specialised knowledge of troop deployments and such like.
So, some reasons why I think Putin will go into The Ukraine:
Firstly, it is not primarily about NATO. If his stated demands were met, Putin would probably be happy and might put off the invasion for now, but I think that primarily his goal in going into The Ukraine would be the hope of reuniting the Russians. Putin considers Ukrainians to be Russians. Kiev was the capital of the first Russian state. Most of the Ukraine has been part of Russia for hundreds of years and the only reason it was part of a different state to Russia under the Soviet Union, in Putin's thinking, I presume, was because the Russians wanted to make the Soviet Union look like it was an International Union rather than just a Greater Russia, so they generously gave a bit of Russian territory to create some states like Belarus, which had never previously existed and The Ukraine, which had only existed when the Nazi's had control of the territory. The Russians had thought that Belarus and The Ukraine would always be under the control of the Soviet Politburo so there was no problem with calling these regions independent states. They had never imagined that their creations might actually become independent !! They even added the Crimea to The Ukraine in 1954. Thinking like this you can see that Putin, a strong nationalist, might want to correct the 'geopolitical tragedy' of the collapse of the Soviet Union and bring at least these, formerly Russian, states back into Russia. In Belarus it appears Putin has achieved this aim relatively peacefully (There is a 'Union State' agreement by which Russia and Belarus  are essentially merging). He must have thought he was on the way to achieving the same with the Ukraine when Viktor Yanukovych was elected President. He was hoping to get The Crimea back into Russia even more quickly with Yanukovych scheduling a referendum to be held in Crimea in 2014 to let the Crimea decide between the Ukraine, Russia and Independence. When Yanukovych was undemocratically overthrown Putin's strategy for peacefully reintegrating The Ukraine took a significant hit, though, I would assume. 
So, Putin's sense of grievance over The Ukraine is pretty strong. He believes The West underhandedly stole The Ukraine away from him by overthrowing a democratically elected President. He would also see an invasion as a noble effort to reunite his people. So his motivations to take control of the Ukraine are far stronger than some concerns about an aggressive foreign alliance structure. Geo-strategically there is a lot to gain as well, many analysts talk about Russia's declining population, extremely long borders, and open, easy-to-invade geography. Adding the Ukraine to Russia would add 40 plus million people while shortening their border and putting that border on an easily defensible mountain chain.
So, Putin has a lot to gain from bringing Ukraine back into the Russian fold. Not to mention, entry into the pantheon of Russian greats, if he pulls it off. And the greater the gain; the greater the risk one is willing to take to obtain it.

So, why now? Why during this particular standoff?
Well:

• Given that the West has started arming Ukraine, if he backs off now he will have incurred a price for his build up of troops (the better arming of Ukraine and the uniting of NATO) without having achieved any gain. Given that a price has already been paid Putin will not want to walk away.
• If Putin waits till next year Ukraine will only be better armed
• Right now, many European countries have a large dependency on Russian gas and oil and so are not very motivated to stop trading with Russia. In a year's time these countries might have diversified their economies away from Russian commodities.
• Right now, many in the American administration see China as America's biggest concern and so their attention is divided. In a year's time, China might have been laid low by a financial crises, causing the US administration to start rating Russia as their strongest competitor.
• Given that the US has at no point said they will help defend Ukraine militarily, the one card that might really dissuade Putin has not been played.

Given all of the above, it is my prediction that Putin will act rather than back down.
One way or the other, we will soon know.

Well, this blog is meant to be about geopolitical predictions, so here is a big one:
Russia will go into The Ukraine again and this time they will go in big.
Why big?
Because the international reaction to them taking the rest of Donbas would be the same as if they invaded the entire country. So if they go in they should go in for everything they want.
In addition, the more audacious their gambit, the stronger the impression they will make on their neighbors and the world.
Why would they go in at all?
I will have to save my reasoning for a later post.

Many news reports are saying that there are more than 100,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border. Some news reports are saying around 90,000.

So, does this mean an invasion of The Ukraine is imminent?

I would say: certainly not. The Russians are positioning themselves to take advantage of possible opportunities. Russian troops moving into the Ukraine, en masse, is certainly more likely than it was a year ago, but it may not come in the form of an invasion and will not happen at all unless global and local conditions present a compelling opportunity.

First: The Why?
Why would Russia want to take possession of The Ukraine?

Because in many Russian minds, and almost certainly in Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s mind, The Ukraine is Russian territory. The very first historical mentions of a Russian people and state come from tales of the ‘Kievan Rus’. Kiev was the first capital of the Russians. Today, Kiev is the capital of The Ukraine. Many Russian’s don’t see The Ukraine as just a lost province; they see it as their historical heartland. They strongly desire to see The Ukraine re-united with the rest of Russia.

Second: The Why Now?
Why is it far more likely that the Russians might make a play for taking back The Ukraine now, rather than a year ago?

Because they have finished the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which means that they can now pump natural gas direct to Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Previously, their gas, which provides an enormous income stream, had to pass through The Ukraine to reach Western Europe. So, naturally, the fear was that any aggressive moves toward The Ukraine could see the Ukrainians shut down the gas pipelines and hamstring the Russian economy from the very beginning of the war. Now, the Ukrainians can no longer play this card. So, the price the Russians would have to pay for aggression against The Ukraine has been substantially lowered. Not only that, but the Russians now have leverage over many of the European nations who might otherwise have supported The Ukraine against Russia. Now, the Germans, for example, know that if they support The Ukraine against Russia, they risk losing the natural gas upon which their economy currently depends. Previously, the Germans would have lost the gas immediately that the war started so the Russians could not have used the restriction of supply as a threat to keep them out of the conflict.

So, the Russians are highly motivated to regain The Ukraine and they have already created infrastructure and political levers that would significantly lower the expected cost of an invasion of The Ukraine. So why wouldn’t they go ahead and invade?

The main reason why the Russians would limit military actions against The Ukraine as much as possible is precisely because they see themselves as the one people. They would like to re-unify the country peacefully if they can. Many think that the Ukrainian identity is weak and does not have deep historical roots for many Ukrainian citizens, they hope that a well-managed crisis might bring many Ukrainian citizens around to wanting to re-integrate with Russia. President Putin is also surely aware that a brutal invasion may well be something which could inspire a stronger sense of Ukrainian identity than that which already exists. To draw an historical example, one might say that the inhabitants of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor had no strong sense of a national identity at the time when the Portuguese abandoned that colony, however, after a brutal Indonesian invasion, the East Timorese identity became extremely strong.
So, the Russians are hoping that The Ukraine will soon find itself in such economic or governmental difficulties that a re-unification with ‘Greater Russia’ will be welcomed by the populace. Of course, now that the Ukrainian government can no longer stop them exporting gas to Western Europe the Russians are able to tighten the economic screws on The Ukraine in a way they never have before. They have already banned exports of coal to The Ukraine, it remains to be seen if they are going to shut off the oil and gas as well this winter. There are various ways that the Russians can manipulate circumstances within The Ukraine to try and bring on a crisis. It is not the purpose of this article to try to detail them all. What I would like to emphasize, however, is that there are some potential global events which Russia might be watching or even waiting for.
Imagine, for example, that China began implementing its plans to take control of Taiwan. Such activity, whether it be a blockade or a military assault, would likely take a great deal of American attention. Would that not present a perfect opportunity for an old-fashioned military invasion of The Ukraine? Is it not possible that there might not already be a deal between China and Russia such that if China begins an attack on Taiwan then Russia should attack The Ukraine, to divide the attention and resources of America and its allies? Certainly, such a deal would make perfect sense. Indeed, the deal might even go the other way. It might read that ‘if Russia attacks The Ukraine then China should begin its attack on Taiwan.
Remember, such attacks would not be seen by either country as an act of aggression against a sovereign state. China would see an attack on Taiwan as simply the final chapter in a long-running civil war. Certainly, that civil war has been cold for many decades now, but, nonetheless, Taiwan is the last holdout of the Chinese Communist Party’s opponents in the battle to control China. Taking control of Taiwan would be for them an act of national reunification. For the Russians, with The Ukraine, it is the same. They too would see an invasion of The Ukraine as an attempt to reunify their country. Both Russia and China are very conscious, however, that the USA and the West would represent their actions differently and are worried about what they would do against them. Seen from this vantage point it would seem strange if there is not a deal between these two countries to co-ordinate their attacks on Taiwan and The Ukraine.

So ...

Right now, the Russians are in a strong position to move on The Ukraine; they have removed their economic vulnerability; global fossil fuel prices are high, boosting their economic strength and making their customers less likely to want to seek other suppliers; they have a strong leader with good domestic support and the US administration is focused on China and domestic discord and the American people are tired of foreign engagements. If an opportunity appears, the Russians may well move on The Ukraine.

However ...

For the Chinese, the current moment does not appear so compelling. The US is watching them closely and they do not want to get into a hot war with the Americans. However, their hand might be forced. My feeling is that the Chinese will continue to keep trading with the US for as long as they can, and the American administration will go along with this for as long as it can too. However, American domestic opinion might eventually force the administration to cease engagement with China. Just on the 2nd of December, 2021, the World Tennis Association has ceased any engagement with China over the Peng Shuai affair. One can imagine that outrage over what is reportedly happening in Sinkiang (Xinxiang) might shortly follow. At some point trade between China and The West might come to an abrupt halt and at that point China might feel it has much less to lose by attacking Taiwan. Indeed, attacking Taiwan might become a necessary, even the only, face-saving move left to a Chinese leader who is faced with the West’s anti-Chinese actions.

So, if Russia chose to make moves on The Ukraine this winter, it is quite likely that Chinese would not act on Taiwan but rather choose to wait till their own circumstances were more compelling. However, if China does move on Taiwan this northern winter then I think it very likely that Russia would initiate some actions against the sovereignty of The Ukraine.
 
