Do you see what I am seeing?
Many in the media are talking down the possibility of a war between the USA and Iran. "Iran does not want a war," they say, "They know they can't match the US." Maybe so, but who says it is Iran who gets to choose?
Since the 'Shale Revolution' which made the US effectively independent of Middle Eastern oil, as recently as during the Trump Presidency, the US no longer has to worry about Iran being able to shut down its energy supply. Indeed, if a war in the Persian Gulf shut down oil production in the region that would just strengthen the US vis-a-vis all of its economic competitors whose production costs would suddenly increase, if indeed they were able to maintain much production at all.
So what is to stop the US going after Iran's nuclear program? We all know that the US doesn't want the Iranians getting nuclear weapons; not when Iran's regime considers the US to be 'The Great Satan'.
In the past the US had to tread carefully as a result of their dependence on Gulf Oil; that dependence no longer exists.
The logic is clear.
Perhaps the US president does not want a war, but there are certainly some Hawks in the US defense establishment who might think now is a good time to authorize some aggressive actions that might inspire retaliation of the sort that makes heavy-handed responses hard to avoid for even the most pacifist presidents.
There are certainly signs that some foreign powers are preparing for a Persian Gulf Crisis.
Suddenly, Japan has some naval strength positioned in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. This is very unusual for Japan. Could it be that Gulf oil dependent Japan is making sure it has naval power in place to convoy out any of its oil tankers if fighting breaks out?
Then there is Turkey. Suddenly, out of the blue, Turkey's parliament has decided to authorize troop deployment to hapless, but oil rich Libya.
Now, the Libyan civil war has been going on since 2011 so one could be forgiven for asking of Turkey, 'Why now?'
Could it be that Turkey is foreseeing the possibility of a loss of oil imports from the nearby Gulf States and is consequently seeking to put itself in a position where it can use its considerable military to secure access to Libya's oil reserves?

Perhaps Iran and the US will sort out their differences without much disruption to Persian Gulf oil supplies, some however appear to be making sure that they are prepared for a potential energy crisis.

I have not been watching the world for a while. Having been buried in my own personal projects, family and occupation I only now put my head up and look around at the world.
So what do I see?

1. I see that oil prices are high and have been that way for a while.
2. I see that Turkey, is finally flexing its military muscles and is slowly, carefully and quietly conquering parts of northern Syria.
3. I see that there are moves being made within Saudi Arabia to purge any possible sources of opposition to the king and the crown prince.
4. I see that neither the EU nor the Eurozone have collapsed, but the governments and politicians that oppose it seem to be gaining influence not losing it.
5. I see that President Xi of China is gathering enormous powers to himself.
6. I see that Donald Trump is meeting the President of North Korea in Singapore.
7. I see that Russia is hosting a World Cup, a bare four years after hosting a Winter Olympics

So what do I make of it all?

1. That with the rebound in oil prices Russia and Saudi Arabia are doing much better than many expected two years ago.
2. With Turkey moving into Arab territory there is an extra incentive for Arabs to unify and that there will be support for a strong Arab leader if one emerges.
3. Saudi Arabia could be strengthening itself internally in preparation for taking on a more aggressive role in its region.
4. The EU is already fraying politically. There is no need for it to disappear; countries can just stop doing what it says and it will simply become less and less important. Hungary and Poland are already flouting its directives, and they are flouting their flouting. The Eurozone can’t simply fade away. It will either continue to function more-or-less as-is or countries will leave it. I think some countries will eventually choose to leave.
5. The fact that 6. Is occurring despite 5. Suggests that Xi is extremely concerned by China’s relative strength vis-à-vis USA and is willing to be very nice to the USA and help them with North Korea so as to dissuade the USA from totally devastating the Chinese economy as they could do if they launched a trade war.
6. I see the American President’s meeting with the North Korean President as more of a reflection of the state of mind of the Chinese President than anything else.
7. Having weathered western sanctions and now showing an expected budget surplus for this year, Russia will be able to use the World Cup to show the world that reports of its imminent demise were vastly premature.

Extra observations:
The USA has recently started taking steps to act in its own economic interests and despite some bad press has found the process less politically painful than many expected. As their first small steps succeed, their appetite for putting America first will probably increase.
It has become clear to me that Russia has probably offered the US a grand bargain/threat on Ukraine, which would run something like ‘Ukraine stays out of NATO and the EU and you stay out of Ukraine or we let the tanks role.’ The Donbas Republics are key to this strategy because if Ukraine joined NATO and Russia attacked then all of NATO would be duty bound to go to war with Russia – and they probably would in the case of such a clear attack. If, however, Ukraine joined NATO and then the Donbas Republics suddenly had some extremely successful offensive thrusts in their on-going civil war, then technically no NATO members would be ‘duty bound’ to intervene. This would explain why so little has been done for Ukraine by the West since its ouster of the pro-Russian government.

Desperate times call for desperate acts.
 
News is coming to us that the EU and Turkey have struck a breakthrough deal to halt (or, at least, significantly reduce) the migrant flows from Turkey to Europe. It appears that the Turks are prepared to take back every asylum seeker who arrives in Greece, in return for some concessions but mostly for good will.
 
One would like to think that this move is driven by altruism and a desire to be a better neighbour and global citizen. And perhaps it is.
But there is another way to read the situation.

One might look at Turkey’s current geopolitical position and conclude that Turkey is in a dire situation and needs as many friends as it can get.
 
 
Turkey’s weakness
Turkey’s great geopolitical weakness is the fact that the southwest quarter of Turkey is a land mostly populated by the ethnic minority, the Kurds. There are roughly 15 million Kurds in the southwestern corner of Turkey and roughly another fifteen million of them living just over the Turkish border in the adjacent corners of Syria, Iraq and Iran. Many of the Turkish Kurds have agitated for an independent state in the past. Many of them are still doing so today. What their efforts for independence have lacked in the past have been a powerful international sponsor.
 
