This article will examine the risk versus reward potential of all the prospective northern​ offensives that Russia could run in Ukraine. It will then come to a conclusion as to the most likely.

Offensive One
Direction  – Driving south from Belorussia along the Polish border, taking or encircling Lviv then following the Dniester River valley to seal off the Romanian border and the Moldavian border north of Transdniestria.

Rewards – The purpose of this offensive would be to cut Ukraine off from Western supplies. Given that Hungary, Slovakia and Transnistria are not allowing military supplies to cross their borders into Ukraine then it is only the Polish border, the Romanian border and a small section of Moldavian border north of Transnistria where supplies are making it into Ukraine (The flow of goods from the Romanian border south of Transnistria has been blocked by the destruction of two strategic bridges). Without supplies from its allies, Ukraine would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. So if this offensive was successful it would mean a quick and decisive end to the war. Added benefits for Russia would be that most of the fighting and consequent destruction and death would take place in the extreme west of the country, which is the most anti-Russian part of the country, leaving the more pro-Russian East and Centre with less damage.

Risks – The danger with this thrust, though, is that the Russian right flank would be extremely vulnerable to an attack across the Polish border by the very well-armed and highly motivated Poles. With fighting right on the Polish border it runs the risk of some munitions straying across the border and giving Poland an excuse to cross the border in retaliation. Such a move would be the more likely as, if the Russians had an extended offensive pushing south from Belorussia, it would be very tempting for the Poles to enter the fray, cutting the salient off from Belorussia in the north and thereby surrounding the attacking army in one relatively easy move. That would be a disaster for the Russians. Further more, it would be very difficult for the Russians to take Lviv quickly a major city with perhaps the greatest anti-Russian, pro-war sentiment in Ukraine.

Conclusion – Whilst the rewards of this plan are enormous. The potential for a disaster is too high a risk for the Russians. This is not the strategy they will employ at this time.
 

Offensive Two
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia, beginning at a point midway between the Polish border and the Dneiper river, then heading south to make contact with the northern border of the Russian ally, Transnistria.

Rewards – Similar to Offensive One, the purpose of this offensive would be to cut off Kiev and the great majority of Ukraine from Western supplies. 

Risks – Unlike Offensive One, though, the Russians do not have the difficult task of taking Lviv indeed there are no major urban areas standing in the way of this offensive reaching its desired goal. This thrust would also be far enough away from the Polish border that the fighting has little chance of spilling over, and if the Poles decide to intervene anyway, then the Russians will have some time to prepare to face them as they will need to cross some 60 to 100 kilometres of Ukrainian held territory before encountering the Russian flank. Not being right up against the Polish border, however, will mean, though, that there will be a significant slab of Ukrainian territory on the Russians’ western flank with the major city of Lviv at its core and that even if the rest of Ukraine is cut off this western region would be well set up to carry on the fight.
Being a salient striking down between Ukraine’s two primary military logistics hubs of Lviv and Kiev, this Offensive also has the potential to see an attacking Russian army cut off from its support and encircled. Though that possibility is reduced by the less likely intervention of the Poles.
 
Conclusion – There is a lot to recommend this offensive plan. Particularly, when it may well be the case that Putin does not want Lviv and was intending for it to be the capital of a rump Ukrainian state, which would be useful to him as somewhere for all the die hard Ukrainian nationalists to go to, rather than staying in the conquered part of Ukraine and causing the Russian administration headaches.
I do not think the Russians will undertake this offensive at this time. They are currently winning in the East (if only marginally) and at the moment the momentum of the war is turning in their favour. They appear to be getting stronger while the Ukrainians appear to be weakening. Given this situation they will be reluctant to do anything risky that could turn momentum and morale against them. Better to pursue safer courses of action even if their gains are only small rather than give the Ukrainians a chance to have a big win and undo all of the positive momentum. As one analyst has said ‘Right now, the Ukrainians only hope of victory is through a Russian mistake.’ I think the Russians would assess that they need to avoid the possibility of a ‘mistake’ at all costs, so their up-coming offensive will be, I think, one that risks little.
If the Russians are successful in taking the East bank of the Dnieper. It will be after that when they will endeavour to launch this offensive, not now.
 

Offensive Three
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia straight at Kiev.

Rewards – Taking the capital of Ukraine.

Risks – Destroying the city which was the medieval capital of Russia for 600 years. A very difficult and costly fight through Ukraine’s largest city. Making enemies and warriors of many civilians who might not otherwise have been wanting to resist the Russian takeover.
Despite the great cost to achieve, it would not necessarily bring the war to an end even on the East bank of the Dniepr.

Conclusion – Not going to happen. My guess is that Putin does not want to see sustained fighting in Kiev. The initial attack on Kiev was conducted in the hope of scaring Ukraine into submission. Once it was clear that sustained fighting would be needed to take the city, Putin withdrew.
 

Offensive Four
Direction – Driving south from Belorussia along the East bank of the Dneipr River, taking Chernihiv, taking or encircling the Eastern suburbs of Kiev, pushing on along the Dneipr to meet up with another Russian army pushing north along the eastern bank of the Dniepr from Zhaprizhia or a Russian army pushing west toward the Dneipr from a starting point between Sumy and Kharkiv.

Rewards – Cutting off Eastern Ukraine from all supplies from the West which would mean any Ukrainian forces in the East would quickly run out of munitions and weapons systems with which to fight. This offensive would also make Kiev a frontline town subject to artillery fire from the Russian forces. This would have a significant psychological impact on the Ukrainians. Also reducing the ability of their largest city to function productively and in all likelihood forcing a withdrawal of the central government to the West, probably to Lviv.
 
Risks – As with all salient attacks there is the risk of being cut off and encircled. An attack along the east bank of the Dneipr to Chernihiv was attempted at the beginning of the war and failed to take Chernihiv, so it is known that Chernihiv will not be easy to take. Making deep attacks from two or three directions requires a lot of manpower, firepower and logistics in an environment where mobile warfare has proven difficult, so far. Given all of this it is possible that these offensive thrusts will become stalled before meeting up. Offensive thrusts that fail to meet their goals will cause reputational/morale damage to the Russian army.
 
Conclusion – This strategy will be employed in parts. The pushing south along the east bank of the Dneipr will be held off for now but attempts to attack north from Zhaporizia along the Dneipr and West from between Kharkiv and Sumy will be made. If both, or even just one, of these attacks goes exceptionally well then a thrust from the north will eventually be made.
Part of the reason why I am confident the Zhaporizhia and Sumy/Kharkiv thrusts will be made is because these attacks have multiple success points. On the Zhaporizhia front if they just move the front forward a few kilometres; it is a success; if they take or encircle Eastern Zhaprizhia City – they have taken control of a vital Dneipr crossing; big success; if they make it all the way to Dnipro; they have blocked two key Dneipr crossings; outstanding success. From the border between Sumy and Kharkiv, if they simply take some Ukrainian territory then they have succeeded in creating a buffer zone along the border; success; if they push in 30 kilometres between Sumy and Kharkiv, then they have put themselves in a position to encirlcle either city or drive toward the Dneipr, thus putting the enemy in doubt and forcing them to divide their forces or leave one or more options open; big success; from there the outstanding success of encircling Kharkiv or Sumy or driving to the Dneipr is possible. If the later option is achieved then an attempt to meet that thrust with an army coming up from Zhaporizhia or down from Chernihiv would be a next step.
 
Ultimate Conclusion
So, I am predicting that if the war plays out in the Russian favour, but the Ukrainians continue to fight, then first we will see offensive four put into action and then after that offensive two. Of course, as outlined in the previous blog, I would see the partial implementation of Offensive Four being conducted in tandem with attempts to advance on all existing fronts in order to stretch Ukraine's strategic reserves to the maximum.
 

