Some Carrots in the Pot.
There were many notable things about Putin's speech yesterday (Australian East Coast Time) which ended in his recognition of the independence of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk(see attached link www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrGLhhTtxFU). One of the things which struck me though is that when he spoke about how the Bolsheviks, when they created the Soviet state of Ukraine, were too generous with its borders, he not only says that 'historically Russian lands' were given to it, but also that 'historically Hungarian' and historically Polish' lands were also given to it. Such an admission leaves the door open to future negotiations with Hungary and Poland about a future carve-up of current Ukrainian territory. Indeed, I would guess that the Hungarians have long had their eye on just such a redrawing of their border with Ukraine and their pro-Russian attitudes over recent years have been, at least in part, a preparing of the ground for just such a negotiation, where they barter their support for Russian moves into Ukraine in return for a renegotiation of their border with The Ukraine, in the event that Russia does come to control it. Given that the Hungarian speaking section of Ukraine is only a small sliver of territory immediately adjacent to the current border and on the western side of the Carpathian mountains it would seem to be an exchange that Putin may well be willing to contemplate.

Hungary is already in the Russian camp. Poland, however, is completely another matter. Poland has led the European resistance to Russian actions in The Ukraine and they have been The Ukraine's strongest supporter. They have also done their best to pull Belarus away from its links to Russia, and they have worked to block Russian influence in Lithuania and increase their own.

This advocacy is not entirely based on a fear of Russia, as some claim. Poland also has an historical claim on all of these states having ruled them during the 15th and 16th centuries. As well as during a brief period in the 20th century, between the world wars.  Poland is a true historical competitor to Russia in these territories and as such it would seem unlikely that their hostility to Russia could be altered. However, Putin's recent reference to 'historically Polish lands' suggests that he might be amenable to giving some of Ukraine 'back' to Poland, if he gained control of it, and that thought will now be firmly lodged in the back of many Polish nationalists minds. Perhaps in the future, Polish resistance to the Russian occupation of The Ukraine might be turned to support by the negotiated return of some 'historically Polish lands'. And I am sure, if such negotiations ever did take place then Poland's leaving NATO and signing a security treaty with Russia would also be on the table.

Putin's potential undermining of NATO did not stop there, however, at the same time as talking about Polish lands being given to Ukraine he also spoke of 'historically German lands' being given to Poland. What if Putin told Poland that he would give them their 'historical lands' only if they agreed to give half as much land area back to Germany. Would this be enough to lure an already wobbly Germany out of NATO?

Putin's speech has already shaken Europe for reasons not mentioned here. However, Putin chooses his words carefully, and various nationalist leaders in Hungary, Poland and Germany will have heard the suggestion that some of their dearly held goals might be achieved through an alliance with Russia.

Many news reports are saying that there are more than 100,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border. Some news reports are saying around 90,000.

So, does this mean an invasion of The Ukraine is imminent?

I would say: certainly not. The Russians are positioning themselves to take advantage of possible opportunities. Russian troops moving into the Ukraine, en masse, is certainly more likely than it was a year ago, but it may not come in the form of an invasion and will not happen at all unless global and local conditions present a compelling opportunity.

First: The Why?
Why would Russia want to take possession of The Ukraine?

Because in many Russian minds, and almost certainly in Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s mind, The Ukraine is Russian territory. The very first historical mentions of a Russian people and state come from tales of the ‘Kievan Rus’. Kiev was the first capital of the Russians. Today, Kiev is the capital of The Ukraine. Many Russian’s don’t see The Ukraine as just a lost province; they see it as their historical heartland. They strongly desire to see The Ukraine re-united with the rest of Russia.

Second: The Why Now?
Why is it far more likely that the Russians might make a play for taking back The Ukraine now, rather than a year ago?