 
The Threat from Russia
Right now Turkey must feel that there is a grave threat that Russia might ‘Play the Kurdish Card’
Russia is doing well in Syria, supporting the Assad regime, an opponent of Turkey (by Turkey here, and in the rest of the article, we will mean Turkey under the current government). The Syrian Kurds, yet another opponent of Turkey, are also doing well in Syria. Now while there is not yet any formal alliance between the Assad regime and the Kurds, they are in many ways natural allies. The Assad regime is based on the Alawite ethnic minority and so likes to protect minorities from being overwhelmed by Syria’s majority Sunni Arabs. The Kurds are another ethnic minority within Syria and they would like to keep the gains they have made in the Syrian Civil War. Not being numerous enough to control Syria themselves, the Kurds have to be considering that their lot might be better with the pro-minority Assad regime than with its majority Sunni Arab opponents.
 
Turkey is opposing both Russia and the Kurds in Syria. Turkey is afraid that these two might unite and then Russia might play the ‘Kurdish card’.
 
Right now, the conditions whereby Russia might seriously back Kurdish secession from Turkey appear to be drawing close.
Russia would have much to gain by such a move. It would: weaken an adversary; be seen as a liberator of an oppressed minority; create a large new ally in the Middle East, and; create, moreover, an ally which shares a border with Armenia a close ally of Russia and a member of its Eurasian Economic Union. A liberated Kurdistan could immediately join the Russia dominated Eurasian Economic Union. Something that would be an appealing prospect to the Russians for a number of reasons.
 

The Threat from the United States of America
The USA does not want to see Russia liberating the Kurds from Turkey and perhaps creating a strong pro-Russian Kurdish state encompassing all of the contiguous Kurdish regions from Turkey, Syria, Iraq and possibly even Iran. That would be a major coup for the Russians and would make them look like the liberator of an oppressed people. The USA likes to wear the mantle of liberator of oppressed peoples; it does not want the Russians to steal this mantle. So, to date, the USA has been keeping the Syrian Kurds away from the Russians by giving them lots of support and keeping Turkish troops away from them.
More than this the Americans are just putting the finishing touches on two military airbases within Syrian Kurdish territory.
 
The Turks must be very worried.
Could it be that the US is planning to support the Kurds rather than let the Russians support them? US warplanes are currently flying out of Turkish airbases; why build airbases just over the border in Kurdish held Syria? Is the US expecting a breach with Turkey?
 
The Turkish government has every reason to be extremely concerned. Right now it appears that both the world superpower and their closest military rival have some pressing reasons for supporting the independence aspirations of the Kurdish populations in their region. In the past, had one of these powers tried to 'Play the Kurdish Card' Turkey would have allied with the opposing power to help counteract the threat, but now that option does not appear possible.
Neither the USA or Russia have committed to supporting an independent Kurdistan yet, but the potential for such an action grows as both the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars rage on and the Kurds in both countries continue to be the most reliable allies that the USA has in both conflicts; while at the same time the Kurds are also the most logical allies of the Russians.
 
Given this predicament it is no wonder that the Turks are seeking to make an ally of Germany and the European Union. The Turks are in need of powerful friends and even more in need of international good will. In light of this, the fact that the Turks are suddenly agreeing to make big moves to help Europe solve its refuge crisis makes good sense.
 
What more can Turkey do?
Turkey needs to make its peace with the Kurds.
There are two ways it could do this. It could either let the Kurds secede or it could bring the Kurds so far into its power structures that they will see the Turkish state as belonging as much to them as to any Turk.
 
The Turks could benefit from letting the Kurds secede.
Geopolitically speaking, in many ways the Kurds and the Turks are natural partners. Even if all the Kurdish regions were combined into a large Kurdish state it would still be a landlocked country. Kurdistan would need to befriend a neighbour with some coastline. The relatively developed and prosperous peninsula ofTurkey would be a logical economic partner for an Independent Kurdistan. Even under today’s difficult conditions Iraqi Kurdistan has allied with Turkey to secretly build an oil pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.
One also need not think that there would be an insurmountable reservoir of ill will from the Kurds toward their former rulers either. Hungary was under Austrian Habsburg rule for hundreds of years and yet now Austria is in many ways Hungary’s preferred neighbour. The reason why is because Austria agreed to allow local plebiscites along its border so that local communities could vote on which country they wanted to be in. By one such plebiscite the city of Sopron went from being Austrian to being Hungarian. As a result Hungary has no border disputes with Austria, unlike many of its other neighbours, and consequently Austrian-Hungarian relations are strong.
 
If Turkey, of its own volition, was to grant its Kurdish regions independence and ensure that the borders were in the right places. It would be seen as the midwife of Kurdish independence and gain much gratitude as a result. It would also immediately gain tremendous kudos with the Kurdish populations in neighbouring countries.
 
If Turkey is the first country to grant its Kurds independence it will immediately be seen as the greatest friend of the Kurds in the region and consequently any future Kurdish nation would be far more likely to form an economic or even political union with Turkey than any other of its neighbours. Letting the Kurds have independence could be Turkey’s road to truly becoming the leader of its region.
 
Even without its Kurdish corner Turkey would still be a large and powerful state of 65 million. It would be a richer place on average, as the Kurdish corner is a poorer region, and it may well be accepted into the European Union, as the ‘Kurdish Problem’ is the most cited reason for why the EU has not accepted Turkey to date.
 
