This article will examine the risk versus reward potential of all the prospective northern​ offensives that Russia could run in Ukraine. It will then come to a conclusion as to the most likely.

Offensive One
Direction  – Driving south from Belorussia along the Polish border, taking or encircling Lviv then following the Dniester River valley to seal off the Romanian border and the Moldavian border north of Transdniestria.

Rewards – The purpose of this offensive would be to cut Ukraine off from Western supplies. Given that Hungary, Slovakia and Transnistria are not allowing military supplies to cross their borders into Ukraine then it is only the Polish border, the Romanian border and a small section of Moldavian border north of Transnistria where supplies are making it into Ukraine (The flow of goods from the Romanian border south of Transnistria has been blocked by the destruction of two strategic bridges). Without supplies from its allies, Ukraine would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. So if this offensive was successful it would mean a quick and decisive end to the war. Added benefits for Russia would be that most of the fighting and consequent destruction and death would take place in the extreme west of the country, which is the most anti-Russian part of the country, leaving the more pro-Russian East and Centre with less damage.

Risks – The danger with this thrust, though, is that the Russian right flank would be extremely vulnerable to an attack across the Polish border by the very well-armed and highly motivated Poles. With fighting right on the Polish border it runs the risk of some munitions straying across the border and giving Poland an excuse to cross the border in retaliation. Such a move would be the more likely as, if the Russians had an extended offensive pushing south from Belorussia, it would be very tempting for the Poles to enter the fray, cutting the salient off from Belorussia in the north and thereby surrounding the attacking army in one relatively easy move. That would be a disaster for the Russians. Further more, it would be very difficult for the Russians to take Lviv quickly a major city with perhaps the greatest anti-Russian, pro-war sentiment in Ukraine.

Conclusion – Whilst the rewards of this plan are enormous. The potential for a disaster is too high a risk for the Russians. This is not the strategy they will employ at this time.
 

Offensive Two
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia, beginning at a point midway between the Polish border and the Dneiper river, then heading south to make contact with the northern border of the Russian ally, Transnistria.

Rewards – Similar to Offensive One, the purpose of this offensive would be to cut off Kiev and the great majority of Ukraine from Western supplies. 

Risks – Unlike Offensive One, though, the Russians do not have the difficult task of taking Lviv indeed there are no major urban areas standing in the way of this offensive reaching its desired goal. This thrust would also be far enough away from the Polish border that the fighting has little chance of spilling over, and if the Poles decide to intervene anyway, then the Russians will have some time to prepare to face them as they will need to cross some 60 to 100 kilometres of Ukrainian held territory before encountering the Russian flank. Not being right up against the Polish border, however, will mean, though, that there will be a significant slab of Ukrainian territory on the Russians’ western flank with the major city of Lviv at its core and that even if the rest of Ukraine is cut off this western region would be well set up to carry on the fight.
Being a salient striking down between Ukraine’s two primary military logistics hubs of Lviv and Kiev, this Offensive also has the potential to see an attacking Russian army cut off from its support and encircled. Though that possibility is reduced by the less likely intervention of the Poles.
 
Conclusion – There is a lot to recommend this offensive plan. Particularly, when it may well be the case that Putin does not want Lviv and was intending for it to be the capital of a rump Ukrainian state, which would be useful to him as somewhere for all the die hard Ukrainian nationalists to go to, rather than staying in the conquered part of Ukraine and causing the Russian administration headaches.
I do not think the Russians will undertake this offensive at this time. They are currently winning in the East (if only marginally) and at the moment the momentum of the war is turning in their favour. They appear to be getting stronger while the Ukrainians appear to be weakening. Given this situation they will be reluctant to do anything risky that could turn momentum and morale against them. Better to pursue safer courses of action even if their gains are only small rather than give the Ukrainians a chance to have a big win and undo all of the positive momentum. As one analyst has said ‘Right now, the Ukrainians only hope of victory is through a Russian mistake.’ I think the Russians would assess that they need to avoid the possibility of a ‘mistake’ at all costs, so their up-coming offensive will be, I think, one that risks little.
If the Russians are successful in taking the East bank of the Dnieper. It will be after that when they will endeavour to launch this offensive, not now.
 

Offensive Three
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia straight at Kiev.

Rewards – Taking the capital of Ukraine.