Because they have finished the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which means that they can now pump natural gas direct to Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Previously, their gas, which provides an enormous income stream, had to pass through The Ukraine to reach Western Europe. So, naturally, the fear was that any aggressive moves toward The Ukraine could see the Ukrainians shut down the gas pipelines and hamstring the Russian economy from the very beginning of the war. Now, the Ukrainians can no longer play this card. So, the price the Russians would have to pay for aggression against The Ukraine has been substantially lowered. Not only that, but the Russians now have leverage over many of the European nations who might otherwise have supported The Ukraine against Russia. Now, the Germans, for example, know that if they support The Ukraine against Russia, they risk losing the natural gas upon which their economy currently depends. Previously, the Germans would have lost the gas immediately that the war started so the Russians could not have used the restriction of supply as a threat to keep them out of the conflict.

So, the Russians are highly motivated to regain The Ukraine and they have already created infrastructure and political levers that would significantly lower the expected cost of an invasion of The Ukraine. So why wouldn’t they go ahead and invade?

The main reason why the Russians would limit military actions against The Ukraine as much as possible is precisely because they see themselves as the one people. They would like to re-unify the country peacefully if they can. Many think that the Ukrainian identity is weak and does not have deep historical roots for many Ukrainian citizens, they hope that a well-managed crisis might bring many Ukrainian citizens around to wanting to re-integrate with Russia. President Putin is also surely aware that a brutal invasion may well be something which could inspire a stronger sense of Ukrainian identity than that which already exists. To draw an historical example, one might say that the inhabitants of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor had no strong sense of a national identity at the time when the Portuguese abandoned that colony, however, after a brutal Indonesian invasion, the East Timorese identity became extremely strong.
So, the Russians are hoping that The Ukraine will soon find itself in such economic or governmental difficulties that a re-unification with ‘Greater Russia’ will be welcomed by the populace. Of course, now that the Ukrainian government can no longer stop them exporting gas to Western Europe the Russians are able to tighten the economic screws on The Ukraine in a way they never have before. They have already banned exports of coal to The Ukraine, it remains to be seen if they are going to shut off the oil and gas as well this winter. There are various ways that the Russians can manipulate circumstances within The Ukraine to try and bring on a crisis. It is not the purpose of this article to try to detail them all. What I would like to emphasize, however, is that there are some potential global events which Russia might be watching or even waiting for.
Imagine, for example, that China began implementing its plans to take control of Taiwan. Such activity, whether it be a blockade or a military assault, would likely take a great deal of American attention. Would that not present a perfect opportunity for an old-fashioned military invasion of The Ukraine? Is it not possible that there might not already be a deal between China and Russia such that if China begins an attack on Taiwan then Russia should attack The Ukraine, to divide the attention and resources of America and its allies? Certainly, such a deal would make perfect sense. Indeed, the deal might even go the other way. It might read that ‘if Russia attacks The Ukraine then China should begin its attack on Taiwan.
Remember, such attacks would not be seen by either country as an act of aggression against a sovereign state. China would see an attack on Taiwan as simply the final chapter in a long-running civil war. Certainly, that civil war has been cold for many decades now, but, nonetheless, Taiwan is the last holdout of the Chinese Communist Party’s opponents in the battle to control China. Taking control of Taiwan would be for them an act of national reunification. For the Russians, with The Ukraine, it is the same. They too would see an invasion of The Ukraine as an attempt to reunify their country. Both Russia and China are very conscious, however, that the USA and the West would represent their actions differently and are worried about what they would do against them. Seen from this vantage point it would seem strange if there is not a deal between these two countries to co-ordinate their attacks on Taiwan and The Ukraine.

So ...

Right now, the Russians are in a strong position to move on The Ukraine; they have removed their economic vulnerability; global fossil fuel prices are high, boosting their economic strength and making their customers less likely to want to seek other suppliers; they have a strong leader with good domestic support and the US administration is focused on China and domestic discord and the American people are tired of foreign engagements. If an opportunity appears, the Russians may well move on The Ukraine.

However ...