 
Bringing the Kurds in
If Turkey is unwilling to see a quarter of its territory lost to another country (and most nations and leaders would be) then the only way to really make peace with the Kurds would be to bring them into the power structure so they feel that the country they share with the Turks is as much theirs as any Turk's. To do this they would probably need to change the name of the country and create some sort of federation. A Kurdish president might then convince the Kurdish masses that they were living in a country that was truly theirs.
 
In an earlier article below, I have already outlined that this is what I suspect Turkey’s president Erdogan has realised and is possibly trying to achieve. The constitutional changes that would be needed would never get through the Turkish parliament as it now stands, so that might be one of the reasons why Erdogan is trying to change system so that he has more power as president. It is also a potential reason for his recent secretive visits to the jailed Kurdish resistance leader Abdullah Ocalan and Abdullah Ocalan’s consequent request that the Kurdish partisans put down their arms and cooperate in a democratic solution. It is possible that Ocalan found the idea of a Kurdish/Turkish federation an acceptable alternative to an independent Kurdistan.
If Erdogan did have such plans it is understandable that he would not make them publically known as they would not be popular with many Turkish nationalist and in a democratic system they could easily be blocked. Erdogan might well be seeking his increased powers in order to be able to make the changes to the country that he sees as necessary.  For now, Erdogan is pursuing a constitutional route to increased presidential powers, but with all that is going on in Turkey at the moment, combining terrorist attacks with refugees and wars on its borders, one could imagine Erdogan finding enough justification in some near future event for the declaration of martial law. He could then take to himself all the powers that he needs. Such a declaration of martial law, need not necessarily be contrived either. There are many ways in which the wars on Turkey’s borders could eventually impact on Turkey in a way that makes the assumption of martial law prudent.
 
In conclusion
Turkey’s offers of to take back all refugees travelling to Greece from Turkey should buy a lot of goodwill from Germany and the EU, and Turkey is very much in need of allies at the moment. In this article I have set out, in relatively simple terms, what Turkey has to fear and some possible solutions.
There are many scenarios that could play out from our current circumstances that would bring transformative change to Turkey.  The sudden, dramatic offers in relation to refugees are an indicator that the governing elite of Turkey know that they are in a far more precarious and challenging situation than most would like to admit.

Does anyone else get the feeling that there could be a deal on between Turkey and Saudi Arabia for the division of Syria? And that their troops might be on the ground in Syria sooner rather than later?
The likely deal would involve Turkey getting control of a slice of northern Syria extending 100-150 kilometres south from its own border. Saudi Arabia would take all the remaining lands occupied by IS.
​The benefits of this deal for Turkey would be that it gets control of the Kurdish region in which the YPG is setting too good an example to Turkey's own restive Kurds of what an independent Kurdish state might look like.
The benefits to Saudia Arabia have been covered in earlier blogs and can be read below.

Why sooner rather than later?
Because of the Russians.
Saudi Arabia might have always had a long term plan to put troops on the ground in Syria, but until recently there was no rush. The longer the civil war in Syria dragged on and the more horrible and intractable it became the more likely it was that a Saudi intervention would be seen as a blessing.
Now that the Russians have rejuvenated the Assad loyalists, however, and there is talk of them re-taking Raqqa, the Saudi's need to get involved while there is still some Islamic State territory left for them to liberate.
Ideally the Saudi's would like to take Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, before they put boots on the ground inside Islamic state territory, but with their troops approaching the outskirts of Sanaa as this article is written, and the campaign for Sanaa generally progressing well for the Saudi's, it seems likely that they have decided that they need to seize their moment and will commit to fighting in two theatres.
The Turks, are also no doubt wanting to put a stop to the possible linking up of the two Kurdish controlled regions of northern Syria, a scenario which becomes increasingly likely as the continued aerial bombardment of IS makes them less able to fend off the Kurdish YPG advances.
Turkey was particularly concerned by the YPG's recent seizure of territory on the western bank of the Euphrates: which put the YPG one step closer to linking up their two bodies of territory along the Turkish border.
Another concern for both Turkey and Saudi Arabia is the prospect of a deal being struck between Assad and the Kurds. It would be advantageous for them both to act before such a deal came into being and further strengthened the Assad regime's reviving claims to be the legitimate, and still ruling, government of Syria. 

If the Turks get the North and the Saudis take the South who gets the East and the coast of Syria?
This is a good question.
With Russia giving the Assad regime considerable support one would have to say at this stage that the Assad regime is likely to retain control of the territory they already have and may well takeover most of the rebel areas which are not either Kurdish or IS. This would leave Syria divided into three spheres of power with Assad on the coast and in the coastal mountains, the Turks in the North and the Saudis controlling the remaining, mostly desert regions, to the South and South-East. 
With Russia having become so invested in supporting the Assad regime it is natural that the Turks and the Saudis would be very wary of trying to extend their intervention to the coast, but if both of these countries had their armies in the field and the tacit backing of the United States then they may well dare to take the fight to Assad and the Russians.
Then again, Russia's main concerns at the moment are with its Eastern European border and it could well be bought out of the fight in Syria if the US were to allow it significant gains in Ukraine, for example.

It's all about the Russians
The Russians, the Assad regime and even the Iranians have begun sabre rattling in response to the Turkish and Saudi announcements that they are willing to put troops on the ground in Syria. Naturally, it would be disastrous for the Russians, the Assad regime and Iran if either Turkey or Saudi Arabia or both intervened in Syria. Therefore they will be willing to go to lengths to prevent such interventions. Consequently, all of these parties are now engaged in a sabre rattling face-off.
Much will depend on the disposition of the US and the European Union in negotiations conducted far from the Syrian battlefields.
​Perhaps the Russians will succeed in staring down one or both threats.
If they do it will be a significant victory for Putin, leaving the Russian backed regime as the most likely final victor of the Syrian civil war.
Will the US allow this to happen?
The Syrian civil war could be about to enter a new phase of significant foreign intervention.