Over the past several months, Putin has been gathering his ingredients. Today he threw in the salt. Now he will slowly bring the pot to the boil.

​This may not be a very professional sounding analysis, but it is what is in my mind.

So, in my last hurried post I said I would explain my reasoning for why I think Putin will go into Ukraine. I have left it late enough, so I had better explain myself now before events overtake the need for any prediction.
Now, I am by no means a military expert, so my predictions are based on political calculations rather than any specialised knowledge of troop deployments and such like.
So, some reasons why I think Putin will go into The Ukraine:
Firstly, it is not primarily about NATO. If his stated demands were met, Putin would probably be happy and might put off the invasion for now, but I think that primarily his goal in going into The Ukraine would be the hope of reuniting the Russians. Putin considers Ukrainians to be Russians. Kiev was the capital of the first Russian state. Most of the Ukraine has been part of Russia for hundreds of years and the only reason it was part of a different state to Russia under the Soviet Union, in Putin's thinking, I presume, was because the Russians wanted to make the Soviet Union look like it was an International Union rather than just a Greater Russia, so they generously gave a bit of Russian territory to create some states like Belarus, which had never previously existed and The Ukraine, which had only existed when the Nazi's had control of the territory. The Russians had thought that Belarus and The Ukraine would always be under the control of the Soviet Politburo so there was no problem with calling these regions independent states. They had never imagined that their creations might actually become independent !! They even added the Crimea to The Ukraine in 1954. Thinking like this you can see that Putin, a strong nationalist, might want to correct the 'geopolitical tragedy' of the collapse of the Soviet Union and bring at least these, formerly Russian, states back into Russia. In Belarus it appears Putin has achieved this aim relatively peacefully (There is a 'Union State' agreement by which Russia and Belarus  are essentially merging). He must have thought he was on the way to achieving the same with the Ukraine when Viktor Yanukovych was elected President. He was hoping to get The Crimea back into Russia even more quickly with Yanukovych scheduling a referendum to be held in Crimea in 2014 to let the Crimea decide between the Ukraine, Russia and Independence. When Yanukovych was undemocratically overthrown Putin's strategy for peacefully reintegrating The Ukraine took a significant hit, though, I would assume. 
So, Putin's sense of grievance over The Ukraine is pretty strong. He believes The West underhandedly stole The Ukraine away from him by overthrowing a democratically elected President. He would also see an invasion as a noble effort to reunite his people. So his motivations to take control of the Ukraine are far stronger than some concerns about an aggressive foreign alliance structure. Geo-strategically there is a lot to gain as well, many analysts talk about Russia's declining population, extremely long borders, and open, easy-to-invade geography. Adding the Ukraine to Russia would add 40 plus million people while shortening their border and putting that border on an easily defensible mountain chain.
So, Putin has a lot to gain from bringing Ukraine back into the Russian fold. Not to mention, entry into the pantheon of Russian greats, if he pulls it off. And the greater the gain; the greater the risk one is willing to take to obtain it.

So, why now? Why during this particular standoff?
Well:

• Given that the West has started arming Ukraine, if he backs off now he will have incurred a price for his build up of troops (the better arming of Ukraine and the uniting of NATO) without having achieved any gain. Given that a price has already been paid Putin will not want to walk away.
• If Putin waits till next year Ukraine will only be better armed
• Right now, many European countries have a large dependency on Russian gas and oil and so are not very motivated to stop trading with Russia. In a year's time these countries might have diversified their economies away from Russian commodities.
• Right now, many in the American administration see China as America's biggest concern and so their attention is divided. In a year's time, China might have been laid low by a financial crises, causing the US administration to start rating Russia as their strongest competitor.
• Given that the US has at no point said they will help defend Ukraine militarily, the one card that might really dissuade Putin has not been played.

Given all of the above, it is my prediction that Putin will act rather than back down.
One way or the other, we will soon know.

Well, this blog is meant to be about geopolitical predictions, so here is a big one:
Russia will go into The Ukraine again and this time they will go in big.
Why big?
Because the international reaction to them taking the rest of Donbas would be the same as if they invaded the entire country. So if they go in they should go in for everything they want.
In addition, the more audacious their gambit, the stronger the impression they will make on their neighbors and the world.
Why would they go in at all?
I will have to save my reasoning for a later post.

Many news reports are saying that there are more than 100,000 Russian troops on the Ukrainian border. Some news reports are saying around 90,000.

So, does this mean an invasion of The Ukraine is imminent?

I would say: certainly not. The Russians are positioning themselves to take advantage of possible opportunities. Russian troops moving into the Ukraine, en masse, is certainly more likely than it was a year ago, but it may not come in the form of an invasion and will not happen at all unless global and local conditions present a compelling opportunity.

First: The Why?
Why would Russia want to take possession of The Ukraine?

Because in many Russian minds, and almost certainly in Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s mind, The Ukraine is Russian territory. The very first historical mentions of a Russian people and state come from tales of the ‘Kievan Rus’. Kiev was the first capital of the Russians. Today, Kiev is the capital of The Ukraine. Many Russian’s don’t see The Ukraine as just a lost province; they see it as their historical heartland. They strongly desire to see The Ukraine re-united with the rest of Russia.

Second: The Why Now?
Why is it far more likely that the Russians might make a play for taking back The Ukraine now, rather than a year ago?

Because they have finished the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which means that they can now pump natural gas direct to Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Previously, their gas, which provides an enormous income stream, had to pass through The Ukraine to reach Western Europe. So, naturally, the fear was that any aggressive moves toward The Ukraine could see the Ukrainians shut down the gas pipelines and hamstring the Russian economy from the very beginning of the war. Now, the Ukrainians can no longer play this card. So, the price the Russians would have to pay for aggression against The Ukraine has been substantially lowered. Not only that, but the Russians now have leverage over many of the European nations who might otherwise have supported The Ukraine against Russia. Now, the Germans, for example, know that if they support The Ukraine against Russia, they risk losing the natural gas upon which their economy currently depends. Previously, the Germans would have lost the gas immediately that the war started so the Russians could not have used the restriction of supply as a threat to keep them out of the conflict.

So, the Russians are highly motivated to regain The Ukraine and they have already created infrastructure and political levers that would significantly lower the expected cost of an invasion of The Ukraine. So why wouldn’t they go ahead and invade?