Summary:
Russia is presently very well set up to intervene in The Ukraine, more so than at any period since The Ukraine Crisis began back in 2013-2014 with the toppling of a democratically elected pro-Russian government. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has made Russia far less vulnerable to Ukrainian economic retaliation and simultaneously given the Russians more economic control of several Western European countries (most significantly, Germany). Consequently, the Russians are far more likely to intervene in the Ukraine than they have been previously, and they have stationed their military in a manner that would allow them to intervene very quickly should an opportunity arise. The Russians are probably working to manufacture such an opportunity, with moves like banning coal exports to The Ukraine, but other opportunities could arise without their meddling, an example of such being a Chinese play for Taiwan. Other opportunities, though, can be imagined, such as a poor response to the pandemic within The Ukraine causing  economic or administrative failure. Despite their strong position a Russian invasion is not a given, however, as the Russians would like to avoid alienating the majority of Ukrainians. They would prefer to intervene in the country in a situation where their intervention would be welcomed by, at least, a significant number of Ukrainians. However, if something like an invasion of Taiwan was begun by the Chinese the Russians may well think that the international circumstances were so favorable that they should take advantage of the situations and launch an invasion of The Ukraine regardless.
​Such are the precarious circumstances in which we find ourselves at the moment.

Do you see what I am seeing?
Many in the media are talking down the possibility of a war between the USA and Iran. "Iran does not want a war," they say, "They know they can't match the US." Maybe so, but who says it is Iran who gets to choose?
Since the 'Shale Revolution' which made the US effectively independent of Middle Eastern oil, as recently as during the Trump Presidency, the US no longer has to worry about Iran being able to shut down its energy supply. Indeed, if a war in the Persian Gulf shut down oil production in the region that would just strengthen the US vis-a-vis all of its economic competitors whose production costs would suddenly increase, if indeed they were able to maintain much production at all.
So what is to stop the US going after Iran's nuclear program? We all know that the US doesn't want the Iranians getting nuclear weapons; not when Iran's regime considers the US to be 'The Great Satan'.
In the past the US had to tread carefully as a result of their dependence on Gulf Oil; that dependence no longer exists.
The logic is clear.
Perhaps the US president does not want a war, but there are certainly some Hawks in the US defense establishment who might think now is a good time to authorize some aggressive actions that might inspire retaliation of the sort that makes heavy-handed responses hard to avoid for even the most pacifist presidents.
There are certainly signs that some foreign powers are preparing for a Persian Gulf Crisis.
Suddenly, Japan has some naval strength positioned in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. This is very unusual for Japan. Could it be that Gulf oil dependent Japan is making sure it has naval power in place to convoy out any of its oil tankers if fighting breaks out?
Then there is Turkey. Suddenly, out of the blue, Turkey's parliament has decided to authorize troop deployment to hapless, but oil rich Libya.
Now, the Libyan civil war has been going on since 2011 so one could be forgiven for asking of Turkey, 'Why now?'
Could it be that Turkey is foreseeing the possibility of a loss of oil imports from the nearby Gulf States and is consequently seeking to put itself in a position where it can use its considerable military to secure access to Libya's oil reserves?

Perhaps Iran and the US will sort out their differences without much disruption to Persian Gulf oil supplies, some however appear to be making sure that they are prepared for a potential energy crisis.

I have not been watching the world for a while. Having been buried in my own personal projects, family and occupation I only now put my head up and look around at the world.
So what do I see?

1. I see that oil prices are high and have been that way for a while.
2. I see that Turkey, is finally flexing its military muscles and is slowly, carefully and quietly conquering parts of northern Syria.
3. I see that there are moves being made within Saudi Arabia to purge any possible sources of opposition to the king and the crown prince.
4. I see that neither the EU nor the Eurozone have collapsed, but the governments and politicians that oppose it seem to be gaining influence not losing it.
5. I see that President Xi of China is gathering enormous powers to himself.
6. I see that Donald Trump is meeting the President of North Korea in Singapore.
7. I see that Russia is hosting a World Cup, a bare four years after hosting a Winter Olympics

So what do I make of it all?

1. That with the rebound in oil prices Russia and Saudi Arabia are doing much better than many expected two years ago.
2. With Turkey moving into Arab territory there is an extra incentive for Arabs to unify and that there will be support for a strong Arab leader if one emerges.
3. Saudi Arabia could be strengthening itself internally in preparation for taking on a more aggressive role in its region.
4. The EU is already fraying politically. There is no need for it to disappear; countries can just stop doing what it says and it will simply become less and less important. Hungary and Poland are already flouting its directives, and they are flouting their flouting. The Eurozone can’t simply fade away. It will either continue to function more-or-less as-is or countries will leave it. I think some countries will eventually choose to leave.
5. The fact that 6. Is occurring despite 5. Suggests that Xi is extremely concerned by China’s relative strength vis-à-vis USA and is willing to be very nice to the USA and help them with North Korea so as to dissuade the USA from totally devastating the Chinese economy as they could do if they launched a trade war.
6. I see the American President’s meeting with the North Korean President as more of a reflection of the state of mind of the Chinese President than anything else.
7. Having weathered western sanctions and now showing an expected budget surplus for this year, Russia will be able to use the World Cup to show the world that reports of its imminent demise were vastly premature.

Extra observations:
The USA has recently started taking steps to act in its own economic interests and despite some bad press has found the process less politically painful than many expected. As their first small steps succeed, their appetite for putting America first will probably increase.
It has become clear to me that Russia has probably offered the US a grand bargain/threat on Ukraine, which would run something like ‘Ukraine stays out of NATO and the EU and you stay out of Ukraine or we let the tanks role.’ The Donbas Republics are key to this strategy because if Ukraine joined NATO and Russia attacked then all of NATO would be duty bound to go to war with Russia – and they probably would in the case of such a clear attack. If, however, Ukraine joined NATO and then the Donbas Republics suddenly had some extremely successful offensive thrusts in their on-going civil war, then technically no NATO members would be ‘duty bound’ to intervene. This would explain why so little has been done for Ukraine by the West since its ouster of the pro-Russian government.

If we stand back and look at the map of Asia we see three giants, China, India and Indonesia. The most strategic ground between them is Malaysia and ‘lo and behold’ the population of Malaysia is made up of Malays (the same ethnicity as Indonesians) Chinese and Indians. All three countries would like to control this territory. The Europeans sailed from the other side of the world to do just that and fought wars amongst themselves for the benefit.  Malacca, Malaysia’s most notable city of 500 years ago, has a history of having been ruled by the Portuguese, then the Dutch and then the English. The Europeans were interested in Malaysia because it controlled the shortest shipping route between China and India, through the Malacca Strait, and that strait was at the same time the safest route into the riches of the Indonesian archipelago.

All three of the Asian giants have large populations of their ethnic brethren living in Malaysia. Can anyone see the potential for conflict?

All sides already have form.
 
The Chinese
Malays/Indonesians populate the lands on both sides of the Malacca Strait, so one might assume that they were its typical rulers prior to the arrival of the European naval empires. Malacca’s pre-European history, however, centres around the tales of the great warriors Hang Tua and Hang Jabat and of the Babanonya – the princess and her 100 handmaidens who all arrived from the sea. All are now thought by many to have been ethnically Chinese; Hang being a form of Han. Thus suggesting that Malacca’s heyday as the dominant city on the Straits was a period when it was actually ruled by a Chinese elite. Certainly, there is no doubt that Chinese traders have been long established both in Malacca and throughout the Strait's major port cities.

A more striking example of the Chinese’s ability to gain influence in the Straits is Singapore. In 1800 Singapore was nothing but a swampy island with a few Malay villages on it. Sir Stamford Raffles, the British colonial administrator par excellence, however, identified it as the perfect spot to establish the Straits' next power city. The Chinese flooded in and became the dominant population of the island, then, after Malaysia’s independence from Great Britain, they broke away and formed their own independent country. Consequently, Singapore is a clear case of Malay-ruled territory being taken over and subsequently ruled by Chinese.
 
The Indians
India too has an ongoing history of involvement in Malaysia. Under the British, Malaysia was ruled from Calcutta, but the most significant influences of India in Malaysia are, like the Chinese, not the result of any officially stated government policy, but rather the result of their people’s movement (whether that be irrespective of, or as a result of, specific government policies is a matter for another article). The potential for the ‘innocent’ migration of economic immigrants to have nation changing effects has already been seen in the case of Singapore, but an Indian example can be seen in the shape of the Tamils. An Indian ethnic group, hailing from Tamil Nadu, the Tamils, migrated to Sri Lanka, the island nation which was just across the Palk Straits from their homeland. Initially, it was poor fishermen who arrived, setting up villages on the coast. The indigenous Sinhalese allowed them to stay. With the passage of years and the growth of their population, however, the Tamils eventually declared their own independent republic in the north of Sri Lanka and a decades long civil war ensued before the Tamil republic was eventually crushed. In this case, the Indian (Tamil) immigrants were unsuccessful in establishing an independent state for themselves, unlike the Chinese of Singapore, but during the long years of civil war many of those Tamils fled the fighting to settle in Malaysia, where they are now the largest of the Indian minorities. An ethnic group with a record of migrating into an area and then trying to establish their own Independence might certainly be considered a threat by the indigenous Malay population.
 
The Indonesians/Malays
So, the Chinese have taken Singapore and the Indians bear watching, but for most of the second half of the 20th century I would say the Malays have been the ones gaining ground. While it is true that Singapore gained its independence in this period. It is the case that the massive influx of Chinese to Singapore occurred under British rule. British rule was also friendly to the immigration of Indians into Malaysia. Since Malaysia gained Independence from Britain in 1957, the welfare and relative demographics of the native Malay populations have risen significantly vis-à-vis their two large immigrant communities. Indeed, part of the reason why Malaysia let Singapore go relatively amicably was because the Malays knew that if Singapore stayed in their federation then the immigrant populations would out-number the Malays. By letting Singapore leave they ensured that they would at least be able to maintain control of what was left of the country through a democratic majority. Ever since, the Malay led government of Malaysia has been pursuing policies which ‘positively discriminate’ in favour of Malay citizens. These policies have succeeded in growing the wealth and numbers of the Malay population. Malaysia has also prospered economically, such that it now has a GDP per capita which is much higher than all of its three neighbouring giants. Such success could mean that if there were ever a federation of Indonesia and Malaysia it may well be led by Malaysia rather Indonesia. That uniting the Malays into one homeland is an idea with a serious political following has been known since Indonesia's President Sukarno endeavoured to make the dream a reality, by force, during the period from 1963 to 1966. A Malaysian led initiative would be more likely to succeed peacefully, however, given that until now it is Malaysia who has resisted the idea through fear of complete domination from Jakarta. That such a possibility is increasingly likely is due to Malaysia's growing wealth, which gives it an increasingly strong position vis-a-vis its much larger neighbour: a time might come when Malaysian politicians might think that some sort of federation might present more opportunities than risks.
 