In stepping up its involvement in the Syrian conflict to include airstrikes and actual troops on the ground Russia has several ways that it can gain a geopolitical advantage.
To begin with, however, a reminder of the basics. For the moment, for Russia, everything is about The Ukraine.
So how does getting involved with Syria influence events in the Ukraine?
There are several potential positive answers to this question for Russia.
Firstly, if they make it impossible for Assad to be overthrown while they are supporting him, then they raise the possibility that the US and the Europeans will have to do a deal with Russia in order to get the outcomes they want in Syria, and, of course, that means that Russia can negotiate for the outcomes they desire in The Ukraine.
Secondly, if the US want to maintain a hard line against Russia and Assad, it is possible that the Europeans or Turkey might start to see the Americans as standing in the way of a settlement, and Russia consequently gains by dividing its opponents (in the Ukrainian context).

Of course, on entering the Syrian civil war the Russians could not know which way the cards would fall as events played out.
It was possible that the US would hold its allies in line through the sheer strength of its global influence, but even if it did so, the Russians would lose nothing by this. Putin's calculation must surely have been that there was little to lose by intervening in Syria and much to gain if things went well.
So far, the Syrian intervention is playing well for the Russians.
In a much publicized UN speech Putin put forward strong arguments for backing the Assad regime as being the shortest way to end the civil war and eradicate the Islamic State. In doing so he managed to make the US look like they are pursuing a foolish policy in trying to fight (almost) all sides at once; a diplomatic coop for Putin

Since then, the massive increase in Syrian refugees trying to find asylum in Europe has further played into the Russians' hands.
In trying to deal with the asylum seekers, the European countries are now being impacted by events in Syria and, regardless of whether they are closing borders or opening arms, they would much rather they didn't have too. Consequently, the Europeans are now much more eager for a quick settlement of the Syrian civil war, and the US must worry that if they don't provide their allies with some prospect of a resolution to the asylum seeker problem soon then the Europeans may well go behind their backs and deal with the Russians independently in an attempt to end the Syrian crisis. This, of course, is all good news for the Russians, their relative influence vis-a-vis the US is strengthening.

Now, with the atrocities which have occurred in France, we have a major European country wishing to do something decisive toward the destruction of the Islamic State. On the face of it, one would have to think that this new impetus toward action in Syria can only improve the Russian position further.

It will be interesting to see in what ways (or even if) the new French resolve (as stated by their president) can alter events on the ground in Syria.

Some might wonder at Turkey's reluctance to engage in Syria even when being given the green light by the world's superpower the mighty USA. Turkey is of a size to easily dominate this smaller and poorer neighbour, so with the world superpower backing them why aren't they taking their opportunities?
The answer is that Turkey knows it is sitting on a powder keg and it cannot afford to antagonise anyone who could light a match.
As Turkey has not managed to successfully integrate its Kurdish regions it knows that a strong push for an independent Kurdish nation is a threat to its territorial integrity. As there are already around thirty million Kurds living in a relatively cohesive area the stage is set, as it has been for a long time. Two big  factors have worked against the creation of a Kurdish state historically: Kurdish disunity and the the lack of a significant external backer. Continuing this state of affairs and preventing the Kurds from gaining a powerful international backer must be a priority of Turkish foreign policy, afterall guarding the home territories must always take precedence over exerting influence abroad. Why Turkey has been so reluctant to engage with the USA in Syria is because it fears that if it allies itself fully with the US then Russia will see it as an enemy and will be tempted to start supporting the Kurds. Russia may not be anywhere near as powerful as the USA, but it is certainly powerful enough to make an independent Kurdistan a realistic possibility if it lends its support to the venture. Turkey consequently has been reluctant to antogonise the Russians either by acting against their ally Al Assad or by joining in with US operations against Islamic State. Until recently that meant that Turkey was not even allowing the US to use its airbases.

So what changed Turkey's mind? Why has it now agreed to work with the US?
The answer it would appear is the looming threat that if Turkey did not stop stonewalling the US then the US would turn for help to the Kurds themselves. As the Kurds have proven themselves in both Iraq and Syria as the only effective fighting force that has broad appeal to western populations (hence the numbers of western volunteers beginning to travel to the Middle East to fight alongside the Kurds) the Turks realise that there is a danger of them becoming a cause celebre in the west.  Western nations have already begun directly arming the Kurds of Iraq. The Turks would also have been aware of how well the Kurds were doing in Syria. Where previously the Kurds had controlled three separate pockets of territory along the Turkish border, during the civil war so far they have managed to take control of the land between two of these pockets so that they now control the vast majority of Syrian territory adjacent to the Turkish border. It is notable that the area that the Turks have supposedly agreed to occupy within Syria is the area which separates the two Kurdish regions, effectively blocking them from joining up and becoming an even stronger territorial entity.

What can we expect of Turkey now?
At this point, Despite having agreed to American demands it appears that the Turks are still trying to avoid Russian ire by telling them that they were forced into co-operation. This is a narrative which tallies with the slow and reluctant actions the Turks have taken on the ground so far (except for their enthusiastic bombing of PKK camps, the Kurdish separatist movement that operates within Turkey). The Turks are making a show of being reluctant to enter Syria for the benefit of the Russians, but they would also hope to be sending a similar message to their Arab neighbours who have resentful memories of Turkish colonialism during the Ottoman period. By their circumspect movements into Syria so far the Turks are trying to say 'We are only in this because we have to be!'