The main reason why the Russians would limit military actions against The Ukraine as much as possible is precisely because they see themselves as the one people. They would like to re-unify the country peacefully if they can. Many think that the Ukrainian identity is weak and does not have deep historical roots for many Ukrainian citizens, they hope that a well-managed crisis might bring many Ukrainian citizens around to wanting to re-integrate with Russia. President Putin is also surely aware that a brutal invasion may well be something which could inspire a stronger sense of Ukrainian identity than that which already exists. To draw an historical example, one might say that the inhabitants of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor had no strong sense of a national identity at the time when the Portuguese abandoned that colony, however, after a brutal Indonesian invasion, the East Timorese identity became extremely strong.
So, the Russians are hoping that The Ukraine will soon find itself in such economic or governmental difficulties that a re-unification with ‘Greater Russia’ will be welcomed by the populace. Of course, now that the Ukrainian government can no longer stop them exporting gas to Western Europe the Russians are able to tighten the economic screws on The Ukraine in a way they never have before. They have already banned exports of coal to The Ukraine, it remains to be seen if they are going to shut off the oil and gas as well this winter. There are various ways that the Russians can manipulate circumstances within The Ukraine to try and bring on a crisis. It is not the purpose of this article to try to detail them all. What I would like to emphasize, however, is that there are some potential global events which Russia might be watching or even waiting for.
Imagine, for example, that China began implementing its plans to take control of Taiwan. Such activity, whether it be a blockade or a military assault, would likely take a great deal of American attention. Would that not present a perfect opportunity for an old-fashioned military invasion of The Ukraine? Is it not possible that there might not already be a deal between China and Russia such that if China begins an attack on Taiwan then Russia should attack The Ukraine, to divide the attention and resources of America and its allies? Certainly, such a deal would make perfect sense. Indeed, the deal might even go the other way. It might read that ‘if Russia attacks The Ukraine then China should begin its attack on Taiwan.
Remember, such attacks would not be seen by either country as an act of aggression against a sovereign state. China would see an attack on Taiwan as simply the final chapter in a long-running civil war. Certainly, that civil war has been cold for many decades now, but, nonetheless, Taiwan is the last holdout of the Chinese Communist Party’s opponents in the battle to control China. Taking control of Taiwan would be for them an act of national reunification. For the Russians, with The Ukraine, it is the same. They too would see an invasion of The Ukraine as an attempt to reunify their country. Both Russia and China are very conscious, however, that the USA and the West would represent their actions differently and are worried about what they would do against them. Seen from this vantage point it would seem strange if there is not a deal between these two countries to co-ordinate their attacks on Taiwan and The Ukraine.

So ...

Right now, the Russians are in a strong position to move on The Ukraine; they have removed their economic vulnerability; global fossil fuel prices are high, boosting their economic strength and making their customers less likely to want to seek other suppliers; they have a strong leader with good domestic support and the US administration is focused on China and domestic discord and the American people are tired of foreign engagements. If an opportunity appears, the Russians may well move on The Ukraine.

However ...

For the Chinese, the current moment does not appear so compelling. The US is watching them closely and they do not want to get into a hot war with the Americans. However, their hand might be forced. My feeling is that the Chinese will continue to keep trading with the US for as long as they can, and the American administration will go along with this for as long as it can too. However, American domestic opinion might eventually force the administration to cease engagement with China. Just on the 2nd of December, 2021, the World Tennis Association has ceased any engagement with China over the Peng Shuai affair. One can imagine that outrage over what is reportedly happening in Sinkiang (Xinxiang) might shortly follow. At some point trade between China and The West might come to an abrupt halt and at that point China might feel it has much less to lose by attacking Taiwan. Indeed, attacking Taiwan might become a necessary, even the only, face-saving move left to a Chinese leader who is faced with the West’s anti-Chinese actions.

So, if Russia chose to make moves on The Ukraine this winter, it is quite likely that Chinese would not act on Taiwan but rather choose to wait till their own circumstances were more compelling. However, if China does move on Taiwan this northern winter then I think it very likely that Russia would initiate some actions against the sovereignty of The Ukraine.
 
Summary:
Russia is presently very well set up to intervene in The Ukraine, more so than at any period since The Ukraine Crisis began back in 2013-2014 with the toppling of a democratically elected pro-Russian government. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has made Russia far less vulnerable to Ukrainian economic retaliation and simultaneously given the Russians more economic control of several Western European countries (most significantly, Germany). Consequently, the Russians are far more likely to intervene in the Ukraine than they have been previously, and they have stationed their military in a manner that would allow them to intervene very quickly should an opportunity arise. The Russians are probably working to manufacture such an opportunity, with moves like banning coal exports to The Ukraine, but other opportunities could arise without their meddling, an example of such being a Chinese play for Taiwan. Other opportunities, though, can be imagined, such as a poor response to the pandemic within The Ukraine causing  economic or administrative failure. Despite their strong position a Russian invasion is not a given, however, as the Russians would like to avoid alienating the majority of Ukrainians. They would prefer to intervene in the country in a situation where their intervention would be welcomed by, at least, a significant number of Ukrainians. However, if something like an invasion of Taiwan was begun by the Chinese the Russians may well think that the international circumstances were so favorable that they should take advantage of the situations and launch an invasion of The Ukraine regardless.
​Such are the precarious circumstances in which we find ourselves at the moment.

I have not been watching the world for a while. Having been buried in my own personal projects, family and occupation I only now put my head up and look around at the world.
So what do I see?

1. I see that oil prices are high and have been that way for a while.
2. I see that Turkey, is finally flexing its military muscles and is slowly, carefully and quietly conquering parts of northern Syria.
3. I see that there are moves being made within Saudi Arabia to purge any possible sources of opposition to the king and the crown prince.
4. I see that neither the EU nor the Eurozone have collapsed, but the governments and politicians that oppose it seem to be gaining influence not losing it.
5. I see that President Xi of China is gathering enormous powers to himself.
6. I see that Donald Trump is meeting the President of North Korea in Singapore.
7. I see that Russia is hosting a World Cup, a bare four years after hosting a Winter Olympics

So what do I make of it all?

1. That with the rebound in oil prices Russia and Saudi Arabia are doing much better than many expected two years ago.
2. With Turkey moving into Arab territory there is an extra incentive for Arabs to unify and that there will be support for a strong Arab leader if one emerges.
3. Saudi Arabia could be strengthening itself internally in preparation for taking on a more aggressive role in its region.
4. The EU is already fraying politically. There is no need for it to disappear; countries can just stop doing what it says and it will simply become less and less important. Hungary and Poland are already flouting its directives, and they are flouting their flouting. The Eurozone can’t simply fade away. It will either continue to function more-or-less as-is or countries will leave it. I think some countries will eventually choose to leave.
5. The fact that 6. Is occurring despite 5. Suggests that Xi is extremely concerned by China’s relative strength vis-à-vis USA and is willing to be very nice to the USA and help them with North Korea so as to dissuade the USA from totally devastating the Chinese economy as they could do if they launched a trade war.
6. I see the American President’s meeting with the North Korean President as more of a reflection of the state of mind of the Chinese President than anything else.
7. Having weathered western sanctions and now showing an expected budget surplus for this year, Russia will be able to use the World Cup to show the world that reports of its imminent demise were vastly premature.

Extra observations:
The USA has recently started taking steps to act in its own economic interests and despite some bad press has found the process less politically painful than many expected. As their first small steps succeed, their appetite for putting America first will probably increase.
It has become clear to me that Russia has probably offered the US a grand bargain/threat on Ukraine, which would run something like ‘Ukraine stays out of NATO and the EU and you stay out of Ukraine or we let the tanks role.’ The Donbas Republics are key to this strategy because if Ukraine joined NATO and Russia attacked then all of NATO would be duty bound to go to war with Russia – and they probably would in the case of such a clear attack. If, however, Ukraine joined NATO and then the Donbas Republics suddenly had some extremely successful offensive thrusts in their on-going civil war, then technically no NATO members would be ‘duty bound’ to intervene. This would explain why so little has been done for Ukraine by the West since its ouster of the pro-Russian government.

The Twentieth Century was a Slavic century
The Slavs won the last two world wars and their tide is still rising.
 