The state of play
If we stand back and look at the map, particularly an ethnic or demographic map, we see that the pieces are on the board and they are changing position (the game is in play). The Malays/Indonesians (a nation of chess lovers) are ahead, but everyone is still in the game.
In a sense there is a sort of ‘Cold War’ going on in Malaysia in the form of a battle between ethnicities for influence and power. On the ground the battle is waged every day through such acts as the Chinese sending their children to private Chinese schools rather than government ones and Indian communities turning local caves into Hindu shrines.
 
Could there be a ‘hot’ conflict in Malaysia?
Certainly, the conditions exist in Malaysia for the slow fuse of ethnic tensions to be ignited into a ‘hot’ conflict. All that is needed is a spark. And the great danger of a 'hot' conflict in Malaysia is that it has the potential to draw in all three Asian giants.
 
Potential sparks
Both the Chinese and Indian ethnicities are already positively-discriminated against in Malaysia. The discrimination has generally been accepted as ‘positive’ by the world and many Malaysians on account of the fact that when it began Malays were by far the poorest and most under-privileged segment of Malaysian society. On average they may still be less wealthy than the Indian and Chinese communities, but at what point does 'positive discrimination' become just 'discrimination'? At what point do discriminated-against minorities feel that enough is enough? Will there be a point in the future where large, globally significant countries like China and India decide that they can no longer abide having Malaysia discriminate against their ethnic diaspora?
At the other end of the stick, could an increase in Malay nationalism lead to a Pan Malay movement that would seek to unify Malaysia with the other Malay homeland of Indonesia? How would the large minorities of Chinese and Indians react to such an event? Would such an event lead to more, or less, discrimination.
 
China’s push into the South China Sea shows a growing willingness on behalf of China to make plays for increased control of its important seaways? Where does that end? There have been similarities drawn between China’s current policies and the US moves from the 19th century to control the Carribean Sea. Those moves ended in US control of the Panama Canal, the World’s 3rd most important sea route. The Malacca Straits are the World’s second most important sea route. The USA controls the Panama Canal but does not directly control Panama so the Chinese may not need to physically control Malaysia, but the US does involve itself in Panamanian affairs; the deposition of Manuel Norriega being one notable example.
 
In conclusion
Malaysia is already an ethnic battleground, albeit a very civilized one at the moment. There are, however, shifts in power and influence amongst the main ethnic groups in Malaysia and with each ethnic group having a giant nation at their back the potential for conflict, even large scale international warfare exists.

The Malays have the homeground advantage and recently the game has been on their terms, but Singapore demonstrates that there have been periods of history where they have lost ground, literally, demonstrating that their current control cannot be taken for granted.

China has made a recent aggressive surge into the nearby waters of the South China Sea, and there are suggestions that the currently embattled prime minister of Malaysia, Abdul Razak, might be susceptible to taking Chinese money and support if it helps him stay in power.
​
Meanwhile, India, calmly sitting back, might be the one to win influence by not making enemies.

My feeling is that Indonesia, or some Malay based power, will be the ultimate winner in Malaysia, so long as they have better than competent leadership (certainly not a given) but the real question is not so much who will win but whether the battle to control the strategic Malay Peninsular might turn violent, leading to the involvement of one, or more, of the Asian Giants in an armed conflict.

The Twentieth Century was a Slavic century
The Slavs won the last two world wars and their tide is still rising.
 
I love historical maps. If you look at a series of historical maps over a period of a thousand or even thousands of years you can see the rise and fall of nations and empires simply by viewing the changes in the territory they control. If you apply this very simple analysis to maps that are both pre- and post- both of the world wars you will see that the Slavic people were very clearly the winners of both. Prior to the First World War much of Central and Eastern Europe was controlled by two large German run empires, the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. By the end of the war the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been replaced by the Slav controlled states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland (plus Austria and Hungary) and the German Empire had also ceded some territory to the newly recreated Poland. By the end of the Second World War Poland had taken over even more, formerly German, territory.
In future centuries I have no doubt that some historians looking back will say that in Europe the story of the 20th century was the story of the Slavs. They were the people whose power was steadily growing through the century. And if you think ‘Well the maps are misleading, the Slavs were just the accidental beneficiaries of historical circumstance,’ then I would draw your attention to the Russian revolution; the event whose intellectual, philosophical, and political repercussions virtually shaped the history of every other nation of the world through the rest of that century. Need I point out that the Russian revolution took place in a Slavic state.
Indeed, the true accidental beneficiaries of history in the 20th century are the Americans and the Anglosphere. They have leapt forward while the ‘Great Tussle’ was going on elsewhere. And the great tussle of the twentieth century, by the way, was not between the Soviet Union and the USA so much as it was between the Slavic and Germanic peoples.
The Slavic territorial advances of the twentieth century were just the most recent chapters in a struggle that had been going on for centuries. The Slavs were the dominant people of Eastern and Central Europe by the 6th century AD having spread west in the wake of the westward moving Germans, but the German’s made many attempts to push back to the East over the intervening centuries. Charlemagne’s campaigns are one famous early example; and the activities of the Teutonic knights form another. In general, though, the Germans were not able to shift the Slavs from the territory they had settled on, although with the advantages of their more advanced civilisation they often did come to control them. Hence, the appearance of so many Slavic states in place of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War was not on account of a sudden mass migration of Slavs into the area, but rather a removal of German overlordship from a population that was already Slavic. The humiliated Germans pushed back again after their losses in the First World War. They managed to gain control of a great deal of the German inhabited regions of Czechoslovakia and then launched the invasion of Poland which precipitated the Second World War. Eventually, though, they were repelled and lost even more territory to the Slavs. The end of the Second World War also included the removal of large ethnic German populations from many regions of both Poland and Czechoslovakia thus increasing the proportion of Europe inhabited by Slavs. During the Cold War, Slavic control extended even further than their settled populations with the virtual Russian control of East Germany marking the historical high point of Slavic power within Europe for the last 800 years. Since then, with the reunification of Germany, Slavic control has receded, although Slav inhabited territory has not.
Not only were the most significant territorial wars of the Twentieth Century conducted between Germans and Slavs, one might even say that all of the intellectual running in the twentieth century was carried on between Russia and Germany as well. Marx, after all was a German, so the German’s also have a claim to originating that great intellectual tussle of the Twentieth Century: the foment around the ideas of communism.
 
 
As Germany has this century resurfaced as the most powerful economy in Europe and Russia is struggling to deal with American hostility and low oil prices what makes you think Slavic power will trend up rather than down in the near future?
 
It is important to remember that Slavic power is not synonymous with Russian power. There are other Slavic countries in Europe, and it is in their policies that I see the source of their continuing rise. It is generally known that many Slavic countries have done well since the end of the Cold War. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia stand out as having become countries with a good standard of living and education. The largest of these, Poland, has even become very significant politically and is charting its own independent course between the major regional powers of Germany, Russia and the USA. The Slavic countries, led by Poland, can already be seen to have the self-confidence to stand up to the European Union. Their refusal to accept hordes of refugees from very different cultures is a prime example of this. For many of these nations, having only recently gained control of a sovereign country for their people they are understandably reluctant to share it with others. In most cases these countries have a degree of cultural homogeneity that the Western European countries have already lost. That homogeneity therefore is a point of difference with the West and one that the Eastern European countries could well benefit from. Cultural homogeneity makes nation building a much easier task and with national pride comes a willingness to make sacrifices for the benefit of the country. Such national feeling has in the past made certain nations more formidable in war than other countries, it also leads to stronger community feelings between individuals with all of the intendant, though difficult to quantify, benefits which that entails. 
As an example of the benefits of strong nationalism, the Russia of today can be used. Russia appears to be surviving sanctions and economic difficulties with very little political unrest, and this appears to be the result of the peoples’ gratitude for what the Putin led government has done for Russia and Russian pride since the beginning of the century.
So, their attachment to nationalism, though it may well cause frictions and even war in some areas will, I think, be of overall benefit to Eastern Europe in the years ahead.
 
Another element of growing Slavic power will be their continuance of their westward push. The Slavs have been gradually pushing west for centuries and I see the hordes of Slav workers who poured into Britain and other Western countries at the start of this century as a continuation of the same trend. Consequently, politicians in Britain, France and Germany know that they have to consider the views of significant Polish minorities while politicians in Warsaw have no such concerns. Overall, this increases the relative power of the Slavic populations in Europe.
 
The downfall of Russia should also not be taken as a downfall of Slavic power. I am not at all convinced that Russia is about to deteriorate from its present position, but even if it did most of the likely beneficiaries of such an event would be Slavic states. And, in the event, they would probably be Slavic states with a great deal of support from the United States behind them. If one thinks about the reconstruction of Japan and Western Germany after the Second World War; a Poland or Ukraine with such backing could quickly become very influential.
 
Climate change is also a phenomenon which appears to be working in favour of the Slavs.
If the Earth is warming, and the North Pole is warming at the fastest rate, then this could significantly improve agricultural yields in Russia and increase the percentage of land where human habitation is viable. As Russia has more land above the Arctic Circle, and immediately adjacent to it, than any other country; it is the country, of all the countries on Earth, which stands to gain the most from a warmer climate. Less ice in the Arctic Ocean could also open up Russia’s northern coast to more maritime trade making that coast more economically productive, and militarily strategic, as well.
Poland too stands to benefit from a warming Northern Hemisphere. With a coastline on the Baltic, a sea which often freezes over in winter, Poland could gain all-year round maritime access and even an increased beach-tourism industry, not to mention longer growing seasons for its already fertile plains.
 
In conclusion
I feel that the facts on the ground indicate that the Slavs are quietly improving their position in Europe while the West is concerning itself with other matters. The presence of large numbers of Slavs in many of Western Europe’s major cities, where not so long ago they were almost non-existent, is an indicator of their growing influence. In similar vein, the fact that Slavs are now noticeable as tourists in places like Australia and South-East Asia also speaks to the fact that incomes and living standards in their home countries are improving to positions where they are comparable with Western countries. The evidence of the map is also telling, in that it shows that Slavic governments control a greater portion of Europe than at any time (with the exception of the Cold War period) since the 11th century. The map also shows that Russia is the biggest country in the world and has increased in size recently with the addition of Crimea. There is talk of the possibility of Russia losing territory in Europe in the next decade, but even if this were to occur, the beneficiaries of such a collapse would most likely be other Slavic states. Global warming is of geo-strategic benefit to the Slavs, as well.
Lastly, the fact that large numbers of Slavic migrants are settling in Western Europe, yet the Slavic nations keep their own countries migrant free and culturally homogeneous suggests that Slavs will have a voice amongst the many divergent cultures in Western countries in the future whilst those countries will have no voice in the culturally harmonious Slav homelands. All these trends suggest to me that Slavic influence and power in Europe is set to increase in the coming decade, rather than the reverse.
 