For the Chinese, the current moment does not appear so compelling. The US is watching them closely and they do not want to get into a hot war with the Americans. However, their hand might be forced. My feeling is that the Chinese will continue to keep trading with the US for as long as they can, and the American administration will go along with this for as long as it can too. However, American domestic opinion might eventually force the administration to cease engagement with China. Just on the 2nd of December, 2021, the World Tennis Association has ceased any engagement with China over the Peng Shuai affair. One can imagine that outrage over what is reportedly happening in Sinkiang (Xinxiang) might shortly follow. At some point trade between China and The West might come to an abrupt halt and at that point China might feel it has much less to lose by attacking Taiwan. Indeed, attacking Taiwan might become a necessary, even the only, face-saving move left to a Chinese leader who is faced with the West’s anti-Chinese actions.

So, if Russia chose to make moves on The Ukraine this winter, it is quite likely that Chinese would not act on Taiwan but rather choose to wait till their own circumstances were more compelling. However, if China does move on Taiwan this northern winter then I think it very likely that Russia would initiate some actions against the sovereignty of The Ukraine.
 
Summary:
Russia is presently very well set up to intervene in The Ukraine, more so than at any period since The Ukraine Crisis began back in 2013-2014 with the toppling of a democratically elected pro-Russian government. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has made Russia far less vulnerable to Ukrainian economic retaliation and simultaneously given the Russians more economic control of several Western European countries (most significantly, Germany). Consequently, the Russians are far more likely to intervene in the Ukraine than they have been previously, and they have stationed their military in a manner that would allow them to intervene very quickly should an opportunity arise. The Russians are probably working to manufacture such an opportunity, with moves like banning coal exports to The Ukraine, but other opportunities could arise without their meddling, an example of such being a Chinese play for Taiwan. Other opportunities, though, can be imagined, such as a poor response to the pandemic within The Ukraine causing  economic or administrative failure. Despite their strong position a Russian invasion is not a given, however, as the Russians would like to avoid alienating the majority of Ukrainians. They would prefer to intervene in the country in a situation where their intervention would be welcomed by, at least, a significant number of Ukrainians. However, if something like an invasion of Taiwan was begun by the Chinese the Russians may well think that the international circumstances were so favorable that they should take advantage of the situations and launch an invasion of The Ukraine regardless.
​Such are the precarious circumstances in which we find ourselves at the moment.

The Twentieth Century was a Slavic century
The Slavs won the last two world wars and their tide is still rising.
 
I love historical maps. If you look at a series of historical maps over a period of a thousand or even thousands of years you can see the rise and fall of nations and empires simply by viewing the changes in the territory they control. If you apply this very simple analysis to maps that are both pre- and post- both of the world wars you will see that the Slavic people were very clearly the winners of both. Prior to the First World War much of Central and Eastern Europe was controlled by two large German run empires, the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. By the end of the war the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been replaced by the Slav controlled states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland (plus Austria and Hungary) and the German Empire had also ceded some territory to the newly recreated Poland. By the end of the Second World War Poland had taken over even more, formerly German, territory.
In future centuries I have no doubt that some historians looking back will say that in Europe the story of the 20th century was the story of the Slavs. They were the people whose power was steadily growing through the century. And if you think ‘Well the maps are misleading, the Slavs were just the accidental beneficiaries of historical circumstance,’ then I would draw your attention to the Russian revolution; the event whose intellectual, philosophical, and political repercussions virtually shaped the history of every other nation of the world through the rest of that century. Need I point out that the Russian revolution took place in a Slavic state.
Indeed, the true accidental beneficiaries of history in the 20th century are the Americans and the Anglosphere. They have leapt forward while the ‘Great Tussle’ was going on elsewhere. And the great tussle of the twentieth century, by the way, was not between the Soviet Union and the USA so much as it was between the Slavic and Germanic peoples.
The Slavic territorial advances of the twentieth century were just the most recent chapters in a struggle that had been going on for centuries. The Slavs were the dominant people of Eastern and Central Europe by the 6th century AD having spread west in the wake of the westward moving Germans, but the German’s made many attempts to push back to the East over the intervening centuries. Charlemagne’s campaigns are one famous early example; and the activities of the Teutonic knights form another. In general, though, the Germans were not able to shift the Slavs from the territory they had settled on, although with the advantages of their more advanced civilisation they often did come to control them. Hence, the appearance of so many Slavic states in place of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War was not on account of a sudden mass migration of Slavs into the area, but rather a removal of German overlordship from a population that was already Slavic. The humiliated Germans pushed back again after their losses in the First World War. They managed to gain control of a great deal of the German inhabited regions of Czechoslovakia and then launched the invasion of Poland which precipitated the Second World War. Eventually, though, they were repelled and lost even more territory to the Slavs. The end of the Second World War also included the removal of large ethnic German populations from many regions of both Poland and Czechoslovakia thus increasing the proportion of Europe inhabited by Slavs. During the Cold War, Slavic control extended even further than their settled populations with the virtual Russian control of East Germany marking the historical high point of Slavic power within Europe for the last 800 years. Since then, with the reunification of Germany, Slavic control has receded, although Slav inhabited territory has not.
Not only were the most significant territorial wars of the Twentieth Century conducted between Germans and Slavs, one might even say that all of the intellectual running in the twentieth century was carried on between Russia and Germany as well. Marx, after all was a German, so the German’s also have a claim to originating that great intellectual tussle of the Twentieth Century: the foment around the ideas of communism.
 