I love historical maps. If you look at a series of historical maps over a period of a thousand or even thousands of years you can see the rise and fall of nations and empires simply by viewing the changes in the territory they control. If you apply this very simple analysis to maps that are both pre- and post- both of the world wars you will see that the Slavic people were very clearly the winners of both. Prior to the First World War much of Central and Eastern Europe was controlled by two large German run empires, the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. By the end of the war the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been replaced by the Slav controlled states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland (plus Austria and Hungary) and the German Empire had also ceded some territory to the newly recreated Poland. By the end of the Second World War Poland had taken over even more, formerly German, territory.
In future centuries I have no doubt that some historians looking back will say that in Europe the story of the 20th century was the story of the Slavs. They were the people whose power was steadily growing through the century. And if you think ‘Well the maps are misleading, the Slavs were just the accidental beneficiaries of historical circumstance,’ then I would draw your attention to the Russian revolution; the event whose intellectual, philosophical, and political repercussions virtually shaped the history of every other nation of the world through the rest of that century. Need I point out that the Russian revolution took place in a Slavic state.
Indeed, the true accidental beneficiaries of history in the 20th century are the Americans and the Anglosphere. They have leapt forward while the ‘Great Tussle’ was going on elsewhere. And the great tussle of the twentieth century, by the way, was not between the Soviet Union and the USA so much as it was between the Slavic and Germanic peoples.
The Slavic territorial advances of the twentieth century were just the most recent chapters in a struggle that had been going on for centuries. The Slavs were the dominant people of Eastern and Central Europe by the 6th century AD having spread west in the wake of the westward moving Germans, but the German’s made many attempts to push back to the East over the intervening centuries. Charlemagne’s campaigns are one famous early example; and the activities of the Teutonic knights form another. In general, though, the Germans were not able to shift the Slavs from the territory they had settled on, although with the advantages of their more advanced civilisation they often did come to control them. Hence, the appearance of so many Slavic states in place of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War was not on account of a sudden mass migration of Slavs into the area, but rather a removal of German overlordship from a population that was already Slavic. The humiliated Germans pushed back again after their losses in the First World War. They managed to gain control of a great deal of the German inhabited regions of Czechoslovakia and then launched the invasion of Poland which precipitated the Second World War. Eventually, though, they were repelled and lost even more territory to the Slavs. The end of the Second World War also included the removal of large ethnic German populations from many regions of both Poland and Czechoslovakia thus increasing the proportion of Europe inhabited by Slavs. During the Cold War, Slavic control extended even further than their settled populations with the virtual Russian control of East Germany marking the historical high point of Slavic power within Europe for the last 800 years. Since then, with the reunification of Germany, Slavic control has receded, although Slav inhabited territory has not.
Not only were the most significant territorial wars of the Twentieth Century conducted between Germans and Slavs, one might even say that all of the intellectual running in the twentieth century was carried on between Russia and Germany as well. Marx, after all was a German, so the German’s also have a claim to originating that great intellectual tussle of the Twentieth Century: the foment around the ideas of communism.
 
 
As Germany has this century resurfaced as the most powerful economy in Europe and Russia is struggling to deal with American hostility and low oil prices what makes you think Slavic power will trend up rather than down in the near future?
 
It is important to remember that Slavic power is not synonymous with Russian power. There are other Slavic countries in Europe, and it is in their policies that I see the source of their continuing rise. It is generally known that many Slavic countries have done well since the end of the Cold War. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia stand out as having become countries with a good standard of living and education. The largest of these, Poland, has even become very significant politically and is charting its own independent course between the major regional powers of Germany, Russia and the USA. The Slavic countries, led by Poland, can already be seen to have the self-confidence to stand up to the European Union. Their refusal to accept hordes of refugees from very different cultures is a prime example of this. For many of these nations, having only recently gained control of a sovereign country for their people they are understandably reluctant to share it with others. In most cases these countries have a degree of cultural homogeneity that the Western European countries have already lost. That homogeneity therefore is a point of difference with the West and one that the Eastern European countries could well benefit from. Cultural homogeneity makes nation building a much easier task and with national pride comes a willingness to make sacrifices for the benefit of the country. Such national feeling has in the past made certain nations more formidable in war than other countries, it also leads to stronger community feelings between individuals with all of the intendant, though difficult to quantify, benefits which that entails. 
As an example of the benefits of strong nationalism, the Russia of today can be used. Russia appears to be surviving sanctions and economic difficulties with very little political unrest, and this appears to be the result of the peoples’ gratitude for what the Putin led government has done for Russia and Russian pride since the beginning of the century.
So, their attachment to nationalism, though it may well cause frictions and even war in some areas will, I think, be of overall benefit to Eastern Europe in the years ahead.
 
Another element of growing Slavic power will be their continuance of their westward push. The Slavs have been gradually pushing west for centuries and I see the hordes of Slav workers who poured into Britain and other Western countries at the start of this century as a continuation of the same trend. Consequently, politicians in Britain, France and Germany know that they have to consider the views of significant Polish minorities while politicians in Warsaw have no such concerns. Overall, this increases the relative power of the Slavic populations in Europe.
 
The downfall of Russia should also not be taken as a downfall of Slavic power. I am not at all convinced that Russia is about to deteriorate from its present position, but even if it did most of the likely beneficiaries of such an event would be Slavic states. And, in the event, they would probably be Slavic states with a great deal of support from the United States behind them. If one thinks about the reconstruction of Japan and Western Germany after the Second World War; a Poland or Ukraine with such backing could quickly become very influential.
 
Climate change is also a phenomenon which appears to be working in favour of the Slavs.
If the Earth is warming, and the North Pole is warming at the fastest rate, then this could significantly improve agricultural yields in Russia and increase the percentage of land where human habitation is viable. As Russia has more land above the Arctic Circle, and immediately adjacent to it, than any other country; it is the country, of all the countries on Earth, which stands to gain the most from a warmer climate. Less ice in the Arctic Ocean could also open up Russia’s northern coast to more maritime trade making that coast more economically productive, and militarily strategic, as well.
Poland too stands to benefit from a warming Northern Hemisphere. With a coastline on the Baltic, a sea which often freezes over in winter, Poland could gain all-year round maritime access and even an increased beach-tourism industry, not to mention longer growing seasons for its already fertile plains.
 
In conclusion
I feel that the facts on the ground indicate that the Slavs are quietly improving their position in Europe while the West is concerning itself with other matters. The presence of large numbers of Slavs in many of Western Europe’s major cities, where not so long ago they were almost non-existent, is an indicator of their growing influence. In similar vein, the fact that Slavs are now noticeable as tourists in places like Australia and South-East Asia also speaks to the fact that incomes and living standards in their home countries are improving to positions where they are comparable with Western countries. The evidence of the map is also telling, in that it shows that Slavic governments control a greater portion of Europe than at any time (with the exception of the Cold War period) since the 11th century. The map also shows that Russia is the biggest country in the world and has increased in size recently with the addition of Crimea. There is talk of the possibility of Russia losing territory in Europe in the next decade, but even if this were to occur, the beneficiaries of such a collapse would most likely be other Slavic states. Global warming is of geo-strategic benefit to the Slavs, as well.
Lastly, the fact that large numbers of Slavic migrants are settling in Western Europe, yet the Slavic nations keep their own countries migrant free and culturally homogeneous suggests that Slavs will have a voice amongst the many divergent cultures in Western countries in the future whilst those countries will have no voice in the culturally harmonious Slav homelands. All these trends suggest to me that Slavic influence and power in Europe is set to increase in the coming decade, rather than the reverse.
 
Before leaving off …
I would also like to point out that almost everything that has been said here about the Slavic countries, applies as well to most other non-Slav countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania do, for the most part, possess the same advantages and attitudes as their Slavic neighbours and they therefore have the potential to benefit in the same way. Indeed, the similarity in their attitude to nationalism has led the governments of Hungary and Poland to become virtual brothers-in-arms on certain issues within the European Union, and they, along with Putin’s Russia, are now looked to as examples of how countries should be run by many nationalist groups throughout the West and the rest of the world; a clarifying example of how these countries are already gaining influence in the world while the attention of the West’s governments remains focused elsewhere.