Before leaving off …
I would also like to point out that almost everything that has been said here about the Slavic countries, applies as well to most other non-Slav countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania do, for the most part, possess the same advantages and attitudes as their Slavic neighbours and they therefore have the potential to benefit in the same way. Indeed, the similarity in their attitude to nationalism has led the governments of Hungary and Poland to become virtual brothers-in-arms on certain issues within the European Union, and they, along with Putin’s Russia, are now looked to as examples of how countries should be run by many nationalist groups throughout the West and the rest of the world; a clarifying example of how these countries are already gaining influence in the world while the attention of the West’s governments remains focused elsewhere.

The most populous country in the world is China – and everyone has heard the predictions that China will be the next super power.
The second most populous country is India – and everyone is aware that India is Asia’s other giant.
The third most populous country in the world is the United States of America – and there is no need to mention what everyone knows about it.
The fourth most populous country in the world is …. How many people could finish that sentence correctly?
A new colleague of mine, knowing of my connection to Indonesia, went away and consulted an encyclopaedia for some facts about the country. Later she asked me if what she had read was true. Did Indonesia really have 240 million people? I thought the number sounded a little light but I acceded that it was close.
“But that means it is bigger than Germany, bigger than France,” she responded in amazement.
My colleague, it appeared, had previously thought of Indonesia as just an exotic tourist destination whose greatest importance came from being close to Australia. She was clearly stunned by the implications of Indonesia’s population statistics.
There is weight in those statistics. Any country which has that many people, my colleague clearly realised, was a country with some power. And she was very surprised that she had reached middle age without realising that Australia’s neighbour was so much more than a cheap tourist destination.
Indonesia is probably best known for the island of Bali, an idyllic island that is a Mecca for tourists. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that Bali is even better known than Indonesia. The author of this article remembers a conversation with someone who said they had never been to Indonesia, but that they had been to Bali.
This conversation was probably symptomatic of the lack of attention paid to Indonesia even by those who should know better.
Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation on earth. Only China, India and the USA are larger. It is also developing fast in ways that are important but would not show up strongly in the economic statistics by which most countries’ relative health is usually analysed.
 
Democracy
Since the fall of Suharto in 1990 Indonesian democracy has become increasingly robust. The first democratically elected President in this period, Abdurahman Wahid, was barred from running again by the country’s elite for being beyond their control and the next two presidents were consequently members of the ruling class (Megawati Sukarnoputri, a former President’s daughter and Susilo Bambang Yudhyono, a former general) but the current president Joko Widodo makes much of his humble origins and is certainly not from the military/inherited wealth background of his predecessors, a fact which suggests that democracy is now too firmly entrenched in Indonesia for the elites to control. This is a very positive sign for Indonesia, speaking to the growth of institutions that become too strong to corrupt. With increasing democracy comes increasing accountability and amidst anti-corruption drives and civil society activism Indonesia is slowly descending in the global corruption rankings - steadily falling away from its former world number one ranking under President (read dictator) Suharto.
 
The Arts
Exactly why the arts should matter is still not exactly clear to the author of this article but what is clear is that the flourishing of the arts coincides with the flourishing of a country. All countries that have had a golden age of artistic achievement have had a coinciding golden age of influence in the world as well. With this thought in mind the impressive artistic output of Indonesia should be heeded. Though Indonesian is a very new language it has already (in the author’s opinion) produced at least one great novelist, Mochtar Lubis, and many great musicians. And now its movies are starting to attract international attention, as its painters and sculptors long have.  This vibrant arts scene means that Indonesia has soft power force. The author remembers watching television in Madagascar and seeing how all of the local stars were just imitating American models. He realised then that a country’s artistic output can bind other peoples to it far more surely than any military might. Soft power comes out of the arts and Indonesia’s artistic output in the Indonesian language is part of what is helping to bind this archipelagic nation together. The author’s personal experience of this comes from noting that twenty years ago Sasak children on the island of Lombok would be speaking only Sasak as they played and would wait to learn Indonesian at school, starting in the fourth grade, whereas today Sasak children run around imitating their favourite cartoon and television characters and calling to each other in the Indonesian that those characters use. Indonesia’s art scene is increasing the internal strength and cohesion of the country. An important factor in an island nation that boasts more than 300 ethnicities, each with their own language.
 
But isn’t Indonesia too divided amongst all its ethnic groups?
The fact that Indonesia needs to work to bring its people together is something which is often cited as the reason why analysts doubt that Indonesia will ever have the influence that its population figures suggest it should. It is said that Indonesia is too divided ethnically and geographically. However, it is the authors observation that Indonesia hangs together much more easily than many imagine. It is true that there is resentment in the outer islands for the domination of Java and the Javanese, but this does not mean that there is resentment for the idea of Indonesia. In many ways it has felt to me on my travels there that the outer islands are more Indonesian than Java. You are more likely to hear Indonesian being spoken on the side of the road in Sulawesi and Kupang than you are in Java. The outer islands also share a cosmopolitan history that separates them from the central islands of Java and Bali. Java and Bali have abundant fertile plains that gave rise to cultures that derived their main source of wealth from farming. Aristocracies ruled over peasants and very hierarchical, self-sustaining, inward looking cultures developed. The outer islands by contrast were mostly mountainous with poor soils. Farming was pursued, certainly, but it was not the abundant provider that it was in Java and Bali, consequently the people of the outer islands were much more dependent on fishing and sea-craft and developed cultures that saw maritime trading as their main source of wealth. What they traded varied from location to location. In some places it might be minerals like iron, in others, spices which grew well on those islands like cloves and nutmeg, some sold swallows nests from their limestone caves, in other areas dried fish or other marine resources like trepang were sold. Whatever their trade goods, in the outer islands the richest centres were always their trading ports and their main source of wealth was trade. Consequently, the cultures that developed in these islands were led by traders. Therefore, they were more egalitarian, far more outward looking and dependant on constant interaction with other islands and other peoples for the maintenance of their standard of living.
The cultures of Indonesia’s outer islands therefore have always been living in a loose web of inter-dependence with each other, so the idea of a unified maritime empire, which is essentially what Indonesia is, sits quite naturally with them. Foreign analysts who arrive in Jakarta and see the relative wealth and power of Java compared to the other islands and consequently deduce that Indonesia is essentially a colonial system controlled by Java, can be forgiven for thinking that, given the enormity and variety of Indonesia’s peoples and geographies, the centre cannot hold. However, Indonesia is not that classic ‘core and peripheries’ colonial system. Certainly, Java is the powerful and dominating core, but there is much more binding the peripheries together than Java’s power. In many ways the true heart of Indonesia is spread among those islands and Java and Bali are the odd ones out not the uniting force.
 
Isn’t Indonesia at a massive economic disadvantage through being spread among all those islands?
Being an archipelagic nation is an economic advantage, not a disadvantage, take a look at Japan and the United Kingdom by way of quick examples.
The seas between the Indonesian islands are sheltered and narrow. It does not require ocean crossings to move between these islands; these seas, or straits, are small and calm. Furthermore, they are equatorial waters that are out of the path of hurricanes. They are very safe waters to cross. Now, given that even with today’s modern transport systems, moving goods by boat is still far cheaper than moving them by rail or truck, all of this water, is, in fact, an economic advantage. Think of all the trouble that China is having trying to develop the regions that are not either coastal or on a navigable river. That is never going to be a large problem for Indonesia. Indeed, Indonesia has prospered by its archipelagic nature in the past. Sophisticated maritime trade was already present in Indonesia when the Europeans finally arrived, looking for spice, in the fifteenth century and for a while Indonesia was the economic epicentre of the global trading system. The European discovery of the continents of the Americas and Australia were all just accidents in their search for the riches of the Indes (read ‘Indonesia’). As another example of Indonesia’s economic importance back then the island of Manhatten, where stands modern day New York, was swapped for a tiny Indonesian island called Rum.
 
But aren’t Indonesia’s people too spread out to provide economies of scale in a central location?
It is also not the case that, with all its islands, Indonesia lacks a population centre with the critical mass to sustain an advanced economy. The island of Java has more than 100 million inhabitants and according to some estimates Jakarta is the second largest city on the planet. Not only that, but Indonesia is also urbanising fast and currently stands at 54.7% urban (www.worldometers.info). Indonesia has both a concentrated core and a hinterland accessible by coastal shipping. There are economic virtues here to be capitalised upon.
Furthermore, Indonesia sits astride the sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. These are the sea lanes which connect China and Japan with Middle East Oil and connect the West Coast of the USA with India.
The Malacca Strait is the second most important sea route in the world and its waters are divided between Indonesia and Malaysia (A country which, in large parts, shares both language and ethnicity with Indonesia).
 
What about border change? Isn’t Indonesia too unstable?
Since Independence Indonesia has acquired and then released the territory of East Timor and has fought a successful war to gain the western half of Papua and an unsuccessful war to incorporate Malaysia. There is a feeling that Indonesia’s borders are not yet set and that this is a potential risk factor for the country. This is true and there is much that can be said on this topic, but I would simplify it down to saying the area it is most likely to lose would be the western half of Papua, the least developed part of the archipelago, and the area it is most likely to gain is Malaysia, a more highly developed neighbour, which shares language and ethnicity with Indonesia and really only developed as a separate nation due to one area having been ruled by the British in European colonial times and the other having been ruled by the Dutch.
Were Indonesia to merge or federate with Malaysia at some point in the future then the resulting country would have complete control of the Malacca Straits and would be an even larger and richer and well-positioned nation than the current Indonesia. That such a union could be brought about successfully at some point in the future seems quite likely given that the two nations both share the same national language, Bahasa, and are ethnically very similar as well.
Were Indonesia to lose western Papua, it would admittedly lose its richest mining province, but it would also lose its least developed and least integrated citizens. It is quite possible that the loss of western Papua would be a benefit to Indonesia as whole.
Being an island nation also means that Indonesia is far less susceptible to invasion from its neighbours than a country with land borders.
 