Could Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud be the leader to unite the Arab world?  Well, that is an interesting topic to speculate about.  We are at a point in history where some circumstances have arisen that would make the unification of the Arab world, or at least a decent part of it, more likely than it has been since the time of Nasser.  To begin with the Arab world has rarely been more in need of leadership with chaos and civil war reigning in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and large regions of other Arab countries.  Also one might argue that  Saudi Arabia currently enjoys a supremacy in terms of Arab leadership that not even Nasser's Egypt enjoyed, with the total lack of any strong rival for influence.  Algeria would be the next strongest Arab Sunni state, but it is located in the Maghreb, far from the Middle East, the hub of the Arab world.

 One can definitely  say that Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud has already achieved an impressive feat of Arab unity in bringing a coalition of 10 Arab states together to fight a war in Yemen.  How much further could he go?

Let us post a speculative history for Saudi Arabia's near future.
a.   A period of honing military prowess and cementing one's position at the top of the regional power hegemony by leading a military coalition in Yemen.
b.   Taking control of the lands of the Islamic State after that group has been worn down by international attacks.

This would be a fine point for Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to stop and rest on his laurels, and given his age one might say this would be about where you would expect him to stop.  As he is 79 one would assume he could not really expect any more than ten good years and it would be possible for Saudi Arabia to get to this point within ten years.
The next big step for Saudi Arabia to take would be to seize the rest of Syria, but there would be big questions over whether that would be a wise step. Incorporating a large secularised population like Damascus could have a destabilizing effect within Saudi Arabia as already discussed in previous articles.  Oddly enough though Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's age might make him more likely to take the step than others given that being the Arab leader to reunite Mecca and Damascus would make his name stand tall in posterity and he might reason that he probably won't be around long enough to deal with any messy consequences.

c    Taking control of the west of Syria will lead naturally into the need to dominate Lebanon as well.
d   With the respect earned from its previous victories and expansions Saudi Arabia, under whatever leader, may find itself with such prestige among the Arab populations of its remaining neighbours that all sorts of possibilities present themselves.

What could a brave king do?

One way in which geopolitical analysts attempt to predict the future is a method known as ‘scenario planning’. According to this method you think up as many possible scenarios as you can, within reason, and then you try and estimate the percentage chance of them coming to pass.  This is a fun task for analysts because it is one of the few times where they are seriously asked to plan out the most dramatic and extreme scenarios.  In this short article we will not attempt to set out a range of scenarios and estimate their chances of coming to pass.  What we will do though is endeavour to give you an idea of what the potential consequences of having a ‘brave king’ in Saudi Arabia really are.

Saudi Arabia’s potential for expansion

Point One:

In this world of nation states the Arab lands are an anomaly. From Morocco to Oman you have a great string of countries that are all inhabited by a people who speak the same language and define themselves as being from the same culture; they are Arabs. Consequently, most of the nations which the Arabs inhabit have few natural borders with their neighbours. On both sides of the border the people speak Arabic and call themselves Arabs and there is a past history in which the border did not exist and the inhabitants of both countries lived happily together either as part of the Ottoman Empire or one of the earlier caliphates. Not surprisingly, therefore, there have been many political leaders in the Arab World who have been advocates of Pan-Arabism and have dreamed of uniting the Arabs into one super state.  Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt briefly united Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic and Saddam Hussein tried to present himself as a Pan-Arab unifier in his invasion of Kuwait.  Given this unique circumstance of the Arab nations, whenever a strong leader emerges in one of their countries there are always some who will ask, “Could he be the one?”

I do not raise this matter in order to discuss whether  Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud could be the man to reunite all the Arabs, but to simply emphasise that the borders surrounding most Arab countries are more easily shifted or dissolved than those that correspond to real ethnic and cultural divisions; and that consequently Saudi Arabia would have less barriers to expansion than most countries simply by virtue of being Arab.

Point Two:

I said in the previous article that Saudi Arabia is the strongest state in the Arab world, one might argue that Egypt with its massive population is the strongest, but due to its poverty and Saudi Arabia’s wealth it is Saudi Arabia which influences the Egyptian government at the moment and not vice versa.  Egypt has been a heavily populated behemoth throughout recorded history, but it has often had outsiders come in and take over the running of its political structures.  Simply having a larger population than Saudi Arabia does not make it immune from being influenced or even dominated by Saudi Arabia. Egypt is currently part of the Saudi led coalition which is attacking Saudi enemies in Yemen.

Egypt is large, but it does not currently have the power to exert much influence on other countries.  Saudi Arabia by contrast, through its money, and increasingly through its military capabilities, does have that ability.  It is by far the most influential Arab state in today’s world.

Prediction:

The above two points being made, my prediction is that, under a brave king, Saudi Arabia will be the state to occupy the space currently occupied by the Islamic State.

Why?

1.       The Sunni Arabs of this region will prefer Sunni Arab Saudi Arabia to Shia dominated Iraq or Alawite controlled Syria.

2.       Saudi Arabia is a very traditionally Islamic state and is the keeper of Islam’s two most holy sites so to those locals who previously used religious rhetoric to support the Islamic State, Saudi Arabia will be an acceptable (even supportable) replacement.

3.       Saudi Arabia has the necessary internal and institutional strength for conducting an annexation of territory.  It has a compliant population who like to see their nation acting strongly and their military institutions are working well enough to conduct a sophisticated air campaign against Yemen and lead a 10 country coalition.  King Salman also  has particularly good support within the country’s power hierarchies after 48 years as the governor of Riyadh, during which time he was frequently used by the monarchy as the main man for healing rifts between factions and disciplining minor royals.  Tasks which show the high level of respect with which he was and is regarded and the great position he has enjoyed to build personal relationships and alliances within Saudi Arabia’s power structures.