Risks – Destroying the city which was the medieval capital of Russia for 600 years. A very difficult and costly fight through Ukraine’s largest city. Making enemies and warriors of many civilians who might not otherwise have been wanting to resist the Russian takeover.
Despite the great cost to achieve, it would not necessarily bring the war to an end even on the East bank of the Dniepr.

Conclusion – Not going to happen. My guess is that Putin does not want to see sustained fighting in Kiev. The initial attack on Kiev was conducted in the hope of scaring Ukraine into submission. Once it was clear that sustained fighting would be needed to take the city, Putin withdrew.
 

Offensive Four
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia along the East bank of the Dneipr River, taking Chernihiv, taking or encircling the Eastern suburbs of Kiev, pushing on along the Dneipr to meet up with another Russian army pushing north along the eastern bank of the Dniepr from Zhaprizhia or a Russian army pushing west toward the Dneipr from a starting point between Sumy and Kharkiv.

Rewards – Cutting off Eastern Ukraine from all supplies from the West which would mean any Ukrainian forces in the East would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. This offensive would also make Kiev a frontline town subject to artillery fire from the Russian forces. This would have a significant psychological impact on the Ukrainians. Also reducing the ability of their largest city to function productively and in all likelihood forcing a withdrawal of the central government to the West, probably to Lviv.
 
Risks – As with all salient attacks there is the risk of being cut off and encircled. An attack along the east bank of the Dneipr to Chernihiv was attempted at the beginning of the war and failed to take Chernihiv, so it is known that Chernihiv will not be easy to take. Making deep attacks from two or three directions requires a lot of manpower, firepower and logistics in an environment where mobile warfare has proven difficult, so far. Given all of this it is possible that these offensive thrusts will become stalled before meeting up. Offensive thrusts that fail to meet their goals will cause reputational/morale damage to the Russian army.
 
Conclusion – This strategy will be employed in parts. The pushing south along the east bank of the Dneipr will be held off for now but attempts to attack north from Zhaporizia along the Dneipr and West from between Kharkiv and Sumy will be made. If both, or even just one, of these attacks goes exceptionally well then a thrust from the north will eventually be made.
Part of the reason why I am confident the Zhaporizhia and Sumy/Kharkiv thrusts will be made is because these attacks have multiple success points. On the Zhaporizhia front if they just move the front forward a few kilometres; it is a success; if they take or encircle Eastern Zhaprizhia City – they have taken control of a vital Dneipr crossing; big success; if they make it all the way to Dnipro; they have blocked two key Dneipr crossings; outstanding success. From the border between Sumy and Kharkiv, if they simply take some Ukrainian territory then they have succeeded in creating a buffer zone along the border; success; if they push in 30 kilometres between Sumy and Kharkiv, then they have put themselves in a position to encirlcle either city or drive toward the Dneipr, thus putting the enemy in doubt and forcing them to divide their forces or leave one or more options open; big success; from there the outstanding success of encircling Kharkiv or Sumy or driving to the Dneipr is possible. If the later option is achieved then an attempt to meet that thrust with an army coming up from Zhaporizhia or down from Chernihiv would be a next step.
 
Ultimate Conclusion
So, I am predicting that if the war plays out in the Russian favour, but the Ukrainians continue to fight, then first we will see offensive four put into action and then after that offensive two. Of course, as outlined in the previous blog, I would see the partial implementation of Offensive Four being conducted in tandem with attempts to advance on all existing fronts in order to stretch Ukraine's strategic reserves to the maximum.
 

