The US Congress has just increased sanctions on Russia by overwhelming majorities in both the House of Representatives (419-3) and the Senate (98-2). On the face of it these sanctions may just seem like a patriotic backlash against the Russian for interfering, or trying to interfere in the US election. And for some congressmen that may indeed be the primary motivation for voting for them. The instigators of this bill for new sanctions though had more on their minds than anything related to the last election. The primary target of these sanctions is the Nord Stream 2 project. Nord Stream 2 would see a pipeline laid under the Baltic Sea which would be large enough to supply northern Europe with all of the Russian gas which currently gets to northern Europe via pipelines through Ukraine. The drafters of this new sanctions bill are worried that if Nord Stream 2 is built then Russia will be able to turn off the gas to Ukraine without having to lose its business in northern Europe. This naturally would massively increase Russia’s ability to influence events in Ukraine and possibly even inspire a popular revolt against its current pro-western government (freezing through a couple of Ukrainian winters without heating might just convince a majority of Ukrainians that their government’s anti-Russian stance was not in their own personal interests). Alternately, if peaceful pressure did not suffice then with Nord Stream 2 operating, Russia would also be able to heat up the Donbas conflict and intervene militarily in the Ukraine without jeopardising its main source of foreign income. Given these possibilities it is no surprise that certain segments of the US administration are worried about Nord Stream 2. For sure they want to stop it, so these sanctions cleverly target companies who would do business with Russian energy companies. The US legislators are hoping to stop Nord Stream 2 from the German end by applying pain to any company that would work with the Russians to make Nord Stream 2 a reality. It is a clever strategy and we wait to see if it will work. The Russians have offered the criticism that the US is just trying to drive European nations toward more expensive American energy suppliers. It is a valid point that American companies will be winners if these sanctions have their desired effect. And surely many Europeans are aware that if in addition to making the Russians poorer these sanctions make Europe less energy secure and more dependent on the Americans then that will be just another reason why they will be thought a good idea by some American strategists.
We now wait to see if the sanctions will have their desired effect upon the Nord Stream 2 project. Several factions within Germany clearly don’t like this use of American power to interfere with their own energy security. The German foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, has spoken out against the sanctions bill. What Angela Merkel will say and do we have yet to see.
It is possible that rather than stopping Nord Stream 2 these sanctions might inspire a backlash of their own which will see the Germans choose Russia over the US in this case. The bill’s drafters would argue that without the sanctions the Germans would have agreed to Nord Stream 2 anyway. So at least the sanctions will make them think twice and then reveal how deep their alignment with the US really is.
Coming on the back of Trump’s visit to Europe recently convincing Angela Merkel that Germany needed to provide for its own defence it might look like there is currently a concerted US campaign to push the Germans away from them. If there is though it is interesting to note that the sanctions bill did not originate with the president’s team and it is probable that he personally would not favour it. Given its overwhelming support however it is hard to see President Trump not signing the bill (though he could use the excuse that he does not want to antagonise the US’s valued ally, Germany).
If, in the end, President Trump does sign the bill it will make an interesting example of how the US can be governed (and I mean quite literally governed; eg: ruled/administered) by forces outside the Presidency. Whether those forces will succeed in inserting a wedge between Russia and Germany or will in fact push them closer together is something that we will watch with close attention. Either way, it is safe to say, that the latest sanctions bill illuminates certain aspects of both US foreign policy and the functioning of the US administration at this point in time, and the response to it could illuminate even more about the state of international relations within Europe

Myanmar (formerly Burma) is not often mentioned in the press as a geostrategic country but the rise of China has made it so. Myanmar’s importance to China lies in the fact that it can provide an overland link to the Indian Ocean that saves China from having to ship goods through the contentious South China Sea and Malacca Straits choke point. The Chinese have just opened a pipeline to carry crude oil from Myanmar’s port of Sittwe to Kunming in China’s Southwest. A similar pipeline has already been carrying natural gas along the same route since 2013.
Given this investment in infrastructure it is clear that links between Myanmar and China are already developing. To some this might seem strange as it has been alleged that several of the ethnic armies which operate along the Myanmar-China border have in the past been sponsored by China. Indeed, some would see Myanmar’s former (and partly continuing) isolationist policy as an attempt to protect itself and its national unity from the meddling of its powerful neighbours.