4.       Saudi Arabia’s domestic policies make them particularly capable of dealing with the Islamic State zealots once they capture the area.  Saudi Arabia has already, in the time of its founder Ibn Saud, eradicated ultra-intolerant religious extremists by wiping out entire villages where some violently extremist forms of Wahhabism (a strain of Islam) had taken route.  Saudi Arabia can still act in this sort of dramatic but effective way as it is not accountable to any liberal/human rights focussed discourse within its political structures.  It is not a democracy. Its king is not accountable to any western notions of human rights and for the most part the Saudi population would probably view clemency for such violent enemies of the state as Islamic State as weakness.

5.       Saudi Arabia is made more acceptable to the local population by virtue of its proud history of creating itself through a process of tribal warfare rather than being a country created by western colonial powers.

6.       The area now controlled by Islamic State is a very attractive target of annexation to Saudi Arabia for a number of reasons: firstly, it has two major rivers running through it, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and Saudi Arabia is very water poor and in need of both water and arable land; secondly, the area currently occupied by Islamic State does not possess any major cities, thus if annexed it would not significantly change the power balances within Saudi Arabia.  If Saudi Arabia annexed an area with a city like Damascus in it, for example, that city would soon begin to exert an influence on the internal political dynamics of the country simply by virtue of its population and economic clout.  And given that cities tend to produce more liberal, secular and cosmopolitan views, the influence of a city like Damascus within the country might cause problems for the monarchy and their current ruling institutions.  By comparison the area currently ruled by Islamic State would be an ideal addition to the country possessing as it does a more traditionally minded rural and small town population along with the resources of water and arable land that Saudi Arabia would dearly like to possess.

7.       Although generally speaking the United States, and the western world, do not like the idea of borders changing and states expanding, they will nonetheless find very little to say against such an annexation by a former stalwart ally, particularly given the nature of the regime they will be replacing and the difficulty that any western liberal democracy would have in eradicating the Islamic State zealots from among the local population.

So, it can be seen that Saudi Arabia is essentially ideally constituted to annex the current territory of the Islamic State, so long as they are led by a brave king who is capable of seizing the opportunities that are presented to him.  If he plays his cards right he might even be welcomed in as a liberator by a significant proportion of the local population and hailed as a hero by the rest of the world.

Keep an eye out for ‘A Brave King - Part Three’

Apparently Saudi Arabia has just reached an agreement with France to send three billion dollars worth of military equipment to Lebanon to fight Islamic State.  This follows on from the events of March in which Saudi Arabia put together a coalition of 10 countries to launch airstrikes on Yemen; an engagement which is ongoing and reported to include artillery bombardments over their shared border. It appears very possible that Saudi Arabia could even send troops over the border to engage in conventional ground-based warfare.

It is without doubt that Saudi Arabia has pursued a much more aggressive foreign policy since the accession king Salman Saud on January the 23rd.  Is this simply a coincidence of timing or do we have a much more adventurist king now in charge of the Arab world’s strongest state?

There is no doubting that at this time there are many geopolitical currents that are aligning to push Saudi Arabia into a more assertive role in its region. To begin with the price of oil has dropped and there are many analysts who would say that we are at the beginning of an energy revolution which will increasingly move the world away from using oil as a source of energy.  Many in Saudi Arabia therefore must be aware that their years of fantastic wealth are coming to an end and that they can no longer sit back and rely on their financial power to buy them out of any problems they may have.  Previously the Saudi’s have not had to engage in much political argy-bargy with their neighbours because their oil wealth ensured that the United States (US), the world’s pre-eminent military and political power, was always willing to defend their borders and forgive them any domestic actions which might have caused them international problems either with their neighbours or other nations. Right now, however, one very clear sign that Saudi Arabia is quickly becoming less important to the US is the fact that the US appears to be on the verge of ending its decades-long hostility to Iran, Saudia Arabia’s main regional rival.  Indeed, no clearer sign that the tides are turning is needed, however, there have been many other currents and events that seem be pushing the Saudi’s toward a more interventionist foreign policy. One might say that the Arab Spring and the vast instability it has brought to the Arab world, particularly including the Islamic State on Saudi Arabia’s northern border, signals to the Saudi royalty that just sitting back and allowing events to take their course may not be a wise choice.  And then there is the fact of the civil war in Yemen, which is happening now and appeared to be on the verge of being won by forces antagonistic to the Saudi’s.  This also presented the Saudi’s with the possibility of several undesirable outcomes if they did not become actively involved to try and shape events more to their liking.

So, it cannot be denied that there is a coincidence, or convergence, of forces at the moment that are pushing Saudi Arabia towards a more interventionist foreign policy.  With their declining importance to the US it certainly behoves Saudi Arabia right now to show the neighbours that they have their own weight to throw around and that even without US backing they are a force to be reckoned with. And these changed circumstances appear not to have come as a complete shock to Riyadh because there are certainly signs that the Saudi’s have in recent years been quietly preparing for a less secure place in the world.  Their current spending on defence, for example, is the fourth largest in the world, ahead of such traditional powers as France and the United Kingdom and behind only the US, China and Russia.  This certainly suggests that the Saudi’s have decided to convert their financial power into military power whilst they still can.

It is certainly the case that Saudi Arabia is surrounded by forces pushing it to become more interventionist within its region, but all the same it is fair to say that Salman is a king who is willing to take bold actions.  In everyday life most people are surrounded by opportunities, some take them others don’t.  The fact that since the accession of Salman Saudi Arabia has taken some very bold moves and made significant demonstrations of its power within the region do tell us that we are dealing with a leader who is prepared to take such actions and that alone is a significant fact.