The US Congress has just increased sanctions on Russia by overwhelming majorities in both the House of Representatives (419-3) and the Senate (98-2). On the face of it these sanctions may just seem like a patriotic backlash against the Russian for interfering, or trying to interfere in the US election. And for some congressmen that may indeed be the primary motivation for voting for them. The instigators of this bill for new sanctions though had more on their minds than anything related to the last election. The primary target of these sanctions is the Nord Stream 2 project. Nord Stream 2 would see a pipeline laid under the Baltic Sea which would be large enough to supply northern Europe with all of the Russian gas which currently gets to northern Europe via pipelines through Ukraine. The drafters of this new sanctions bill are worried that if Nord Stream 2 is built then Russia will be able to turn off the gas to Ukraine without having to lose its business in northern Europe. This naturally would massively increase Russia’s ability to influence events in Ukraine and possibly even inspire a popular revolt against its current pro-western government (freezing through a couple of Ukrainian winters without heating might just convince a majority of Ukrainians that their government’s anti-Russian stance was not in their own personal interests). Alternately, if peaceful pressure did not suffice then with Nord Stream 2 operating, Russia would also be able to heat up the Donbas conflict and intervene militarily in the Ukraine without jeopardising its main source of foreign income. Given these possibilities it is no surprise that certain segments of the US administration are worried about Nord Stream 2. For sure they want to stop it, so these sanctions cleverly target companies who would do business with Russian energy companies. The US legislators are hoping to stop Nord Stream 2 from the German end by applying pain to any company that would work with the Russians to make Nord Stream 2 a reality. It is a clever strategy and we wait to see if it will work. The Russians have offered the criticism that the US is just trying to drive European nations toward more expensive American energy suppliers. It is a valid point that American companies will be winners if these sanctions have their desired effect. And surely many Europeans are aware that if in addition to making the Russians poorer these sanctions make Europe less energy secure and more dependent on the Americans then that will be just another reason why they will be thought a good idea by some American strategists.
We now wait to see if the sanctions will have their desired effect upon the Nord Stream 2 project. Several factions within Germany clearly don’t like this use of American power to interfere with their own energy security. The German foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, has spoken out against the sanctions bill. What Angela Merkel will say and do we have yet to see.
It is possible that rather than stopping Nord Stream 2 these sanctions might inspire a backlash of their own which will see the Germans choose Russia over the US in this case. The bill’s drafters would argue that without the sanctions the Germans would have agreed to Nord Stream 2 anyway. So at least the sanctions will make them think twice and then reveal how deep their alignment with the US really is.
Coming on the back of Trump’s visit to Europe recently convincing Angela Merkel that Germany needed to provide for its own defence it might look like there is currently a concerted US campaign to push the Germans away from them. If there is though it is interesting to note that the sanctions bill did not originate with the president’s team and it is probable that he personally would not favour it. Given its overwhelming support however it is hard to see President Trump not signing the bill (though he could use the excuse that he does not want to antagonise the US’s valued ally, Germany).
If, in the end, President Trump does sign the bill it will make an interesting example of how the US can be governed (and I mean quite literally governed; eg: ruled/administered) by forces outside the Presidency. Whether those forces will succeed in inserting a wedge between Russia and Germany or will in fact push them closer together is something that we will watch with close attention. Either way, it is safe to say, that the latest sanctions bill illuminates certain aspects of both US foreign policy and the functioning of the US administration at this point in time, and the response to it could illuminate even more about the state of international relations within Europe

So Angela Merkel said that Germany would take one million refugees and everyone thought ‘that woman is very compassionate,’ and perhaps she is, but when one looks at the decision geo-strategically one finds that there could be other motives behind her decision.
 
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Germany's Struggle
Since its unification in 1871 Germany has been engaged in a Geopolitical struggle with the other core European Powers: France, The United Kingdom and Russia. These four core powers, or empires as they were initially, have for the last 150 years been constantly engaged in the attempt to improve their positions vis-à-vis the others. The Austro-Hungarian Empire also used to be involved in this game, but it was torn apart following the First World War, a reminder of how deadly the game can be. Turkey, initially in the guise of the Ottoman Empire, was also a player in this game, but as they were almost always an ally of the Germans rather than a competitor I will put them on one side for now.
 
So, if we look at what impact Germany’s decision to take one million immigrants has had on its three traditional rivals we start to see the possibility that there might have been more reasons than altruism to recommend this course of action to Germany’s leader.
 

To begin with The United Kingdom.
Less than a month ago we had the dramatic vote for Britain to leave the European Union (EU). Immigration played a major role in that decision and the vote was close. It could certainly be argued that Germany’s sensationalised decision to accept a million refugees helped to convince Britons to choose to leave the European Union.

How does this act affect the comparative power of Britain vis-à-vis Germany?
On the British side of the equation there are many saying that Britain’s economy will suffer by the decision and that the country might fragment with Scotland and Northern Ireland splitting off. Certainly there is a chance of all of this, which would mean the virtual destruction of one of Germany’s tradition rivals. These doomsday predictions, however, may be mightily overstated. I, for one, can envisage Britain enhancing its influence in the world as a result of the Brexit. Whether or not the UK benefits from leaving the EU, though, there is no doubt that their leaving has left Germany in a stronger position within the European Union. Germany was already the strongest country within the European Union, but it could be challenged by Britain and France. With Britain out Germany’s power within the EU immediately grows.
 

What about France?
With Britain out of the EU the only other powerful country left in the EU other than Germany is its old rival; France.

What impact has Ms Merkel’s decision had on the relative strength of France vis-à-vis Germany?
Well, it could be argued that by accepting so many refugees Germany is being seen as a country that is sympathetic to Muslims and it could be argued that Germany has been cultivating this perception since accepting its first influx of Turkish immigrants through its ‘guest worker’ program back in the 60s. So how does this help Germany in its geopolitical game vis-à-vis the other European powers?
 
It should be noted that Germany, to this point, has not suffered from the mass slaughter Islamic terrorist attacks that have hit the UK and particularly France and with this grand gesture to further bolster Germany’s pro-Islamic credentials it could be expected that whatever increase in Islamic terrorism might occur following the decision its targets will be countries other than Germany. France for example is living under a state of emergency due to the frequency of mass casualty Islamic Terror attacks, so it could be argued that Merkel’s decision has contributed to shielding Germany from Islamic terrorist attacks while undermining the civil security of its rival France. Indeed, with the latest attack in Nice horrifying the French people, the chance of a National Front victory at the next election increases and that could lead to a Frexit. A situation that would leave Germany as the sole remaining power within the EU; a situation which would be something akin to Germany taking control of all of the minor countries of Europe; a massive geopolitical advantage to Germany if it should come to pass.

 
And now for the third rival; Russia.
Unlike the others Russia is not in the EU, but Merkel’s decision does have an indirect affect on Russia too. For the past 150 years Germany’s most reliable ally in containing Russia has been Turkey. Russia’s desire to gain control of the sea passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean poses an existential threat to the Turkish State and consequently Turkey, or the Ottoman empire as it was then, allied with Germany in the First World War and avoided joining the Allies against Germany in the Second World War until after the result was a forgone conclusion.
By accepting the one million refugees Germany took the pressure off its old ally Turkey, who was the main transit route for the refugees, and it thereby reaffirmed its bond of goodwill with a country that was at the time involved in a military standoff with Russia over the use of its air force in Syria.
 