The Centre of Asia
In many ways Indonesia is at the centre of Asia. Certainly, some might look at a map and say Sinkiang or Tibet were at the geographic centre of Asia but it can be argued that Indonesia is at the cultural meeting point of Asia. The two great realms of Asia are China and India and those two worlds meet in Indonesia.  Most obviously, Indonesia is halfway along the sea route between these two giants and located at the natural choke point of that sea route, at the end of the Malay Peninsula, but its claim to being between them goes further than that. Many Indonesian ethnic groups have genetic and linguistic connections to southern China but culturally Indonesia is much closer to India. So, there is a fusion of both East Asia and South Asia in Indonesia. And, yes, sitting on that great trade route between the two, being able to disrupt the trade of either yet being far enough removed not to be vulnerable to invasion does give Indonesia an ability to influence the giants from a position of security that a place like Myanmar does not have.
 
If Indonesia’s geography is so good then why hasn’t it been cashed in on already?
In a sense, Indonesia’s geography has already shown its worth at various times in the past. We have already mentioned that when the Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century they found the islands were already home to sophisticated maritime trading networks. And the technology found among the islands was also comparable with what the Europeans were using. Some islanders, for example, were already using cannons (indeed there is some speculation that cannons and firearms in general might have been an Indonesian invention, combining the fireworks powder traded from China with the local penchant for using blow pipes) and their ships too were comparable to what the European’s were using, though designed for the calmer protected seas of South East Asia rather than open ocean sailing.
There were small maritime empires operating in Indonesia, at that time, such as the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore and the Bugis of Makassar, with whom the Europeans had to fight for control when they arrived. But there had been large and wealthy empires in islands before that too, with the most notable being the Majapahit and the Sriwijayan, who were known to the rulers of China. So, history shows that the island of Indonesia could provide the base for both large empires and societies that were advanced by the global standards of the time. It also shows that the islands were a relatively secure base from which to operate as they were never conquered by an external power until the arrival of the Europeans and the creation of their global maritime empires.
So, Indonesia’s geography has proved its worth in the past, and it looks to be moving toward fulfilling its potential once again. In some ways its population is providing the impetus. During colonial times Indonesia’s population was sparse, but now it is growing to a point where a certain degree of influence is inevitable. Perhaps consequently, Indonesia is beginning to take off as one of the new China’s (the countries set to take over China’s low-end manufacturing role as wages in China continue to increase), and constant visitors to Indonesia can see the steady rise in living standards that are becoming available to the general population.
 
Won’t de-globalization stall Indonesia’s growth in its tracks?
So, Indonesia is following in China’s cheap manufacturing footsteps, but what happens if globalisation fades with increased tariff boundaries, robotization, 3D printing and fear of supply route disruption in this period of terrorism and state failure? Could it not be that Indonesia is following an out of date model?
If globalization does fade, Indonesia is one of the few countries that would grow its relative strength in such a world. Such a world is all about having the resources locally and Indonesia is one of the most resource rich countries, it has oil and minerals as well as some of the most productive farmlands on the planet, combining volcanic soils with year-round growing seasons. Indonesia can be both self-sufficient due to its resources and secure thanks to its island geography. So, Indonesia it seems is poised to benefit regardless of what the future brings.
 
Conclusion
Indonesia’s growing power is already showing in how other powers treat it. In particular, its treatment by China is telling. China is throwing its weight around with other South China Sea countries at the moment; building on islands and having naval stand-offs. When Chinese fishing boats are caught fishing in Indonesian waters, however, the Indonesian president flies in to watch them be burned. And the response from China? Very low key. China may be bullying other South China Sea claimants, but it is choosing not to pick a fight with Indonesia.
Indonesia is already a G20 country both economically and militarily and its ranking in both regards has been climbing over recent years.
For mine, though, the real joker in the pack for Indonesia’s potential power is its linguistic and ethnic brotherhood with Malaysia. Regardless of how the relationship between these two countries develops, though, Indonesia is very much the unseen giant of today’s world. It goes under the radar on account of its past poor performance, but there are many reasons to believe that its future will be more significant than its recent past, and for those who look closely there are many signs of building strength.

Perhaps, more should have been made of this earlier, but the idea of boasting has come late. Before everyone forgets how few people called the US election correctly I would like to draw readers' attention to the post on the 18th of June, 2016, where not only the results of the US election, but the Australian election too, were predicted with 100% accuracy.

I do notice that there was one mistake in the post, however, the speech quoted as taking place on the 13th of July, actually took place on the 13th of June; which would make sense seeing as the post went up before the 13th of July.

It has been said that the US does not have a military option against North Korea. North Korea's ability to destroy Seoul if they are struck by the US makes a US strike on the North politically unthinkable, according to many.
However, if South Korea had a public split with the US, and could convince the North that they were totally against any US attack, then perhaps the North would not retaliate against Seoul if such an attack did come.
Somewhat ironically, if the South withdrew from its alliance with the US, over the current crisis then that could give the US more room to act.
And by the way
If the South distanced itself from the US it would also make China happier with the idea of a strike. China certainly doesn't want a full blown war on the Korean peninsula, and so it would oppose a strike if it thought that ran the risk of restarting the Korean War. If, however, there was to be a strike and no war, China could be quite happy about the North having its nuclear and ballistic weaponry removed.
This is just a by the way thought, though, because the US does not need any approval from China to decide whether it bombs North Korea or not.

I said in the raison de etre of this blog that it would be in part a public record of political predictions, so given that recent articles have been more about explanation than prediction I think some crystal ball gazing is due.
 
Predictions relating to the US election:
Donald Trump will win the US presidential election.
Trump made a speech on the 13th of July, which I think will be looked back on as significant. In it he cited protection of the LGBT community as a reason for banning immigrants from countries with a history of exporting Islamic extremists. In the wake of the Orlando massacre this argument will carry weight and will cause rifts within the ‘social progressive’ ranks which had formerly been overwhelmingly in support of Hillary Clinton.
 
Predictions relating to the Australian Election:
In the coming Australian election the Nationals will steal primary votes from the Liberals and the Xenophon Party will steal votes from Labor.
Pauline Hanson will win a senate seat.
The coalition will be returned to government.

In the conflict between Russia and the US the next big play to look out for will take place in the Caucuses, that little band of mountainous countries that lie between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

On the 2nd of April, amidst heavy fighting, Azerbaijan suddenly seized some of the territory formerly held by Armenians in the long frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. This outbreak of violence between these two small countries should set alarm bells ringing for anyone who is watching the greater conflict between Russia and The West.
Ever since the US and Russia fell out over Ukraine, The West has been trying to damage Russia's economy and a key component of this has been trying to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas and oil. One arm of this effort has involved trying to locate an alternative source for oil and gas pipelines into Europe, and the new source which was found was Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has large reserves of cheaply acquirable oil and gas and is close enough to Europe to make pipelines to Europe feasible. Even better, Azerbaijan was formerly part of the Soviet Union, so if The West could draw it into its alliance it would be another thorn in the side of Russia.
Naturally, Russia has an interest in seeing that The West does not succeed in its aims.
Azerbaijan already has some pipelines running to the west. They pass through Georgia, another former member of the Soviet Union that has been drawn to The West. Russia no longer controls Georgia, but they do have troops in the breakaway region of South Ossetia whose territory points like a dagger from the north into the heart of the Georgian state. The southern border of South Ossetia lies not far from where the oil and gas pipelines run. Recently the border posts on the southern border of South Ossetia moved further south, effectively adding extra territory to South Ossetia and bringing the border so close to the oil and gas pipelines that they could now be easily shelled by artillery stationed in South Ossetian territory. Obviously, a cynical observer might conclude that this border shifting is part of a move by Russia and its ally to exert influence over Azerbaijan's ability to export its hydrocarbons to Europe. Specifically it lets the Europeans know that Russia has the ability to stop those pipelines at any moment by having the South Ossetians reignite their frozen conflict with the Georgian state.
That is all well and good for Russia, but pipelines can be moved further south. It would be much better for Russia if it could actually exert enough influence in its former satellites to control the flow of Azerbaijani hydrocarbons entirely. 

Russia has the military might to invade either of its two tiny neighbours Georgia or Azerbaijan, but Russia's reputation in the world would be damaged if it invaded a neighbour for purely economic/geopolitical reasons. Really, Russia would need a more acceptable reason before it could send its troops into a neighbour.
But wouldn't it be good fortune for Russia if such a reason did suddenly appear?

If warfare broke out between Azerbaijan and Russia's strategic ally Armenia then that would constitute a viable reason for Russia to intervene in Azerbaijan.  Who could blame Russia for defending her ally, particularly if Azerbaijan was the country to attack first?

So now we have a situation which has suddenly arisen where Azerbaijan has seized some territory from Armenian forces, what will happen now?
Will the conflict escalate and lead to Russia regaining control of its hydrocarbon rich former satellite by military means?
Or will a more subtle game be played where Russia achieves its control over Azerbaijan's hydrocarbons by threats and promises or is even defeated in securing its interests by a combination of other players and its own weaknesses? Or will nothing much happen, allowing things to go back to the status quo which existed before the attack?

Indicators that the Russians have been manouvering to make a play in the Caucuses:
One might say the Russians won't attack the Azerbaijanis; on the contrary the Russians have been particularly friendly to the Azerbaijani's of late. I would reply to this that one way for the Russians to get the Azerbaijanis to make the error of attacking Armenia is to let them think that the Russians were now better friends with them than the Armenians. One could reference the good relations between Iraq and the US which are said to have encouraged Saddam Hussein into thinking that the Americans would not defend Kuwait if he invaded it.

I would also point out that until 2nd April one might have been wondering why the Russians had decided to suddenly draw down in Syria, when everything was going so well for them there. They were leading their side to victory and making the United States appear ineffectual. One might also have wondered why they did not make greater overtures to the Kurds who would have seemed their natural allies.

Well here we have a good answer to both questions.
The Russians may have decided to start withdrawing from Syria so that they would be ready to focus their forces on Azerbaijan if needed. And they may not have played the Kurdish card in Syria because they wanted to keep it in reserve as a threat against Turkey to keep them from coming to the defence of their ethnic cousins in Azerbaijan.

Predicting what will happen in the Caucuses over the coming months is not the aim of this article. All that this article wishes to do is draw attention to the fact that the conditions have been set up for a big Russian move in the Caucuses, and what may seem like an insignificant sideshow at the moment could become a crucial test in the ongoing Russia/US face off.

Desperate times call for desperate acts.
 