 
As Germany has this century resurfaced as the most powerful economy in Europe and Russia is struggling to deal with American hostility and low oil prices what makes you think Slavic power will trend up rather than down in the near future?
 
It is important to remember that Slavic power is not synonymous with Russian power. There are other Slavic countries in Europe, and it is in their policies that I see the source of their continuing rise. It is generally known that many Slavic countries have done well since the end of the Cold War. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia stand out as having become countries with a good standard of living and education. The largest of these, Poland, has even become very significant politically and is charting its own independent course between the major regional powers of Germany, Russia and the USA. The Slavic countries, led by Poland, can already be seen to have the self-confidence to stand up to the European Union. Their refusal to accept hordes of refugees from very different cultures is a prime example of this. For many of these nations, having only recently gained control of a sovereign country for their people they are understandably reluctant to share it with others. In most cases these countries have a degree of cultural homogeneity that the Western European countries have already lost. That homogeneity therefore is a point of difference with the West and one that the Eastern European countries could well benefit from. Cultural homogeneity makes nation building a much easier task and with national pride comes a willingness to make sacrifices for the benefit of the country. Such national feeling has in the past made certain nations more formidable in war than other countries, it also leads to stronger community feelings between individuals with all of the intendant, though difficult to quantify, benefits which that entails. 
As an example of the benefits of strong nationalism, the Russia of today can be used. Russia appears to be surviving sanctions and economic difficulties with very little political unrest, and this appears to be the result of the peoples’ gratitude for what the Putin led government has done for Russia and Russian pride since the beginning of the century.
So, their attachment to nationalism, though it may well cause frictions and even war in some areas will, I think, be of overall benefit to Eastern Europe in the years ahead.
 
Another element of growing Slavic power will be their continuance of their westward push. The Slavs have been gradually pushing west for centuries and I see the hordes of Slav workers who poured into Britain and other Western countries at the start of this century as a continuation of the same trend. Consequently, politicians in Britain, France and Germany know that they have to consider the views of significant Polish minorities while politicians in Warsaw have no such concerns. Overall, this increases the relative power of the Slavic populations in Europe.
 
The downfall of Russia should also not be taken as a downfall of Slavic power. I am not at all convinced that Russia is about to deteriorate from its present position, but even if it did most of the likely beneficiaries of such an event would be Slavic states. And, in the event, they would probably be Slavic states with a great deal of support from the United States behind them. If one thinks about the reconstruction of Japan and Western Germany after the Second World War; a Poland or Ukraine with such backing could quickly become very influential.
 