So, in conclusion, it can be seen that by making her sensational announcement of accepting one million refugees Angela Merkel was taking a step which enhanced Germany’s geo-strategic position vis-à-vis all of its traditional rivals for power within Europe while at the same time appealing to all those who support ‘compassion politics’ both within the western world and abroad.
For those who doubt that the German chancellor and her advisors could have had anything but humanitarian concerns in mind when they made their decision, I would ask you to pose yourself the following questions:
“Was Angela Merkel aware that Britain was going to have a referendum on whether to leave the EU in the near future?”
“Was Angela Merkel aware that immigration would be a significant issue in that referendum?”
“Was Angela Merkel aware that her acceptance of one million, mostly Islamic refugees into the EU via Germany, from where they might later move to Britain or anywhere else they wanted, would be likely to strengthen Britain’s Leave campaign?”
I would posit that the answer to all of the above questions is “Yes.”
 
It should also be known that, tied in with its alliances with Turkey, Germany has a long history with the idea of using Islam as a weapon. In the first instance this was as a tool to be used against the colonial empires of Britain, France and Russia. On the outbreak of the First World War the Germans even established in Berlin a ‘Bureau of Jihad’ “to produce pan-Islamic propaganda to instigate revolts in French North Africa, Russian Central Asia, and, the jewel in the crown, British India with its 80 million muslims.”[1]
The German Legationsrat and friend of Kaiser Willhelm II who oversaw the establishment of this Bureau, Baron Max von Oppenheim, believed that “In the future Islam will play a much larger role…. [T]he striking power and demographic strength of Islamic lands will one day have a great significance for European states.”[2]
Given that its building of the Berlin to Bagdad railway and its support for the Ottoman Empire in its decay form some of the prouder narratives of German foreign policy over the last 150 years one might find it surprising if Ms Merkel’s advisors were not aware of this heritage. Indeed, one might even note that up until the end of the First World War Syria and Iraq were provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Germany’s erstwhile ally of the day. So in accepting the Syrian and Iraqi refugees one might even wonder if Ms Merkel was not in fact making a nod to Germany’s history and reaffirming an old bond of goodwill between her country and the peoples of that region.
 
In conclusion
For those who think that I might be drawing a very long bow in these speculations, I will concede that you might be right. It is the case that although one might have knowledge of enough facts to uncover the criminal in a detective novel it does not automatically follow that you will put the pieces together correctly to figure out what happened. Similarly, though Angela Merkel knew enough independent facts to forsee the effects of her decision upon her three main European rivals, it does not necessarily follow that she came to those realisations or that they were her primary reasons for acting.
Nonetheless, I think it has been a very enlightening exercise to analyse her action in terms of the effects it would have on Germany's geopolitical rivals.
 
 


[1] Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, Penguin, 2016, p.48

[2] Oppenheim quoted by McMeekin, The Berlin-Bagdad Express, 27, 91 as cited in Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans, Penguin, 2016, p.48

In the conflict between Russia and the US the next big play to look out for will take place in the Caucuses, that little band of mountainous countries that lie between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

On the 2nd of April, amidst heavy fighting, Azerbaijan suddenly seized some of the territory formerly held by Armenians in the long frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. This outbreak of violence between these two small countries should set alarm bells ringing for anyone who is watching the greater conflict between Russia and The West.
Ever since the US and Russia fell out over Ukraine, The West has been trying to damage Russia's economy and a key component of this has been trying to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas and oil. One arm of this effort has involved trying to locate an alternative source for oil and gas pipelines into Europe, and the new source which was found was Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has large reserves of cheaply acquirable oil and gas and is close enough to Europe to make pipelines to Europe feasible. Even better, Azerbaijan was formerly part of the Soviet Union, so if The West could draw it into its alliance it would be another thorn in the side of Russia.
Naturally, Russia has an interest in seeing that The West does not succeed in its aims.
Azerbaijan already has some pipelines running to the west. They pass through Georgia, another former member of the Soviet Union that has been drawn to The West. Russia no longer controls Georgia, but they do have troops in the breakaway region of South Ossetia whose territory points like a dagger from the north into the heart of the Georgian state. The southern border of South Ossetia lies not far from where the oil and gas pipelines run. Recently the border posts on the southern border of South Ossetia moved further south, effectively adding extra territory to South Ossetia and bringing the border so close to the oil and gas pipelines that they could now be easily shelled by artillery stationed in South Ossetian territory. Obviously, a cynical observer might conclude that this border shifting is part of a move by Russia and its ally to exert influence over Azerbaijan's ability to export its hydrocarbons to Europe. Specifically it lets the Europeans know that Russia has the ability to stop those pipelines at any moment by having the South Ossetians reignite their frozen conflict with the Georgian state.
That is all well and good for Russia, but pipelines can be moved further south. It would be much better for Russia if it could actually exert enough influence in its former satellites to control the flow of Azerbaijani hydrocarbons entirely. 

Russia has the military might to invade either of its two tiny neighbours Georgia or Azerbaijan, but Russia's reputation in the world would be damaged if it invaded a neighbour for purely economic/geopolitical reasons. Really, Russia would need a more acceptable reason before it could send its troops into a neighbour.
But wouldn't it be good fortune for Russia if such a reason did suddenly appear?

If warfare broke out between Azerbaijan and Russia's strategic ally Armenia then that would constitute a viable reason for Russia to intervene in Azerbaijan.  Who could blame Russia for defending her ally, particularly if Azerbaijan was the country to attack first?

So now we have a situation which has suddenly arisen where Azerbaijan has seized some territory from Armenian forces, what will happen now?
Will the conflict escalate and lead to Russia regaining control of its hydrocarbon rich former satellite by military means?
Or will a more subtle game be played where Russia achieves its control over Azerbaijan's hydrocarbons by threats and promises or is even defeated in securing its interests by a combination of other players and its own weaknesses? Or will nothing much happen, allowing things to go back to the status quo which existed before the attack?

Indicators that the Russians have been manouvering to make a play in the Caucuses:
One might say the Russians won't attack the Azerbaijanis; on the contrary the Russians have been particularly friendly to the Azerbaijani's of late. I would reply to this that one way for the Russians to get the Azerbaijanis to make the error of attacking Armenia is to let them think that the Russians were now better friends with them than the Armenians. One could reference the good relations between Iraq and the US which are said to have encouraged Saddam Hussein into thinking that the Americans would not defend Kuwait if he invaded it.

I would also point out that until 2nd April one might have been wondering why the Russians had decided to suddenly draw down in Syria, when everything was going so well for them there. They were leading their side to victory and making the United States appear ineffectual. One might also have wondered why they did not make greater overtures to the Kurds who would have seemed their natural allies.

Well here we have a good answer to both questions.
The Russians may have decided to start withdrawing from Syria so that they would be ready to focus their forces on Azerbaijan if needed. And they may not have played the Kurdish card in Syria because they wanted to keep it in reserve as a threat against Turkey to keep them from coming to the defence of their ethnic cousins in Azerbaijan.

Predicting what will happen in the Caucuses over the coming months is not the aim of this article. All that this article wishes to do is draw attention to the fact that the conditions have been set up for a big Russian move in the Caucuses, and what may seem like an insignificant sideshow at the moment could become a crucial test in the ongoing Russia/US face off.

Desperate times call for desperate acts.
 
News is coming to us that the EU and Turkey have struck a breakthrough deal to halt (or, at least, significantly reduce) the migrant flows from Turkey to Europe. It appears that the Turks are prepared to take back every asylum seeker who arrives in Greece, in return for some concessions but mostly for good will.
 
One would like to think that this move is driven by altruism and a desire to be a better neighbour and global citizen. And perhaps it is.
But there is another way to read the situation.

One might look at Turkey’s current geopolitical position and conclude that Turkey is in a dire situation and needs as many friends as it can get.
 