News is coming to us that the EU and Turkey have struck a breakthrough deal to halt (or, at least, significantly reduce) the migrant flows from Turkey to Europe. It appears that the Turks are prepared to take back every asylum seeker who arrives in Greece, in return for some concessions but mostly for good will.
 
One would like to think that this move is driven by altruism and a desire to be a better neighbour and global citizen. And perhaps it is.
But there is another way to read the situation.

One might look at Turkey’s current geopolitical position and conclude that Turkey is in a dire situation and needs as many friends as it can get.
 
 
Turkey’s weakness
Turkey’s great geopolitical weakness is the fact that the southwest quarter of Turkey is a land mostly populated by the ethnic minority, the Kurds. There are roughly 15 million Kurds in the southwestern corner of Turkey and roughly another fifteen million of them living just over the Turkish border in the adjacent corners of Syria, Iraq and Iran. Many of the Turkish Kurds have agitated for an independent state in the past. Many of them are still doing so today. What their efforts for independence have lacked in the past have been a powerful international sponsor.
 
 
The Threat from Russia
Right now Turkey must feel that there is a grave threat that Russia might ‘Play the Kurdish Card’
Russia is doing well in Syria, supporting the Assad regime, an opponent of Turkey (by Turkey here, and in the rest of the article, we will mean Turkey under the current government). The Syrian Kurds, yet another opponent of Turkey, are also doing well in Syria. Now while there is not yet any formal alliance between the Assad regime and the Kurds, they are in many ways natural allies. The Assad regime is based on the Alawite ethnic minority and so likes to protect minorities from being overwhelmed by Syria’s majority Sunni Arabs. The Kurds are another ethnic minority within Syria and they would like to keep the gains they have made in the Syrian Civil War. Not being numerous enough to control Syria themselves, the Kurds have to be considering that their lot might be better with the pro-minority Assad regime than with its majority Sunni Arab opponents.
 
Turkey is opposing both Russia and the Kurds in Syria. Turkey is afraid that these two might unite and then Russia might play the ‘Kurdish card’.
 
Right now, the conditions whereby Russia might seriously back Kurdish secession from Turkey appear to be drawing close.
Russia would have much to gain by such a move. It would: weaken an adversary; be seen as a liberator of an oppressed minority; create a large new ally in the Middle East, and; create, moreover, an ally which shares a border with Armenia a close ally of Russia and a member of its Eurasian Economic Union. A liberated Kurdistan could immediately join the Russia dominated Eurasian Economic Union. Something that would be an appealing prospect to the Russians for a number of reasons.
 

The Threat from the United States of America
The USA does not want to see Russia liberating the Kurds from Turkey and perhaps creating a strong pro-Russian Kurdish state encompassing all of the contiguous Kurdish regions from Turkey, Syria, Iraq and possibly even Iran. That would be a major coup for the Russians and would make them look like the liberator of an oppressed people. The USA likes to wear the mantle of liberator of oppressed peoples; it does not want the Russians to steal this mantle. So, to date, the USA has been keeping the Syrian Kurds away from the Russians by giving them lots of support and keeping Turkish troops away from them.
More than this the Americans are just putting the finishing touches on two military airbases within Syrian Kurdish territory.
 
The Turks must be very worried.
Could it be that the US is planning to support the Kurds rather than let the Russians support them? US warplanes are currently flying out of Turkish airbases; why build airbases just over the border in Kurdish held Syria? Is the US expecting a breach with Turkey?
 
The Turkish government has every reason to be extremely concerned. Right now it appears that both the world superpower and their closest military rival have some pressing reasons for supporting the independence aspirations of the Kurdish populations in their region. In the past, had one of these powers tried to 'Play the Kurdish Card' Turkey would have allied with the opposing power to help counteract the threat, but now that option does not appear possible.
Neither the USA or Russia have committed to supporting an independent Kurdistan yet, but the potential for such an action grows as both the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars rage on and the Kurds in both countries continue to be the most reliable allies that the USA has in both conflicts; while at the same time the Kurds are also the most logical allies of the Russians.
 
Given this predicament it is no wonder that the Turks are seeking to make an ally of Germany and the European Union. The Turks are in need of powerful friends and even more in need of international good will. In light of this, the fact that the Turks are suddenly agreeing to make big moves to help Europe solve its refuge crisis makes good sense.
 
What more can Turkey do?
Turkey needs to make its peace with the Kurds.
There are two ways it could do this. It could either let the Kurds secede or it could bring the Kurds so far into its power structures that they will see the Turkish state as belonging as much to them as to any Turk.
 
The Turks could benefit from letting the Kurds secede.
Geopolitically speaking, in many ways the Kurds and the Turks are natural partners. Even if all the Kurdish regions were combined into a large Kurdish state it would still be a landlocked country. Kurdistan would need to befriend a neighbour with some coastline. The relatively developed and prosperous peninsula ofTurkey would be a logical economic partner for an Independent Kurdistan. Even under today’s difficult conditions Iraqi Kurdistan has allied with Turkey to secretly build an oil pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.
One also need not think that there would be an insurmountable reservoir of ill will from the Kurds toward their former rulers either. Hungary was under Austrian Habsburg rule for hundreds of years and yet now Austria is in many ways Hungary’s preferred neighbour. The reason why is because Austria agreed to allow local plebiscites along its border so that local communities could vote on which country they wanted to be in. By one such plebiscite the city of Sopron went from being Austrian to being Hungarian. As a result Hungary has no border disputes with Austria, unlike many of its other neighbours, and consequently Austrian-Hungarian relations are strong.
 
If Turkey, of its own volition, was to grant its Kurdish regions independence and ensure that the borders were in the right places. It would be seen as the midwife of Kurdish independence and gain much gratitude as a result. It would also immediately gain tremendous kudos with the Kurdish populations in neighbouring countries.
 
If Turkey is the first country to grant its Kurds independence it will immediately be seen as the greatest friend of the Kurds in the region and consequently any future Kurdish nation would be far more likely to form an economic or even political union with Turkey than any other of its neighbours. Letting the Kurds have independence could be Turkey’s road to truly becoming the leader of its region.
 
Even without its Kurdish corner Turkey would still be a large and powerful state of 65 million. It would be a richer place on average, as the Kurdish corner is a poorer region, and it may well be accepted into the European Union, as the ‘Kurdish Problem’ is the most cited reason for why the EU has not accepted Turkey to date.
 
 
Bringing the Kurds in
If Turkey is unwilling to see a quarter of its territory lost to another country (and most nations and leaders would be) then the only way to really make peace with the Kurds would be to bring them into the power structure so they feel that the country they share with the Turks is as much theirs as any Turk's. To do this they would probably need to change the name of the country and create some sort of federation. A Kurdish president might then convince the Kurdish masses that they were living in a country that was truly theirs.
 
In an earlier article below, I have already outlined that this is what I suspect Turkey’s president Erdogan has realised and is possibly trying to achieve. The constitutional changes that would be needed would never get through the Turkish parliament as it now stands, so that might be one of the reasons why Erdogan is trying to change system so that he has more power as president. It is also a potential reason for his recent secretive visits to the jailed Kurdish resistance leader Abdullah Ocalan and Abdullah Ocalan’s consequent request that the Kurdish partisans put down their arms and cooperate in a democratic solution. It is possible that Ocalan found the idea of a Kurdish/Turkish federation an acceptable alternative to an independent Kurdistan.
If Erdogan did have such plans it is understandable that he would not make them publically known as they would not be popular with many Turkish nationalist and in a democratic system they could easily be blocked. Erdogan might well be seeking his increased powers in order to be able to make the changes to the country that he sees as necessary.  For now, Erdogan is pursuing a constitutional route to increased presidential powers, but with all that is going on in Turkey at the moment, combining terrorist attacks with refugees and wars on its borders, one could imagine Erdogan finding enough justification in some near future event for the declaration of martial law. He could then take to himself all the powers that he needs. Such a declaration of martial law, need not necessarily be contrived either. There are many ways in which the wars on Turkey’s borders could eventually impact on Turkey in a way that makes the assumption of martial law prudent.
 
In conclusion
Turkey’s offers of to take back all refugees travelling to Greece from Turkey should buy a lot of goodwill from Germany and the EU, and Turkey is very much in need of allies at the moment. In this article I have set out, in relatively simple terms, what Turkey has to fear and some possible solutions.
There are many scenarios that could play out from our current circumstances that would bring transformative change to Turkey.  The sudden, dramatic offers in relation to refugees are an indicator that the governing elite of Turkey know that they are in a far more precarious and challenging situation than most would like to admit.

Does anyone else get the feeling that there could be a deal on between Turkey and Saudi Arabia for the division of Syria? And that their troops might be on the ground in Syria sooner rather than later?
The likely deal would involve Turkey getting control of a slice of northern Syria extending 100-150 kilometres south from its own border. Saudi Arabia would take all the remaining lands occupied by IS.
​The benefits of this deal for Turkey would be that it gets control of the Kurdish region in which the YPG is setting too good an example to Turkey's own restive Kurds of what an independent Kurdish state might look like.
The benefits to Saudia Arabia have been covered in earlier blogs and can be read below.

Why sooner rather than later?
Because of the Russians.
Saudi Arabia might have always had a long term plan to put troops on the ground in Syria, but until recently there was no rush. The longer the civil war in Syria dragged on and the more horrible and intractable it became the more likely it was that a Saudi intervention would be seen as a blessing.
Now that the Russians have rejuvenated the Assad loyalists, however, and there is talk of them re-taking Raqqa, the Saudi's need to get involved while there is still some Islamic State territory left for them to liberate.
Ideally the Saudi's would like to take Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, before they put boots on the ground inside Islamic state territory, but with their troops approaching the outskirts of Sanaa as this article is written, and the campaign for Sanaa generally progressing well for the Saudi's, it seems likely that they have decided that they need to seize their moment and will commit to fighting in two theatres.
The Turks, are also no doubt wanting to put a stop to the possible linking up of the two Kurdish controlled regions of northern Syria, a scenario which becomes increasingly likely as the continued aerial bombardment of IS makes them less able to fend off the Kurdish YPG advances.
Turkey was particularly concerned by the YPG's recent seizure of territory on the western bank of the Euphrates: which put the YPG one step closer to linking up their two bodies of territory along the Turkish border.
Another concern for both Turkey and Saudi Arabia is the prospect of a deal being struck between Assad and the Kurds. It would be advantageous for them both to act before such a deal came into being and further strengthened the Assad regime's reviving claims to be the legitimate, and still ruling, government of Syria. 