Climate change is also a phenomenon which appears to be working in favour of the Slavs.
If the Earth is warming, and the North Pole is warming at the fastest rate, then this could significantly improve agricultural yields in Russia and increase the percentage of land where human habitation is viable. As Russia has more land above the Arctic Circle, and immediately adjacent to it, than any other country; it is the country, of all the countries on Earth, which stands to gain the most from a warmer climate. Less ice in the Arctic Ocean could also open up Russia’s northern coast to more maritime trade making that coast more economically productive, and militarily strategic, as well.
Poland too stands to benefit from a warming Northern Hemisphere. With a coastline on the Baltic, a sea which often freezes over in winter, Poland could gain all-year round maritime access and even an increased beach-tourism industry, not to mention longer growing seasons for its already fertile plains.
 
In conclusion
I feel that the facts on the ground indicate that the Slavs are quietly improving their position in Europe while the West is concerning itself with other matters. The presence of large numbers of Slavs in many of Western Europe’s major cities, where not so long ago they were almost non-existent, is an indicator of their growing influence. In similar vein, the fact that Slavs are now noticeable as tourists in places like Australia and South-East Asia also speaks to the fact that incomes and living standards in their home countries are improving to positions where they are comparable with Western countries. The evidence of the map is also telling, in that it shows that Slavic governments control a greater portion of Europe than at any time (with the exception of the Cold War period) since the 11th century. The map also shows that Russia is the biggest country in the world and has increased in size recently with the addition of Crimea. There is talk of the possibility of Russia losing territory in Europe in the next decade, but even if this were to occur, the beneficiaries of such a collapse would most likely be other Slavic states. Global warming is of geo-strategic benefit to the Slavs, as well.
Lastly, the fact that large numbers of Slavic migrants are settling in Western Europe, yet the Slavic nations keep their own countries migrant free and culturally homogeneous suggests that Slavs will have a voice amongst the many divergent cultures in Western countries in the future whilst those countries will have no voice in the culturally harmonious Slav homelands. All these trends suggest to me that Slavic influence and power in Europe is set to increase in the coming decade, rather than the reverse.
 
Before leaving off …
I would also like to point out that almost everything that has been said here about the Slavic countries, applies as well to most other non-Slav countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania do, for the most part, possess the same advantages and attitudes as their Slavic neighbours and they therefore have the potential to benefit in the same way. Indeed, the similarity in their attitude to nationalism has led the governments of Hungary and Poland to become virtual brothers-in-arms on certain issues within the European Union, and they, along with Putin’s Russia, are now looked to as examples of how countries should be run by many nationalist groups throughout the West and the rest of the world; a clarifying example of how these countries are already gaining influence in the world while the attention of the West’s governments remains focused elsewhere.