 
Turkey’s weakness
Turkey’s great geopolitical weakness is the fact that the southwest quarter of Turkey is a land mostly populated by the ethnic minority, the Kurds. There are roughly 15 million Kurds in the southwestern corner of Turkey and roughly another fifteen million of them living just over the Turkish border in the adjacent corners of Syria, Iraq and Iran. Many of the Turkish Kurds have agitated for an independent state in the past. Many of them are still doing so today. What their efforts for independence have lacked in the past have been a powerful international sponsor.
 
 
The Threat from Russia
Right now Turkey must feel that there is a grave threat that Russia might ‘Play the Kurdish Card’
Russia is doing well in Syria, supporting the Assad regime, an opponent of Turkey (by Turkey here, and in the rest of the article, we will mean Turkey under the current government). The Syrian Kurds, yet another opponent of Turkey, are also doing well in Syria. Now while there is not yet any formal alliance between the Assad regime and the Kurds, they are in many ways natural allies. The Assad regime is based on the Alawite ethnic minority and so likes to protect minorities from being overwhelmed by Syria’s majority Sunni Arabs. The Kurds are another ethnic minority within Syria and they would like to keep the gains they have made in the Syrian Civil War. Not being numerous enough to control Syria themselves, the Kurds have to be considering that their lot might be better with the pro-minority Assad regime than with its majority Sunni Arab opponents.
 
Turkey is opposing both Russia and the Kurds in Syria. Turkey is afraid that these two might unite and then Russia might play the ‘Kurdish card’.
 
Right now, the conditions whereby Russia might seriously back Kurdish secession from Turkey appear to be drawing close.
Russia would have much to gain by such a move. It would: weaken an adversary; be seen as a liberator of an oppressed minority; create a large new ally in the Middle East, and; create, moreover, an ally which shares a border with Armenia a close ally of Russia and a member of its Eurasian Economic Union. A liberated Kurdistan could immediately join the Russia dominated Eurasian Economic Union. Something that would be an appealing prospect to the Russians for a number of reasons.
 

The Threat from the United States of America
The USA does not want to see Russia liberating the Kurds from Turkey and perhaps creating a strong pro-Russian Kurdish state encompassing all of the contiguous Kurdish regions from Turkey, Syria, Iraq and possibly even Iran. That would be a major coup for the Russians and would make them look like the liberator of an oppressed people. The USA likes to wear the mantle of liberator of oppressed peoples; it does not want the Russians to steal this mantle. So, to date, the USA has been keeping the Syrian Kurds away from the Russians by giving them lots of support and keeping Turkish troops away from them.
More than this the Americans are just putting the finishing touches on two military airbases within Syrian Kurdish territory.
 
The Turks must be very worried.
Could it be that the US is planning to support the Kurds rather than let the Russians support them? US warplanes are currently flying out of Turkish airbases; why build airbases just over the border in Kurdish held Syria? Is the US expecting a breach with Turkey?
 
The Turkish government has every reason to be extremely concerned. Right now it appears that both the world superpower and their closest military rival have some pressing reasons for supporting the independence aspirations of the Kurdish populations in their region. In the past, had one of these powers tried to 'Play the Kurdish Card' Turkey would have allied with the opposing power to help counteract the threat, but now that option does not appear possible.
Neither the USA or Russia have committed to supporting an independent Kurdistan yet, but the potential for such an action grows as both the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars rage on and the Kurds in both countries continue to be the most reliable allies that the USA has in both conflicts; while at the same time the Kurds are also the most logical allies of the Russians.
 
Given this predicament it is no wonder that the Turks are seeking to make an ally of Germany and the European Union. The Turks are in need of powerful friends and even more in need of international good will. In light of this, the fact that the Turks are suddenly agreeing to make big moves to help Europe solve its refuge crisis makes good sense.
 
What more can Turkey do?
Turkey needs to make its peace with the Kurds.
There are two ways it could do this. It could either let the Kurds secede or it could bring the Kurds so far into its power structures that they will see the Turkish state as belonging as much to them as to any Turk.
 
The Turks could benefit from letting the Kurds secede.
Geopolitically speaking, in many ways the Kurds and the Turks are natural partners. Even if all the Kurdish regions were combined into a large Kurdish state it would still be a landlocked country. Kurdistan would need to befriend a neighbour with some coastline. The relatively developed and prosperous peninsula ofTurkey would be a logical economic partner for an Independent Kurdistan. Even under today’s difficult conditions Iraqi Kurdistan has allied with Turkey to secretly build an oil pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.
One also need not think that there would be an insurmountable reservoir of ill will from the Kurds toward their former rulers either. Hungary was under Austrian Habsburg rule for hundreds of years and yet now Austria is in many ways Hungary’s preferred neighbour. The reason why is because Austria agreed to allow local plebiscites along its border so that local communities could vote on which country they wanted to be in. By one such plebiscite the city of Sopron went from being Austrian to being Hungarian. As a result Hungary has no border disputes with Austria, unlike many of its other neighbours, and consequently Austrian-Hungarian relations are strong.
 
If Turkey, of its own volition, was to grant its Kurdish regions independence and ensure that the borders were in the right places. It would be seen as the midwife of Kurdish independence and gain much gratitude as a result. It would also immediately gain tremendous kudos with the Kurdish populations in neighbouring countries.
 
If Turkey is the first country to grant its Kurds independence it will immediately be seen as the greatest friend of the Kurds in the region and consequently any future Kurdish nation would be far more likely to form an economic or even political union with Turkey than any other of its neighbours. Letting the Kurds have independence could be Turkey’s road to truly becoming the leader of its region.
 
Even without its Kurdish corner Turkey would still be a large and powerful state of 65 million. It would be a richer place on average, as the Kurdish corner is a poorer region, and it may well be accepted into the European Union, as the ‘Kurdish Problem’ is the most cited reason for why the EU has not accepted Turkey to date.
 
 
Bringing the Kurds in
If Turkey is unwilling to see a quarter of its territory lost to another country (and most nations and leaders would be) then the only way to really make peace with the Kurds would be to bring them into the power structure so they feel that the country they share with the Turks is as much theirs as any Turk's. To do this they would probably need to change the name of the country and create some sort of federation. A Kurdish president might then convince the Kurdish masses that they were living in a country that was truly theirs.
 
In an earlier article below, I have already outlined that this is what I suspect Turkey’s president Erdogan has realised and is possibly trying to achieve. The constitutional changes that would be needed would never get through the Turkish parliament as it now stands, so that might be one of the reasons why Erdogan is trying to change system so that he has more power as president. It is also a potential reason for his recent secretive visits to the jailed Kurdish resistance leader Abdullah Ocalan and Abdullah Ocalan’s consequent request that the Kurdish partisans put down their arms and cooperate in a democratic solution. It is possible that Ocalan found the idea of a Kurdish/Turkish federation an acceptable alternative to an independent Kurdistan.
If Erdogan did have such plans it is understandable that he would not make them publically known as they would not be popular with many Turkish nationalist and in a democratic system they could easily be blocked. Erdogan might well be seeking his increased powers in order to be able to make the changes to the country that he sees as necessary.  For now, Erdogan is pursuing a constitutional route to increased presidential powers, but with all that is going on in Turkey at the moment, combining terrorist attacks with refugees and wars on its borders, one could imagine Erdogan finding enough justification in some near future event for the declaration of martial law. He could then take to himself all the powers that he needs. Such a declaration of martial law, need not necessarily be contrived either. There are many ways in which the wars on Turkey’s borders could eventually impact on Turkey in a way that makes the assumption of martial law prudent.
 