I find it highly likely that before the Ukraine war is over the Poles will put troops on the ground. Historically, when The Ukraine and Belarus have not been Russian territory, then they have most likely been Polish territory. The Poles, naturally, would like to regain some of their 'lost' eastern lands. Consequently, the current conflict in Ukraine is far too good an opportunity for them to miss. Taking land requires deploying troops so expect to see the Poles on the ground in The Ukraine. Poland's recent orders of massive amounts of military equipment, including 1000 K2 tanks from Korea, indicate the line of their thinking.
Ideally, the Poles would hope to send their troops in with the consent of Ukrainians. Arriving as the saviours when the war had got to the point that Ukraine was on the verge of total defeat. Although self-interested, it would still be a brave move to stand face-to-face with the Russians, but the Poles do have an ace up their sleeve. They can offer the Russians a complete end to the war in return for dividing Ukrainian territory between them; afterall, even today, if Poland suddenly closed its border to any trans-shipment of armaments then the Ukraine War would be over. The Hungarians are already closed to arms shipments. Moldavia is blocked from shipping arms by the fact that its border with The Ukraine is controlled by the breakaway republic of Transniestria which is strongly pro-Russian, to the extent of having a Russian base on its soil. And the Romanians have only some small roads through the thick of the Carpathian mountains to use after the Russians destroyed the bridges on the lower Dniestr River. That leaves tiny Slovakia as their only significant import route and Slovakia's main opposition party is already campaigning against their involvement in the war.
And then, of course, the Poles might be able to win the backing of the USA for their move. That would constitute another huge Ace.
Apparently, the former Polish foreign minister has said that it has been discussed at high levels whether if Ukraine became a Polish 'Protectorate' it would be covered by Article 5 of the NATO constitution requiring all NATO members to come to its defense.
Of course, talk of Polish protectorates only makes sense if the Ukrainians are losing the war and badly. If Ukraine looks like being the eventual winner then look out for the Poles finding reasons to move into Belarus. Were Belarus to send troops into Ukraine the Poles might consider it enough of a justification for them to attack Belarus. The Belarussians may not be simply looking for excuses not to enter Ukraine when they tell the Russians they need their troops to guard their own borders with the West. Putin, too, might well be deliberately wanting to keep Belarus out of harm's way, in order not to give the Poles an excuse to get involved.
Indeed, the only outcome where I do not see Polish troops on the ground, is if something like the current stalemate continues, where Ukraine is still strong enough to defend itself, but the Russians are not destroyed either. If such a stalemate is quickly followed by a ceasefire agreement then the Poles might miss their chance. I use the word 'quickly' deliberately, because it seems unlikely that a stalemate could go on for many years, eventually one side or the other should gain the upper hand as they are too dis-similar in capabilities. So it seems likely that the Poles will get their chance and if the Americans and Ukrainians aren't willing to negotiate with the Russians, the Poles, I suspect will be happy to, as for them a negotiation over Ukraine will not be zero sum; but rather win: win.

Some Carrots in the Pot.
There were many notable things about Putin's speech yesterday (Australian East Coast Time) which ended in his recognition of the independence of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk(see attached link www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrGLhhTtxFU). One of the things which struck me though is that when he spoke about how the Bolsheviks, when they created the Soviet state of Ukraine, were too generous with its borders, he not only says that 'historically Russian lands' were given to it, but also that 'historically Hungarian' and historically Polish' lands were also given to it. Such an admission leaves the door open to future negotiations with Hungary and Poland about a future carve-up of current Ukrainian territory. Indeed, I would guess that the Hungarians have long had their eye on just such a redrawing of their border with Ukraine and their pro-Russian attitudes over recent years have been, at least in part, a preparing of the ground for just such a negotiation, where they barter their support for Russian moves into Ukraine in return for a renegotiation of their border with The Ukraine, in the event that Russia does come to control it. Given that the Hungarian speaking section of Ukraine is only a small sliver of territory immediately adjacent to the current border and on the western side of the Carpathian mountains it would seem to be an exchange that Putin may well be willing to contemplate.

Hungary is already in the Russian camp. Poland, however, is completely another matter. Poland has led the European resistance to Russian actions in The Ukraine and they have been The Ukraine's strongest supporter. They have also done their best to pull Belarus away from its links to Russia, and they have worked to block Russian influence in Lithuania and increase their own.

This advocacy is not entirely based on a fear of Russia, as some claim. Poland also has an historical claim on all of these states having ruled them during the 15th and 16th centuries. As well as during a brief period in the 20th century, between the world wars.  Poland is a true historical competitor to Russia in these territories and as such it would seem unlikely that their hostility to Russia could be altered. However, Putin's recent reference to 'historically Polish lands' suggests that he might be amenable to giving some of Ukraine 'back' to Poland, if he gained control of it, and that thought will now be firmly lodged in the back of many Polish nationalists minds. Perhaps in the future, Polish resistance to the Russian occupation of The Ukraine might be turned to support by the negotiated return of some 'historically Polish lands'. And I am sure, if such negotiations ever did take place then Poland's leaving NATO and signing a security treaty with Russia would also be on the table.

Putin's potential undermining of NATO did not stop there, however, at the same time as talking about Polish lands being given to Ukraine he also spoke of 'historically German lands' being given to Poland. What if Putin told Poland that he would give them their 'historical lands' only if they agreed to give half as much land area back to Germany. Would this be enough to lure an already wobbly Germany out of NATO?