The US Congress has just increased sanctions on Russia by overwhelming majorities in both the House of Representatives (419-3) and the Senate (98-2). On the face of it these sanctions may just seem like a patriotic backlash against the Russian for interfering, or trying to interfere in the US election. And for some congressmen that may indeed be the primary motivation for voting for them. The instigators of this bill for new sanctions though had more on their minds than anything related to the last election. The primary target of these sanctions is the Nord Stream 2 project. Nord Stream 2 would see a pipeline laid under the Baltic Sea which would be large enough to supply northern Europe with all of the Russian gas which currently gets to northern Europe via pipelines through Ukraine. The drafters of this new sanctions bill are worried that if Nord Stream 2 is built then Russia will be able to turn off the gas to Ukraine without having to lose its business in northern Europe. This naturally would massively increase Russia’s ability to influence events in Ukraine and possibly even inspire a popular revolt against its current pro-western government (freezing through a couple of Ukrainian winters without heating might just convince a majority of Ukrainians that their government’s anti-Russian stance was not in their own personal interests). Alternately, if peaceful pressure did not suffice then with Nord Stream 2 operating, Russia would also be able to heat up the Donbas conflict and intervene militarily in the Ukraine without jeopardising its main source of foreign income. Given these possibilities it is no surprise that certain segments of the US administration are worried about Nord Stream 2. For sure they want to stop it, so these sanctions cleverly target companies who would do business with Russian energy companies. The US legislators are hoping to stop Nord Stream 2 from the German end by applying pain to any company that would work with the Russians to make Nord Stream 2 a reality. It is a clever strategy and we wait to see if it will work. The Russians have offered the criticism that the US is just trying to drive European nations toward more expensive American energy suppliers. It is a valid point that American companies will be winners if these sanctions have their desired effect. And surely many Europeans are aware that if in addition to making the Russians poorer these sanctions make Europe less energy secure and more dependent on the Americans then that will be just another reason why they will be thought a good idea by some American strategists.
We now wait to see if the sanctions will have their desired effect upon the Nord Stream 2 project. Several factions within Germany clearly don’t like this use of American power to interfere with their own energy security. The German foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, has spoken out against the sanctions bill. What Angela Merkel will say and do we have yet to see.
It is possible that rather than stopping Nord Stream 2 these sanctions might inspire a backlash of their own which will see the Germans choose Russia over the US in this case. The bill’s drafters would argue that without the sanctions the Germans would have agreed to Nord Stream 2 anyway. So at least the sanctions will make them think twice and then reveal how deep their alignment with the US really is.
Coming on the back of Trump’s visit to Europe recently convincing Angela Merkel that Germany needed to provide for its own defence it might look like there is currently a concerted US campaign to push the Germans away from them. If there is though it is interesting to note that the sanctions bill did not originate with the president’s team and it is probable that he personally would not favour it. Given its overwhelming support however it is hard to see President Trump not signing the bill (though he could use the excuse that he does not want to antagonise the US’s valued ally, Germany).
If, in the end, President Trump does sign the bill it will make an interesting example of how the US can be governed (and I mean quite literally governed; eg: ruled/administered) by forces outside the Presidency. Whether those forces will succeed in inserting a wedge between Russia and Germany or will in fact push them closer together is something that we will watch with close attention. Either way, it is safe to say, that the latest sanctions bill illuminates certain aspects of both US foreign policy and the functioning of the US administration at this point in time, and the response to it could illuminate even more about the state of international relations within Europe

So Angela Merkel said that Germany would take one million refugees and everyone thought ‘that woman is very compassionate,’ and perhaps she is, but when one looks at the decision geo-strategically one finds that there could be other motives behind her decision.
 
​
Germany's Struggle
Since its unification in 1871 Germany has been engaged in a Geopolitical struggle with the other core European Powers: France, The United Kingdom and Russia. These four core powers, or empires as they were initially, have for the last 150 years been constantly engaged in the attempt to improve their positions vis-à-vis the others. The Austro-Hungarian Empire also used to be involved in this game, but it was torn apart following the First World War, a reminder of how deadly the game can be. Turkey, initially in the guise of the Ottoman Empire, was also a player in this game, but as they were almost always an ally of the Germans rather than a competitor I will put them on one side for now.
 
So, if we look at what impact Germany’s decision to take one million immigrants has had on its three traditional rivals we start to see the possibility that there might have been more reasons than altruism to recommend this course of action to Germany’s leader.
 

To begin with The United Kingdom.
Less than a month ago we had the dramatic vote for Britain to leave the European Union (EU). Immigration played a major role in that decision and the vote was close. It could certainly be argued that Germany’s sensationalised decision to accept a million refugees helped to convince Britons to choose to leave the European Union.

How does this act affect the comparative power of Britain vis-à-vis Germany?
On the British side of the equation there are many saying that Britain’s economy will suffer by the decision and that the country might fragment with Scotland and Northern Ireland splitting off. Certainly there is a chance of all of this, which would mean the virtual destruction of one of Germany’s tradition rivals. These doomsday predictions, however, may be mightily overstated. I, for one, can envisage Britain enhancing its influence in the world as a result of the Brexit. Whether or not the UK benefits from leaving the EU, though, there is no doubt that their leaving has left Germany in a stronger position within the European Union. Germany was already the strongest country within the European Union, but it could be challenged by Britain and France. With Britain out Germany’s power within the EU immediately grows.
 