In conclusion
Turkey’s offers of to take back all refugees travelling to Greece from Turkey should buy a lot of goodwill from Germany and the EU, and Turkey is very much in need of allies at the moment. In this article I have set out, in relatively simple terms, what Turkey has to fear and some possible solutions.
There are many scenarios that could play out from our current circumstances that would bring transformative change to Turkey.  The sudden, dramatic offers in relation to refugees are an indicator that the governing elite of Turkey know that they are in a far more precarious and challenging situation than most would like to admit.

Many people have spoken about Paris being an exceptional place for a whole lot of different reasons, but Paris is, at this point in history, exceptional for a geopolitical reason which I have not heard mentioned by anyone else. It strikes me that Paris is the only capital of the former Western European imperial powers that still retains its role as the most important city in that linguistic empire.

What I mean by this is best demonstrated by example.

The Portuguese, Spanish, English and French all created globe spanning empires that left large parts of the world speaking their respective languages. If we look at these linguistic empires today, though, we find that all of the old European capitals have now been super-ceded in power by one of their former colonies.

For example:
The Portuguese speaking world is now definitely led by Brazil rather than Portugal. No one could doubt that Brazil with its 180 million people has more sway in today’s world than tiny Portugal. Lisbon is no longer the centre of the Portuguese speaking world. That honour must go to either Brasilia, the capital of Brasil, or Sao Paulo the largest city of Brasil and one that boasts a population larger than the entire country of Portugal.

The English speaking world is also no longer led from its former colonial capital of London. Although London is certainly still a city of global significance, there is no doubt that the USA is the current leader of the English speaking world and that either Washington, its capital, or New York, its largest city, are the epicentres of power for the English speaking world.

In the Spanish speaking world the Megacity of Mexico City, presiding over a nation of 150 million people, now has more sway in the world than its former colonial master, Madrid. Admittedly, the power gap between Mexico City and Madrid is not as great as in our other two examples, but as Mexico can be expected to continue to increase its economic power through the century Mexico City will pull further ahead.

Compared with all of these examples of imperial European capitals being overtaken by colonial heirs Paris is exceptional. Not only is Paris still the most important city of a French speaking world that numbers 29 countries where French is an official national language, but there is no other city that even comes close.

As an aside, I am aware that some might ask what about the Dutch empire, isn’t Amsterdam still the biggest Dutch speaking city? My answer to that would be that although the Dutch did rule over a very extensive empire in the past, Dutch is no longer an official language of any of the countries which now occupy that space with the exception of the small country of Surinam and the even smaller island of Aruba, consequently the vast majority of Dutch speakers still live in Europe and that outside of Europe there is not much of a Dutch speaking world to speak of, certainly not on the scale of the legacy of the maritime empires mentioned above.

So, apart from being an interesting historical fact, what is the geopolitical significance of Paris still being the pre-eminent French speaking city?

The significance lies in the fact that a large part of the world still looks to France and Paris for much of its cultural imports. Many countries throughout Africa, the Pacific and other corners of the former French empire are watching French news channels, reading French magazines and following the moods and fashions of metropolitan France. This gives France a great deal of ‘soft power’ in these regions of the world. And, just as the influence of the USA does not come just from its superior military (hard power) but also from the fact that teenagers around the world are listening to American music, watching American movies, consuming American products and dreaming of immigrating, the influence of ‘soft power’ should not be under estimated. Because of the fact that France is still at the centre of the French speaking world the cultural output of Paris is still molding the values and aspirations of the citizens of many nations beyond its borders and that is a powerful force.
 
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….
 
 
As a footnote I am also aware that many will say that Moscow is still the capital of the Russian speaking world, and that is in many senses a vast empire. All of which is true, but Moscow is the centre of a land empire built by conquering neighbours and that is a different sort of empire to that established by the Western European Atlantic Powers.

Greece has found some cards to play.
It is no secret that the world has been watching Greece since the beginning of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC).  'Can they avoid falling out of the  Euro?' has been the question everyone has been watching to see answered.  Initially the European Union (EU) put all efforts into keeping  them in, but as the years have ground by and the EU has built greater resilience into its financial institutions (or at least believes it has) the efforts have gradually changed to trying not to let the Greeks get away with too much unearned credit.  It was a story which promised dramatic events, but had become a rather slow and repetitive melodrama.
With the recent election to government of a 'non-establishment' party, however, Greece has once again become more interesting.  The new government, no longer bound by the old establishment alliances, has found that despite the country's dire situation they have some cards to play.

CARD ONE - THE ACE - RUSSIA
The overthrow of the Ukrainian Government and the subsequent developments, including sanctions against Russia, have made Greece far more strategically important to Russia now than it was at the start of the GFC.  Now, with Russia looking to break the unanimity of EU sanctions against it and also to break the unanimity of the NATO alliance, they would be willing to pay a high price for the defection of Greece, most probably including the economic support of the country after a default on its debts to western nations.  The EU and the Americans are well aware of the political consequences of a Greek re-alliance with Moscow and so this is a strong card to play in getting further concessions from them.  If this card alone is not good enough to convince the Europeans to bail out the Greeks then it could indicate that many Europeans are less worried about the political consequences of a  Grexit at this point than the Americans.

CARD TWO - THE JOKER - NAZI COMPENSATION
Another card that the Greek Government has suddenly played is the claim for compensation for the Nazi occupation.  Predictably, this request has met with a cold reception from many in Germany who cite previous payments as appropriate compensation, but there is a considerable portion of the German Bundestag which is viewing the claim more favourably than many would have predicted.  
In the negative, some are arguing that if they grant this claim to Greece then they will be left open to claims from other formerly occupied countries.  This is true, but if the EU just bails out Greece to keep it in the Euro then they (read mostly Germany) will be opening the door to all of the other indebted EU countries.
At this point in time the compensation for Nazi occupation would amount to a smaller sum than the GFC debts.  Notably, Spain, Portugal and Ireland were never occupied by the Nazi's and Italy, although briefly occupied, was originally an ally of the Nazi's so any claim made by them would be in a different category.
The Germans might just find it expedient to pay Greece's compensation claim and consequently bail it out in a way which will not let the other major GFC debtor nations off the hook.

In conclusion, a Nazi occupation compensation payment could well be a blessing in disguise for the Germans.  However, the Germans may yet weigh their interests and decide that the Euro has outlived its usefulness, or that they are not that scared of the Russians.
What is sure, though, is that Greece is once again an interesting country to watch.

26-3-2015 
It has been an interesting day for two reasons.
1. Events in Yemen.
Suddenly the Al-Houthi's supported by forces loyal to the former President appear to be on the verge of taking control of Aden the former Capital of South Yemen.  Given that many pundit have been predicting the imminent break up of Yemen into its former independent parts of North Yemen and South Yemen this is a very significant development.  Particularly significant is the involvement of the former unifying president Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Now, while I do not put myself forward as an expert on Ali Abdullah Saleh, I will say that in unifying North and South Yemen to create one  nation Saleh achieved a feat which makes him one of the most successful national leaders of the twentieth century.  I note that Yemen's current troubles started while Saleh was seriously ill.  If Saleh is back in control of himself, and today's events suggest to me that he is, then those who are saying that 'there is no one who can pull Yemen back together,' might find that they are mistaken.  
Though if Saleh comes back to influence through the aid of his former adversaries, the Houthi's it could well spell worrying times for Saudi Arabia.
2. The Ukrainian President has sacked the powerful oligarch Igor Kolomoisky from the post of Governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region.  Given that Kolomoisky is seen as the man who was most influential in ensuring that Dnipropetrovsk did not join the pro-Russian separatist movement this rift between himself and the Ukrainian government presided over by fellow/rival oligarch Petro Poroschenko is very significant indeed.