Keep an eye out for ‘A Brave King – Part Two – Speculation’

The Islamic State (IS) is not a nationalist entity; it wants a Caliphate that will incorporate all the world.  The Islamic State recognises no national boundaries and intends to unite humanity under Islam.  In professing and promoting a religious identity they are in many ways antithetical to any nationalist identity.  This being said, it still appears to me that IS’s success in Syria and Iraq has been another one of history’s many examples of what happens when you put national borders in the wrong places.

The territory that IS has managed to conquer in Syria and Iraq corresponds in broad outline to what would make a sensible nation state.  The area that they now control (with the addition of Tikrit and the regions that they have only recently been pushed out of) fairly accurately corresponds with the areas of Iraq and Syria that are inhabited by Sunni Muslim Arabs.  The areas of Iraq and Syria that IS has been unable to make significant gains in are the areas inhabited by Kurds, Alawites, Druze, and Shia Arabs.  Consequently the border of IS territory has essentially stabilised along a line which would make a sensible border between a Sunni Arab nation and the neighbouring national groups which surround them.

The leaders and evangelists of the Islamic State believe in a religious identity which subsumes all nationalist identity but the shape of their territory suggests that the general population of that area of the Middle East are still strongly attracted to an ethnic/nationalist identity.  The Sunni Arabs of both Iraq and Syria have been existing in states where they have been ruled over by other ethnic groups.  It is not extraordinary therefore to surmise that part of the appeal of the IS for the people within its territory is that it has finally united all of the area’s Sunni Arabs in one cohesive, self-governing and powerful state.

Perhaps the easiest way to defeat the Islamic State ideologues would be for the international community, led by America, to simply abandon the formal borders of Iraq and Syria as they were drawn by the French and British during their colonial occupation and promise the Sunni Arabs their own nation state with borders that correspond to the demographic reality.  Perhaps then many of the Sunni Arabs of Iraq and Syria would stop supporting the aggressive and extremist IS and the region could look forward to a greater degree of peace and stability.

Various journalists have been describing the recent statements and actions of President Erdogan, jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, and the main legal, pro-Kurdish party, the People's Democratic Party, as 'inconsistent'. And so they may appear to many in Turkey as well as Western observers. However there is an explanation which fits all of the recent discordant announcements together.

Turkey has reached a crossroads in its modern history. A crossroad that exemplifies the limits of ethnic nationalism. If Turkey wishes to become a true regional hegemon the Turkish state must abandon its ethnic Turkish nationalism as a state legitimiser. Neighbouring populations of Arabs and Kurds will never warm to being dominated by another race. The Kurds who already live within the borders of Turkey have demonstrated this quite eloquently over the years. However, if the Turkish state can decouple itself from ethnicity and become a Pan-Ethnic state as the Ottomans before them succeeded in doing then the state apparatus that currently rules the core region of Turkey could expand to hold sway over a much increased territory and the Turks themselves would as a people once again become first among equals in a multiethnic empire.

The reason why Turkey's need for a shift in emphasis is more apparent now than it ever has been before is simply because with the two states to its south, Syria and Iraq, having fallen apart and having remained un-unified and largely ungovernable for some years now the region is quite literally calling out for some strong and benign power to intervene. Secondly, amidst all this chaos it is clear that one group at least will benefit and that group is the Kurds. The Kurds have already established quasi-independent states in both Iraq and Syria and it is clear their tide is rising. Erdogan has no doubt already done the calculus and he knows that there are only two good ways forward from here.
To keep repressing the Kurds in the south-west quarter of Turkey while they gain independence in the states just over the border is a no-win situation. It can be done, but it is certainly not going to create a greater or happier nation. The two options that would better Turkey's position are to either cut the Kurds loose and let them have independence or recreate the state in a way that Kurds will feel they are equal partners in it.
A Turks only Turkey
If Turkey did choose to let the Kurds have independence and let the south-west corner of their country break away it would still have a bright future. A Turkey without the Kurds would still be a large and powerful state. With its internal cohesion and human rights record improving as a result of the loss of the insurgent Kurds one could expect Turkey to become more wealthy and well governed and consequently even more powerful than it is now. It might even be allowed to join the European Union, presuming that were still desirable, and certainly would be seen by Europeans as a valuable, enlightened buffer between them and the unruly rest of the near east. In this scenario Turkey would still have influence in the Middle East as an example that other peoples would like to emulate, but not to join. And though powerful the Turkish state would know that it's power would never grow much beyond its defined borders.