Putin's speech has already shaken Europe for reasons not mentioned here. However, Putin chooses his words carefully, and various nationalist leaders in Hungary, Poland and Germany will have heard the suggestion that some of their dearly held goals might be achieved through an alliance with Russia.

The Twentieth Century was a Slavic century
The Slavs won the last two world wars and their tide is still rising.
 
I love historical maps. If you look at a series of historical maps over a period of a thousand or even thousands of years you can see the rise and fall of nations and empires simply by viewing the changes in the territory they control. If you apply this very simple analysis to maps that are both pre- and post- both of the world wars you will see that the Slavic people were very clearly the winners of both. Prior to the First World War much of Central and Eastern Europe was controlled by two large German run empires, the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. By the end of the war the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been replaced by the Slav controlled states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland (plus Austria and Hungary) and the German Empire had also ceded some territory to the newly recreated Poland. By the end of the Second World War Poland had taken over even more, formerly German, territory.
In future centuries I have no doubt that some historians looking back will say that in Europe the story of the 20th century was the story of the Slavs. They were the people whose power was steadily growing through the century. And if you think ‘Well the maps are misleading, the Slavs were just the accidental beneficiaries of historical circumstance,’ then I would draw your attention to the Russian revolution; the event whose intellectual, philosophical, and political repercussions virtually shaped the history of every other nation of the world through the rest of that century. Need I point out that the Russian revolution took place in a Slavic state.
Indeed, the true accidental beneficiaries of history in the 20th century are the Americans and the Anglosphere. They have leapt forward while the ‘Great Tussle’ was going on elsewhere. And the great tussle of the twentieth century, by the way, was not between the Soviet Union and the USA so much as it was between the Slavic and Germanic peoples.
The Slavic territorial advances of the twentieth century were just the most recent chapters in a struggle that had been going on for centuries. The Slavs were the dominant people of Eastern and Central Europe by the 6th century AD having spread west in the wake of the westward moving Germans, but the German’s made many attempts to push back to the East over the intervening centuries. Charlemagne’s campaigns are one famous early example; and the activities of the Teutonic knights form another. In general, though, the Germans were not able to shift the Slavs from the territory they had settled on, although with the advantages of their more advanced civilisation they often did come to control them. Hence, the appearance of so many Slavic states in place of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War was not on account of a sudden mass migration of Slavs into the area, but rather a removal of German overlordship from a population that was already Slavic. The humiliated Germans pushed back again after their losses in the First World War. They managed to gain control of a great deal of the German inhabited regions of Czechoslovakia and then launched the invasion of Poland which precipitated the Second World War. Eventually, though, they were repelled and lost even more territory to the Slavs. The end of the Second World War also included the removal of large ethnic German populations from many regions of both Poland and Czechoslovakia thus increasing the proportion of Europe inhabited by Slavs. During the Cold War, Slavic control extended even further than their settled populations with the virtual Russian control of East Germany marking the historical high point of Slavic power within Europe for the last 800 years. Since then, with the reunification of Germany, Slavic control has receded, although Slav inhabited territory has not.
Not only were the most significant territorial wars of the Twentieth Century conducted between Germans and Slavs, one might even say that all of the intellectual running in the twentieth century was carried on between Russia and Germany as well. Marx, after all was a German, so the German’s also have a claim to originating that great intellectual tussle of the Twentieth Century: the foment around the ideas of communism.
 
 
As Germany has this century resurfaced as the most powerful economy in Europe and Russia is struggling to deal with American hostility and low oil prices what makes you think Slavic power will trend up rather than down in the near future?
 