If the Turks get the North and the Saudis take the South who gets the East and the coast of Syria?
This is a good question.
With Russia giving the Assad regime considerable support one would have to say at this stage that the Assad regime is likely to retain control of the territory they already have and may well takeover most of the rebel areas which are not either Kurdish or IS. This would leave Syria divided into three spheres of power with Assad on the coast and in the coastal mountains, the Turks in the North and the Saudis controlling the remaining, mostly desert regions, to the South and South-East. 
With Russia having become so invested in supporting the Assad regime it is natural that the Turks and the Saudis would be very wary of trying to extend their intervention to the coast, but if both of these countries had their armies in the field and the tacit backing of the United States then they may well dare to take the fight to Assad and the Russians.
Then again, Russia's main concerns at the moment are with its Eastern European border and it could well be bought out of the fight in Syria if the US were to allow it significant gains in Ukraine, for example.

It's all about the Russians
The Russians, the Assad regime and even the Iranians have begun sabre rattling in response to the Turkish and Saudi announcements that they are willing to put troops on the ground in Syria. Naturally, it would be disastrous for the Russians, the Assad regime and Iran if either Turkey or Saudi Arabia or both intervened in Syria. Therefore they will be willing to go to lengths to prevent such interventions. Consequently, all of these parties are now engaged in a sabre rattling face-off.
Much will depend on the disposition of the US and the European Union in negotiations conducted far from the Syrian battlefields.
​Perhaps the Russians will succeed in staring down one or both threats.
If they do it will be a significant victory for Putin, leaving the Russian backed regime as the most likely final victor of the Syrian civil war.
Will the US allow this to happen?
The Syrian civil war could be about to enter a new phase of significant foreign intervention.

Could Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud be the leader to unite the Arab world?  Well, that is an interesting topic to speculate about.  We are at a point in history where some circumstances have arisen that would make the unification of the Arab world, or at least a decent part of it, more likely than it has been since the time of Nasser.  To begin with the Arab world has rarely been more in need of leadership with chaos and civil war reigning in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and large regions of other Arab countries.  Also one might argue that  Saudi Arabia currently enjoys a supremacy in terms of Arab leadership that not even Nasser's Egypt enjoyed, with the total lack of any strong rival for influence.  Algeria would be the next strongest Arab Sunni state, but it is located in the Maghreb, far from the Middle East, the hub of the Arab world.

 One can definitely  say that Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud has already achieved an impressive feat of Arab unity in bringing a coalition of 10 Arab states together to fight a war in Yemen.  How much further could he go?

Let us post a speculative history for Saudi Arabia's near future.
a.   A period of honing military prowess and cementing one's position at the top of the regional power hegemony by leading a military coalition in Yemen.
b.   Taking control of the lands of the Islamic State after that group has been worn down by international attacks.

This would be a fine point for Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to stop and rest on his laurels, and given his age one might say this would be about where you would expect him to stop.  As he is 79 one would assume he could not really expect any more than ten good years and it would be possible for Saudi Arabia to get to this point within ten years.
The next big step for Saudi Arabia to take would be to seize the rest of Syria, but there would be big questions over whether that would be a wise step. Incorporating a large secularised population like Damascus could have a destabilizing effect within Saudi Arabia as already discussed in previous articles.  Oddly enough though Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's age might make him more likely to take the step than others given that being the Arab leader to reunite Mecca and Damascus would make his name stand tall in posterity and he might reason that he probably won't be around long enough to deal with any messy consequences.

c    Taking control of the west of Syria will lead naturally into the need to dominate Lebanon as well.
d   With the respect earned from its previous victories and expansions Saudi Arabia, under whatever leader, may find itself with such prestige among the Arab populations of its remaining neighbours that all sorts of possibilities present themselves.

What could a brave king do?

One way in which geopolitical analysts attempt to predict the future is a method known as ‘scenario planning’. According to this method you think up as many possible scenarios as you can, within reason, and then you try and estimate the percentage chance of them coming to pass.  This is a fun task for analysts because it is one of the few times where they are seriously asked to plan out the most dramatic and extreme scenarios.  In this short article we will not attempt to set out a range of scenarios and estimate their chances of coming to pass.  What we will do though is endeavour to give you an idea of what the potential consequences of having a ‘brave king’ in Saudi Arabia really are.

Saudi Arabia’s potential for expansion

Point One:

In this world of nation states the Arab lands are an anomaly. From Morocco to Oman you have a great string of countries that are all inhabited by a people who speak the same language and define themselves as being from the same culture; they are Arabs. Consequently, most of the nations which the Arabs inhabit have few natural borders with their neighbours. On both sides of the border the people speak Arabic and call themselves Arabs and there is a past history in which the border did not exist and the inhabitants of both countries lived happily together either as part of the Ottoman Empire or one of the earlier caliphates. Not surprisingly, therefore, there have been many political leaders in the Arab World who have been advocates of Pan-Arabism and have dreamed of uniting the Arabs into one super state.  Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt briefly united Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic and Saddam Hussein tried to present himself as a Pan-Arab unifier in his invasion of Kuwait.  Given this unique circumstance of the Arab nations, whenever a strong leader emerges in one of their countries there are always some who will ask, “Could he be the one?”

I do not raise this matter in order to discuss whether  Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud could be the man to reunite all the Arabs, but to simply emphasise that the borders surrounding most Arab countries are more easily shifted or dissolved than those that correspond to real ethnic and cultural divisions; and that consequently Saudi Arabia would have less barriers to expansion than most countries simply by virtue of being Arab.

Point Two:

I said in the previous article that Saudi Arabia is the strongest state in the Arab world, one might argue that Egypt with its massive population is the strongest, but due to its poverty and Saudi Arabia’s wealth it is Saudi Arabia which influences the Egyptian government at the moment and not vice versa.  Egypt has been a heavily populated behemoth throughout recorded history, but it has often had outsiders come in and take over the running of its political structures.  Simply having a larger population than Saudi Arabia does not make it immune from being influenced or even dominated by Saudi Arabia. Egypt is currently part of the Saudi led coalition which is attacking Saudi enemies in Yemen.

Egypt is large, but it does not currently have the power to exert much influence on other countries.  Saudi Arabia by contrast, through its money, and increasingly through its military capabilities, does have that ability.  It is by far the most influential Arab state in today’s world.

Prediction:

The above two points being made, my prediction is that, under a brave king, Saudi Arabia will be the state to occupy the space currently occupied by the Islamic State.

Why?

1.       The Sunni Arabs of this region will prefer Sunni Arab Saudi Arabia to Shia dominated Iraq or Alawite controlled Syria.

2.       Saudi Arabia is a very traditionally Islamic state and is the keeper of Islam’s two most holy sites so to those locals who previously used religious rhetoric to support the Islamic State, Saudi Arabia will be an acceptable (even supportable) replacement.

3.       Saudi Arabia has the necessary internal and institutional strength for conducting an annexation of territory.  It has a compliant population who like to see their nation acting strongly and their military institutions are working well enough to conduct a sophisticated air campaign against Yemen and lead a 10 country coalition.  King Salman also  has particularly good support within the country’s power hierarchies after 48 years as the governor of Riyadh, during which time he was frequently used by the monarchy as the main man for healing rifts between factions and disciplining minor royals.  Tasks which show the high level of respect with which he was and is regarded and the great position he has enjoyed to build personal relationships and alliances within Saudi Arabia’s power structures.

4.       Saudi Arabia’s domestic policies make them particularly capable of dealing with the Islamic State zealots once they capture the area.  Saudi Arabia has already, in the time of its founder Ibn Saud, eradicated ultra-intolerant religious extremists by wiping out entire villages where some violently extremist forms of Wahhabism (a strain of Islam) had taken route.  Saudi Arabia can still act in this sort of dramatic but effective way as it is not accountable to any liberal/human rights focussed discourse within its political structures.  It is not a democracy. Its king is not accountable to any western notions of human rights and for the most part the Saudi population would probably view clemency for such violent enemies of the state as Islamic State as weakness.

5.       Saudi Arabia is made more acceptable to the local population by virtue of its proud history of creating itself through a process of tribal warfare rather than being a country created by western colonial powers.

6.       The area now controlled by Islamic State is a very attractive target of annexation to Saudi Arabia for a number of reasons: firstly, it has two major rivers running through it, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and Saudi Arabia is very water poor and in need of both water and arable land; secondly, the area currently occupied by Islamic State does not possess any major cities, thus if annexed it would not significantly change the power balances within Saudi Arabia.  If Saudi Arabia annexed an area with a city like Damascus in it, for example, that city would soon begin to exert an influence on the internal political dynamics of the country simply by virtue of its population and economic clout.  And given that cities tend to produce more liberal, secular and cosmopolitan views, the influence of a city like Damascus within the country might cause problems for the monarchy and their current ruling institutions.  By comparison the area currently ruled by Islamic State would be an ideal addition to the country possessing as it does a more traditionally minded rural and small town population along with the resources of water and arable land that Saudi Arabia would dearly like to possess.

7.       Although generally speaking the United States, and the western world, do not like the idea of borders changing and states expanding, they will nonetheless find very little to say against such an annexation by a former stalwart ally, particularly given the nature of the regime they will be replacing and the difficulty that any western liberal democracy would have in eradicating the Islamic State zealots from among the local population.

So, it can be seen that Saudi Arabia is essentially ideally constituted to annex the current territory of the Islamic State, so long as they are led by a brave king who is capable of seizing the opportunities that are presented to him.  If he plays his cards right he might even be welcomed in as a liberator by a significant proportion of the local population and hailed as a hero by the rest of the world.

Keep an eye out for ‘A Brave King - Part Three’

The Islamic State (IS) is not a nationalist entity; it wants a Caliphate that will incorporate all the world.  The Islamic State recognises no national boundaries and intends to unite humanity under Islam.  In professing and promoting a religious identity they are in many ways antithetical to any nationalist identity.  This being said, it still appears to me that IS’s success in Syria and Iraq has been another one of history’s many examples of what happens when you put national borders in the wrong places.