What about France?
With Britain out of the EU the only other powerful country left in the EU other than Germany is its old rival; France.

What impact has Ms Merkel’s decision had on the relative strength of France vis-à-vis Germany?
Well, it could be argued that by accepting so many refugees Germany is being seen as a country that is sympathetic to Muslims and it could be argued that Germany has been cultivating this perception since accepting its first influx of Turkish immigrants through its ‘guest worker’ program back in the 60s. So how does this help Germany in its geopolitical game vis-à-vis the other European powers?
 
It should be noted that Germany, to this point, has not suffered from the mass slaughter Islamic terrorist attacks that have hit the UK and particularly France and with this grand gesture to further bolster Germany’s pro-Islamic credentials it could be expected that whatever increase in Islamic terrorism might occur following the decision its targets will be countries other than Germany. France for example is living under a state of emergency due to the frequency of mass casualty Islamic Terror attacks, so it could be argued that Merkel’s decision has contributed to shielding Germany from Islamic terrorist attacks while undermining the civil security of its rival France. Indeed, with the latest attack in Nice horrifying the French people, the chance of a National Front victory at the next election increases and that could lead to a Frexit. A situation that would leave Germany as the sole remaining power within the EU; a situation which would be something akin to Germany taking control of all of the minor countries of Europe; a massive geopolitical advantage to Germany if it should come to pass.

 
And now for the third rival; Russia.
Unlike the others Russia is not in the EU, but Merkel’s decision does have an indirect affect on Russia too. For the past 150 years Germany’s most reliable ally in containing Russia has been Turkey. Russia’s desire to gain control of the sea passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean poses an existential threat to the Turkish State and consequently Turkey, or the Ottoman empire as it was then, allied with Germany in the First World War and avoided joining the Allies against Germany in the Second World War until after the result was a forgone conclusion.
By accepting the one million refugees Germany took the pressure off its old ally Turkey, who was the main transit route for the refugees, and it thereby reaffirmed its bond of goodwill with a country that was at the time involved in a military standoff with Russia over the use of its air force in Syria.
 
So, in conclusion, it can be seen that by making her sensational announcement of accepting one million refugees Angela Merkel was taking a step which enhanced Germany’s geo-strategic position vis-à-vis all of its traditional rivals for power within Europe while at the same time appealing to all those who support ‘compassion politics’ both within the western world and abroad.
For those who doubt that the German chancellor and her advisors could have had anything but humanitarian concerns in mind when they made their decision, I would ask you to pose yourself the following questions:
“Was Angela Merkel aware that Britain was going to have a referendum on whether to leave the EU in the near future?”
“Was Angela Merkel aware that immigration would be a significant issue in that referendum?”
“Was Angela Merkel aware that her acceptance of one million, mostly Islamic refugees into the EU via Germany, from where they might later move to Britain or anywhere else they wanted, would be likely to strengthen Britain’s Leave campaign?”
I would posit that the answer to all of the above questions is “Yes.”
 
It should also be known that, tied in with its alliances with Turkey, Germany has a long history with the idea of using Islam as a weapon. In the first instance this was as a tool to be used against the colonial empires of Britain, France and Russia. On the outbreak of the First World War the Germans even established in Berlin a ‘Bureau of Jihad’ “to produce pan-Islamic propaganda to instigate revolts in French North Africa, Russian Central Asia, and, the jewel in the crown, British India with its 80 million muslims.”[1]
The German Legationsrat and friend of Kaiser Willhelm II who oversaw the establishment of this Bureau, Baron Max von Oppenheim, believed that “In the future Islam will play a much larger role…. [T]he striking power and demographic strength of Islamic lands will one day have a great significance for European states.”[2]
Given that its building of the Berlin to Bagdad railway and its support for the Ottoman Empire in its decay form some of the prouder narratives of German foreign policy over the last 150 years one might find it surprising if Ms Merkel’s advisors were not aware of this heritage. Indeed, one might even note that up until the end of the First World War Syria and Iraq were provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Germany’s erstwhile ally of the day. So in accepting the Syrian and Iraqi refugees one might even wonder if Ms Merkel was not in fact making a nod to Germany’s history and reaffirming an old bond of goodwill between her country and the peoples of that region.
 