It is important to remember that Slavic power is not synonymous with Russian power. There are other Slavic countries in Europe, and it is in their policies that I see the source of their continuing rise. It is generally known that many Slavic countries have done well since the end of the Cold War. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia stand out as having become countries with a good standard of living and education. The largest of these, Poland, has even become very significant politically and is charting its own independent course between the major regional powers of Germany, Russia and the USA. The Slavic countries, led by Poland, can already be seen to have the self-confidence to stand up to the European Union. Their refusal to accept hordes of refugees from very different cultures is a prime example of this. For many of these nations, having only recently gained control of a sovereign country for their people they are understandably reluctant to share it with others. In most cases these countries have a degree of cultural homogeneity that the Western European countries have already lost. That homogeneity therefore is a point of difference with the West and one that the Eastern European countries could well benefit from. Cultural homogeneity makes nation building a much easier task and with national pride comes a willingness to make sacrifices for the benefit of the country. Such national feeling has in the past made certain nations more formidable in war than other countries, it also leads to stronger community feelings between individuals with all of the intendant, though difficult to quantify, benefits which that entails. 
As an example of the benefits of strong nationalism, the Russia of today can be used. Russia appears to be surviving sanctions and economic difficulties with very little political unrest, and this appears to be the result of the peoples’ gratitude for what the Putin led government has done for Russia and Russian pride since the beginning of the century.
So, their attachment to nationalism, though it may well cause frictions and even war in some areas will, I think, be of overall benefit to Eastern Europe in the years ahead.
 
Another element of growing Slavic power will be their continuance of their westward push. The Slavs have been gradually pushing west for centuries and I see the hordes of Slav workers who poured into Britain and other Western countries at the start of this century as a continuation of the same trend. Consequently, politicians in Britain, France and Germany know that they have to consider the views of significant Polish minorities while politicians in Warsaw have no such concerns. Overall, this increases the relative power of the Slavic populations in Europe.
 
The downfall of Russia should also not be taken as a downfall of Slavic power. I am not at all convinced that Russia is about to deteriorate from its present position, but even if it did most of the likely beneficiaries of such an event would be Slavic states. And, in the event, they would probably be Slavic states with a great deal of support from the United States behind them. If one thinks about the reconstruction of Japan and Western Germany after the Second World War; a Poland or Ukraine with such backing could quickly become very influential.
 
Climate change is also a phenomenon which appears to be working in favour of the Slavs.
If the Earth is warming, and the North Pole is warming at the fastest rate, then this could significantly improve agricultural yields in Russia and increase the percentage of land where human habitation is viable. As Russia has more land above the Arctic Circle, and immediately adjacent to it, than any other country; it is the country, of all the countries on Earth, which stands to gain the most from a warmer climate. Less ice in the Arctic Ocean could also open up Russia’s northern coast to more maritime trade making that coast more economically productive, and militarily strategic, as well.
Poland too stands to benefit from a warming Northern Hemisphere. With a coastline on the Baltic, a sea which often freezes over in winter, Poland could gain all-year round maritime access and even an increased beach-tourism industry, not to mention longer growing seasons for its already fertile plains.
 
In conclusion
I feel that the facts on the ground indicate that the Slavs are quietly improving their position in Europe while the West is concerning itself with other matters. The presence of large numbers of Slavs in many of Western Europe’s major cities, where not so long ago they were almost non-existent, is an indicator of their growing influence. In similar vein, the fact that Slavs are now noticeable as tourists in places like Australia and South-East Asia also speaks to the fact that incomes and living standards in their home countries are improving to positions where they are comparable with Western countries. The evidence of the map is also telling, in that it shows that Slavic governments control a greater portion of Europe than at any time (with the exception of the Cold War period) since the 11th century. The map also shows that Russia is the biggest country in the world and has increased in size recently with the addition of Crimea. There is talk of the possibility of Russia losing territory in Europe in the next decade, but even if this were to occur, the beneficiaries of such a collapse would most likely be other Slavic states. Global warming is of geo-strategic benefit to the Slavs, as well.
Lastly, the fact that large numbers of Slavic migrants are settling in Western Europe, yet the Slavic nations keep their own countries migrant free and culturally homogeneous suggests that Slavs will have a voice amongst the many divergent cultures in Western countries in the future whilst those countries will have no voice in the culturally harmonious Slav homelands. All these trends suggest to me that Slavic influence and power in Europe is set to increase in the coming decade, rather than the reverse.
 
Before leaving off …
I would also like to point out that almost everything that has been said here about the Slavic countries, applies as well to most other non-Slav countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania do, for the most part, possess the same advantages and attitudes as their Slavic neighbours and they therefore have the potential to benefit in the same way. Indeed, the similarity in their attitude to nationalism has led the governments of Hungary and Poland to become virtual brothers-in-arms on certain issues within the European Union, and they, along with Putin’s Russia, are now looked to as examples of how countries should be run by many nationalist groups throughout the West and the rest of the world; a clarifying example of how these countries are already gaining influence in the world while the attention of the West’s governments remains focused elsewhere.