The Ottoman Empire Re-Created
The second beneficial path that is open to Turkey is to abandon its ethnic Turkish nationalism and convert itself into a state which derives its legitimacy from its good governance and ability to provide protection and prosperity to its citizens and which also allows its citizens to express a variety of ethnic identities. Some might say that it would be difficult for Turkey to perform such a transition and this is true, but It could be done. The Kurds of Iraq already look to Turkey as their best friend in the neighbourhood. Turkey conspired with the government of Arbil to transport oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan via a pipeline against the will of the Iraqi government in Bagdad. This has earnt Turkey a lot of good will from the Iraqi Kurds. It is also the case that many Turkish diplomats have already been working to improve relations with the Kurds in neighbouring states because of the inevitable calculus that if Turkey is to compete with Iran regionally then it needs good relations with the Kurds. If Turkey could win the Kurds to it then in addition to having strong bases of influence in both of the disintegrating countries to its south it would also have a fifth column inside Iran by virtue of that country's own sizeable Kurdish population.
To change Turkey in the ways that are required will be difficult; even the country's name is a nationalist statement and would probably need to be changed, however, recent events and the desire of politicians and peoples to become more powerful suggest that Erdogan is already trying to move his country in the desired direction. His recent statement that "There is no Kurdish problem," and the recent loosening of control in the Kurdish regions can be seen in this light. Far more important though was Erdogan's recent visit to the jailed Kurdish leader Ocalan's cell. Most successful national leaders are aware of the big geopolitical picture surrounding their people and so Erdogan may well have found, ironically, that there was no one more capable of understanding his situation and his aspirations than Ocalan. To judge from Ocalan's subsequent call for the Kurds in Turkey to lay down their arms he has also judged that for the Kurds to be equal players in a mighty pan-ethnic state might serve their interests better than being an independent but poor state surrounded by powerful neighbours. Certainly, the Kurds have little to lose by starting along this journey to a pan-ethnic state with Erdogan. If things go well, all will be well, and if things don't go we'll then the Kurds will probably find themselves in an even better position to push for independence. Right now, Erdogan needs the Kurds if he is to realise the dream of turning Turkey into a powerful regional hegemon so the Kurds will have the ability to direct the nature of the state's transformation to their benefit.
Erdogan is also favoured in embarking on this project at this moment by the fact that the Kurds know that they can gain much by alliance with Turkey. The Kurdish enclave of Kobani would have fallen to the Islamic State recently if Turkey had not opened its border to allow Kurdish fighters from other regions to reinforce it. On a larger scale the Kurdish region of Iraq could greatly use Turkish support if it is to hold off the forces of Bagdad and Iran's Shia allies.
The Kurds are also a people who have experienced success in pan-ethnic states in the past, going all the way back to Saladin, the Kurdish ruler of a caliphate that led the resistance to the crusaders.

Erdogan may not yet be sure just how he is going to change Turkey. Ever since he and his Justice and Development (AK) party took power there has been a move toward regional leadership based on pan-islamism. Certainly an Islamic state has much broader regional appeal than one based on a particular nationality, but even pan-Islamism is limiting. There are large regions of both Syria and Iraq that would be alienated by a Sunni Islamic power. Religion is in itself a sort of ethnicity. Ideally, to have the greatest chance of dominating the Middle East the new Turkey would need to be both non-ethnic and non-religious. Perhaps, however, this is a step too far for Erdogan, particularly when most Kurds and most Arabs would identify as being Sunni Moslems. At the very least, however, the new Turkey must be a state in which men like Ocalan feel they could themselves become president and consequently rule over both Kurds and Turks. That is the sort of carrot which could attract the political leadership of the Kurds and other ethnicities into welcoming the expansion of a state based on the same core territory as the former Ottoman Empire.

So, if some journalist are confused that the Turkish government is getting less liberal, but the Kurds seem to be moving closer to a rapprochement it is because they are used to seeing ethnic relations only progress in terms of a dominant ethnicity granting more rights and liberties to members of minorities. What they are failing to see is that there is a new game in town; one that changes everything. Right now the two men who are the most influential leaders of the Turks and the Kurds are talking of the creation of a state in which both ethnicities will be equal parties. Greater liberalism is no longer needed, and indeed can even be inconvenient if you suddenly find yourself a member of the ruling class.

By launching direct military action against the Houthi/Saleh forces in Yemen the Saudis are taking a long term risk.  Though they might be by far the stronger party at the moment it is conceivable that they might meet strong resistance.  It is hard to subdue people who have nothing to lose and the Yemenis are very poor.  They also live in extremely difficult terrain.  Until now the Houthis were respecting the Saudi border.  Now that the Saudis have attacked them they will have no qualms about operating in Saudi territory.  Given there is significant Yemeni/Houthi population in the regions of Saudi Arabia which border Yemen's northern border, the Saudis are leaving themselves open to a war which could end up being fought on their own soil.  The Saudis may rationalise that if the Houthis gain complete control of Yemen they will, given past history, be after their southern regions next anyway.  This may be true, but the international community would have been virtually unified in opposing one country attacking another.  By Saudi Arabia attacking first they have forfeited this moral high ground.
The Saudis do already have the support, perhaps even the encouragement, of the United States of America in their attack and perhaps they believe that this is the only voice in the international court of public opinion that matters so why not invade.  This is a fair point, but America's priorities might change in the future while Yemen''s position on the southern border of Saudi Arabia will not and now that the Saudis have broken the peace I am sure the Houthis will be eager to take the fight into Saudi territory whenever they can.

26-3-2015 
It has been an interesting day for two reasons.
1. Events in Yemen.
Suddenly the Al-Houthi's supported by forces loyal to the former President appear to be on the verge of taking control of Aden the former Capital of South Yemen.  Given that many pundit have been predicting the imminent break up of Yemen into its former independent parts of North Yemen and South Yemen this is a very significant development.  Particularly significant is the involvement of the former unifying president Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Now, while I do not put myself forward as an expert on Ali Abdullah Saleh, I will say that in unifying North and South Yemen to create one  nation Saleh achieved a feat which makes him one of the most successful national leaders of the twentieth century.  I note that Yemen's current troubles started while Saleh was seriously ill.  If Saleh is back in control of himself, and today's events suggest to me that he is, then those who are saying that 'there is no one who can pull Yemen back together,' might find that they are mistaken.  
Though if Saleh comes back to influence through the aid of his former adversaries, the Houthi's it could well spell worrying times for Saudi Arabia.
2. The Ukrainian President has sacked the powerful oligarch Igor Kolomoisky from the post of Governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region.  Given that Kolomoisky is seen as the man who was most influential in ensuring that Dnipropetrovsk did not join the pro-Russian separatist movement this rift between himself and the Ukrainian government presided over by fellow/rival oligarch Petro Poroschenko is very significant indeed.