In conclusion
For those who think that I might be drawing a very long bow in these speculations, I will concede that you might be right. It is the case that although one might have knowledge of enough facts to uncover the criminal in a detective novel it does not automatically follow that you will put the pieces together correctly to figure out what happened. Similarly, though Angela Merkel knew enough independent facts to forsee the effects of her decision upon her three main European rivals, it does not necessarily follow that she came to those realisations or that they were her primary reasons for acting.
Nonetheless, I think it has been a very enlightening exercise to analyse her action in terms of the effects it would have on Germany's geopolitical rivals.
 
 


[1] Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, Penguin, 2016, p.48

[2] Oppenheim quoted by McMeekin, The Berlin-Bagdad Express, 27, 91 as cited in Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, Penguin, 2016, p.48

Greece has found some cards to play.
It is no secret that the world has been watching Greece since the beginning of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC).  'Can they avoid falling out of the  Euro?' has been the question everyone has been watching to see answered.  Initially the European Union (EU) put all efforts into keeping  them in, but as the years have ground by and the EU has built greater resilience into its financial institutions (or at least believes it has) the efforts have gradually changed to trying not to let the Greeks get away with too much unearned credit.  It was a story which promised dramatic events, but had become a rather slow and repetitive melodrama.
With the recent election to government of a 'non-establishment' party, however, Greece has once again become more interesting.  The new government, no longer bound by the old establishment alliances, has found that despite the country's dire situation they have some cards to play.

CARD ONE - THE ACE - RUSSIA
The overthrow of the Ukrainian Government and the subsequent developments, including sanctions against Russia, have made Greece far more strategically important to Russia now than it was at the start of the GFC.  Now, with Russia looking to break the unanimity of EU sanctions against it and also to break the unanimity of the NATO alliance, they would be willing to pay a high price for the defection of Greece, most probably including the economic support of the country after a default on its debts to western nations.  The EU and the Americans are well aware of the political consequences of a Greek re-alliance with Moscow and so this is a strong card to play in getting further concessions from them.  If this card alone is not good enough to convince the Europeans to bail out the Greeks then it could indicate that many Europeans are less worried about the political consequences of a  Grexit at this point than the Americans.

CARD TWO - THE JOKER - NAZI COMPENSATION
Another card that the Greek Government has suddenly played is the claim for compensation for the Nazi occupation.  Predictably, this request has met with a cold reception from many in Germany who cite previous payments as appropriate compensation, but there is a considerable portion of the German Bundestag which is viewing the claim more favourably than many would have predicted.  
In the negative, some are arguing that if they grant this claim to Greece then they will be left open to claims from other formerly occupied countries.  This is true, but if the EU just bails out Greece to keep it in the Euro then they (read mostly Germany) will be opening the door to all of the other indebted EU countries.
At this point in time the compensation for Nazi occupation would amount to a smaller sum than the GFC debts.  Notably, Spain, Portugal and Ireland were never occupied by the Nazi's and Italy, although briefly occupied, was originally an ally of the Nazi's so any claim made by them would be in a different category.
The Germans might just find it expedient to pay Greece's compensation claim and consequently bail it out in a way which will not let the other major GFC debtor nations off the hook.

In conclusion, a Nazi occupation compensation payment could well be a blessing in disguise for the Germans.  However, the Germans may yet weigh their interests and decide that the Euro has outlived its usefulness, or that they are not that scared of the Russians.
What is sure, though, is that Greece is once again an interesting country to watch.