The territory that IS has managed to conquer in Syria and Iraq corresponds in broad outline to what would make a sensible nation state.  The area that they now control (with the addition of Tikrit and the regions that they have only recently been pushed out of) fairly accurately corresponds with the areas of Iraq and Syria that are inhabited by Sunni Muslim Arabs.  The areas of Iraq and Syria that IS has been unable to make significant gains in are the areas inhabited by Kurds, Alawites, Druze, and Shia Arabs.  Consequently the border of IS territory has essentially stabilised along a line which would make a sensible border between a Sunni Arab nation and the neighbouring national groups which surround them.

The leaders and evangelists of the Islamic State believe in a religious identity which subsumes all nationalist identity but the shape of their territory suggests that the general population of that area of the Middle East are still strongly attracted to an ethnic/nationalist identity.  The Sunni Arabs of both Iraq and Syria have been existing in states where they have been ruled over by other ethnic groups.  It is not extraordinary therefore to surmise that part of the appeal of the IS for the people within its territory is that it has finally united all of the area’s Sunni Arabs in one cohesive, self-governing and powerful state.

Perhaps the easiest way to defeat the Islamic State ideologues would be for the international community, led by America, to simply abandon the formal borders of Iraq and Syria as they were drawn by the French and British during their colonial occupation and promise the Sunni Arabs their own nation state with borders that correspond to the demographic reality.  Perhaps then many of the Sunni Arabs of Iraq and Syria would stop supporting the aggressive and extremist IS and the region could look forward to a greater degree of peace and stability.

Various journalists have been describing the recent statements and actions of President Erdogan, jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, and the main legal, pro-Kurdish party, the People's Democratic Party, as 'inconsistent'. And so they may appear to many in Turkey as well as Western observers. However there is an explanation which fits all of the recent discordant announcements together.

Turkey has reached a crossroads in its modern history. A crossroad that exemplifies the limits of ethnic nationalism. If Turkey wishes to become a true regional hegemon the Turkish state must abandon its ethnic Turkish nationalism as a state legitimiser. Neighbouring populations of Arabs and Kurds will never warm to being dominated by another race. The Kurds who already live within the borders of Turkey have demonstrated this quite eloquently over the years. However, if the Turkish state can decouple itself from ethnicity and become a Pan-Ethnic state as the Ottomans before them succeeded in doing then the state apparatus that currently rules the core region of Turkey could expand to hold sway over a much increased territory and the Turks themselves would as a people once again become first among equals in a multiethnic empire.

The reason why Turkey's need for a shift in emphasis is more apparent now than it ever has been before is simply because with the two states to its south, Syria and Iraq, having fallen apart and having remained un-unified and largely ungovernable for some years now the region is quite literally calling out for some strong and benign power to intervene. Secondly, amidst all this chaos it is clear that one group at least will benefit and that group is the Kurds. The Kurds have already established quasi-independent states in both Iraq and Syria and it is clear their tide is rising. Erdogan has no doubt already done the calculus and he knows that there are only two good ways forward from here.
To keep repressing the Kurds in the south-west quarter of Turkey while they gain independence in the states just over the border is a no-win situation. It can be done, but it is certainly not going to create a greater or happier nation. The two options that would better Turkey's position are to either cut the Kurds loose and let them have independence or recreate the state in a way that Kurds will feel they are equal partners in it.
A Turks only Turkey
If Turkey did choose to let the Kurds have independence and let the south-west corner of their country break away it would still have a bright future. A Turkey without the Kurds would still be a large and powerful state. With its internal cohesion and human rights record improving as a result of the loss of the insurgent Kurds one could expect Turkey to become more wealthy and well governed and consequently even more powerful than it is now. It might even be allowed to join the European Union, presuming that were still desirable, and certainly would be seen by Europeans as a valuable, enlightened buffer between them and the unruly rest of the near east. In this scenario Turkey would still have influence in the Middle East as an example that other peoples would like to emulate, but not to join. And though powerful the Turkish state would know that it's power would never grow much beyond its defined borders.

The Ottoman Empire Re-Created
The second beneficial path that is open to Turkey is to abandon its ethnic Turkish nationalism and convert itself into a state which derives its legitimacy from its good governance and ability to provide protection and prosperity to its citizens and which also allows its citizens to express a variety of ethnic identities. Some might say that it would be difficult for Turkey to perform such a transition and this is true, but It could be done. The Kurds of Iraq already look to Turkey as their best friend in the neighbourhood. Turkey conspired with the government of Arbil to transport oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan via a pipeline against the will of the Iraqi government in Bagdad. This has earnt Turkey a lot of good will from the Iraqi Kurds. It is also the case that many Turkish diplomats have already been working to improve relations with the Kurds in neighbouring states because of the inevitable calculus that if Turkey is to compete with Iran regionally then it needs good relations with the Kurds. If Turkey could win the Kurds to it then in addition to having strong bases of influence in both of the disintegrating countries to its south it would also have a fifth column inside Iran by virtue of that country's own sizeable Kurdish population.
To change Turkey in the ways that are required will be difficult; even the country's name is a nationalist statement and would probably need to be changed, however, recent events and the desire of politicians and peoples to become more powerful suggest that Erdogan is already trying to move his country in the desired direction. His recent statement that "There is no Kurdish problem," and the recent loosening of control in the Kurdish regions can be seen in this light. Far more important though was Erdogan's recent visit to the jailed Kurdish leader Ocalan's cell. Most successful national leaders are aware of the big geopolitical picture surrounding their people and so Erdogan may well have found, ironically, that there was no one more capable of understanding his situation and his aspirations than Ocalan. To judge from Ocalan's subsequent call for the Kurds in Turkey to lay down their arms he has also judged that for the Kurds to be equal players in a mighty pan-ethnic state might serve their interests better than being an independent but poor state surrounded by powerful neighbours. Certainly, the Kurds have little to lose by starting along this journey to a pan-ethnic state with Erdogan. If things go well, all will be well, and if things don't go we'll then the Kurds will probably find themselves in an even better position to push for independence. Right now, Erdogan needs the Kurds if he is to realise the dream of turning Turkey into a powerful regional hegemon so the Kurds will have the ability to direct the nature of the state's transformation to their benefit.
Erdogan is also favoured in embarking on this project at this moment by the fact that the Kurds know that they can gain much by alliance with Turkey. The Kurdish enclave of Kobani would have fallen to the Islamic State recently if Turkey had not opened its border to allow Kurdish fighters from other regions to reinforce it. On a larger scale the Kurdish region of Iraq could greatly use Turkish support if it is to hold off the forces of Bagdad and Iran's Shia allies.
The Kurds are also a people who have experienced success in pan-ethnic states in the past, going all the way back to Saladin, the Kurdish ruler of a caliphate that led the resistance to the crusaders.

Erdogan may not yet be sure just how he is going to change Turkey. Ever since he and his Justice and Development (AK) party took power there has been a move toward regional leadership based on pan-islamism. Certainly an Islamic state has much broader regional appeal than one based on a particular nationality, but even pan-Islamism is limiting. There are large regions of both Syria and Iraq that would be alienated by a Sunni Islamic power. Religion is in itself a sort of ethnicity. Ideally, to have the greatest chance of dominating the Middle East the new Turkey would need to be both non-ethnic and non-religious. Perhaps, however, this is a step too far for Erdogan, particularly when most Kurds and most Arabs would identify as being Sunni Moslems. At the very least, however, the new Turkey must be a state in which men like Ocalan feel they could themselves become president and consequently rule over both Kurds and Turks. That is the sort of carrot which could attract the political leadership of the Kurds and other ethnicities into welcoming the expansion of a state based on the same core territory as the former Ottoman Empire.

So, if some journalist are confused that the Turkish government is getting less liberal, but the Kurds seem to be moving closer to a rapprochement it is because they are used to seeing ethnic relations only progress in terms of a dominant ethnicity granting more rights and liberties to members of minorities. What they are failing to see is that there is a new game in town; one that changes everything. Right now the two men who are the most influential leaders of the Turks and the Kurds are talking of the creation of a state in which both ethnicities will be equal parties. Greater liberalism is no longer needed, and indeed can even be inconvenient if you suddenly find yourself a member of the ruling class.

By launching direct military action against the Houthi/Saleh forces in Yemen the Saudis are taking a long term risk.  Though they might be by far the stronger party at the moment it is conceivable that they might meet strong resistance.  It is hard to subdue people who have nothing to lose and the Yemenis are very poor.  They also live in extremely difficult terrain.  Until now the Houthis were respecting the Saudi border.  Now that the Saudis have attacked them they will have no qualms about operating in Saudi territory.  Given there is significant Yemeni/Houthi population in the regions of Saudi Arabia which border Yemen's northern border, the Saudis are leaving themselves open to a war which could end up being fought on their own soil.  The Saudis may rationalise that if the Houthis gain complete control of Yemen they will, given past history, be after their southern regions next anyway.  This may be true, but the international community would have been virtually unified in opposing one country attacking another.  By Saudi Arabia attacking first they have forfeited this moral high ground.
The Saudis do already have the support, perhaps even the encouragement, of the United States of America in their attack and perhaps they believe that this is the only voice in the international court of public opinion that matters so why not invade.  This is a fair point, but America's priorities might change in the future while Yemen''s position on the southern border of Saudi Arabia will not and now that the Saudis have broken the peace I am sure the Houthis will be eager to take the fight into Saudi territory whenever they can.

26-3-2015 
It has been an interesting day for two reasons.
1. Events in Yemen.
Suddenly the Al-Houthi's supported by forces loyal to the former President appear to be on the verge of taking control of Aden the former Capital of South Yemen.  Given that many pundit have been predicting the imminent break up of Yemen into its former independent parts of North Yemen and South Yemen this is a very significant development.  Particularly significant is the involvement of the former unifying president Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Now, while I do not put myself forward as an expert on Ali Abdullah Saleh, I will say that in unifying North and South Yemen to create one  nation Saleh achieved a feat which makes him one of the most successful national leaders of the twentieth century.  I note that Yemen's current troubles started while Saleh was seriously ill.  If Saleh is back in control of himself, and today's events suggest to me that he is, then those who are saying that 'there is no one who can pull Yemen back together,' might find that they are mistaken.  
Though if Saleh comes back to influence through the aid of his former adversaries, the Houthi's it could well spell worrying times for Saudi Arabia.
2. The Ukrainian President has sacked the powerful oligarch Igor Kolomoisky from the post of Governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region.  Given that Kolomoisky is seen as the man who was most influential in ensuring that Dnipropetrovsk did not join the pro-Russian separatist movement this rift between himself and the Ukrainian government presided over by fellow/rival oligarch Petro Poroschenko is very significant indeed.