Clearly, though, Myanmar has decided to abandon isolationism. Realising that their neighbours have all been developing at a faster rate, Myanmar’s government has decided to reconnect to the world before it becomes too weak relative to its strengthening neighbours. This seems like a wise move.
Normally when a country is worried about powerful neighbours stirring up trouble and secessionist movements on their borders they would look to make an alliance with a powerful country that does not share a border with them. One would think that the United States would fit that bill perfectly and there certainly have been signs that Myanmar would like to be better friends with the US. At the end of the day, however, Myanmar has not taken this route and is unlikely to given that the USAs ‘human rights’ agenda, if implemented, would severely restrict the central government’s ability to deal with its myriad ethnic independence movements. Indeed, many governers of Myanmar see national disintegration in the policy advice of western governments. Take for example the Western media and diplomatic pressure to be nicer to the ‘Rohinga minority’. From the Burmese perspective, their Buddhist country is being invaded by Muslim Bangladeshi’s spilling over the border from over-populated Bangladesh while the western governments tell them they should give the invaders more rights. Myanmar’s population is roughly 54 million; Bangladesh with only a third of Myanmar’s area has 151 million. The discouraging of muslim immigration from their neighbour is a matter that many in Myanmar see as a matter of national survival. No wonder that Aung San Su Kyi, who perhaps even owes her life to the human rights agendas of western governments, has, now that she is in power, not been willing to raise her voice in support of protecting the Rohingas.
Given, the current ideologies of western governments, it is not surprising that the government of Myanmar sees them as more of a threat to their national unity than either India or China. Therefore, Myanmar looks for development aid from its neighbours and given that predicament it is not surprising that it is currently favouring China. Myanmar is only of interest to India for the purposes of blocking China. If China did not have interests in Myanmar then India would have little interest in it either. China, however, is interested in Myanmar for what it can offer in terms of access to the Indian Ocean, consequently Myanmar does have leverage against the Chinese in a bilateral relationship. Now that the pipelines are built Myanmar can threaten to close them if the ethnic groups along the Chinese border become restive, giving China an incentive to act with the government in Napydaw in suppressing any independence movements.
So, Myanmar’s geopolitical hand is improving. The advancing technology of pipelines has made it useful to an ‘almost superpower’ in a way it never has been before and it can leverage this usefulness to help build its own national strength.
At the same time Myanmar still faces a number of difficulties. It has many ethnic minorities along its borders that have formed guerrilla armies and make the rule of the central government weak in their areas of strength. It is also surrounded by dangerous neighbours: China and India are both too large for Myanmar to ever win a war against; Bangladesh is dangerous for reasons already mentioned, and; even the fellow Buddhist country of Thailand is an historic rival against whom Myanmar has fought many wars throughout the ages.
In Myanmar’s favour, though, is the fact that its central Burmese core is a very strong and a natural national unit occupying a large area of extremely productive farmland with the economic gift of a large and navigable river flowing through it. As a former colony of Britain, Myanmar’s history of English language use also make it a place where modern industries and services could set up shop more easily than in other low-wage countries, and its proximity to both China and India as well as the important sea lanes of the Indian Ocean mean that it has relatively easy access to large markets.
Other Positives
Mostly tropical but with a temperate region in the far north Myanmar stretches from the warm waters of the Andaman Sea to the frozen heights of the tail end of the Himalayas giving it a climatic range that is useful for agriculture. Being a relatively large country it also has a good variety of natural resources and a relatively large population, though no-where near as crowded as most of its neighbours.
Mighty rivers, fertile plains, jungle clad hills and ice-capped mountains with a kaleidoscope of ethnic groups could also make Myanmar a great tourist destination.
 
In conclusion
Myanmar has since its independence been at great risk of losing territory to secessionist movements. So far it has held together and the country has great potential.
When all things are considered it is not surprising that the government in Napydaw currently sees  China, with its lack of concern for a country’s ‘human rights’ record, as the friendliest power. At least China has a positive interest in Myanmar, unlike the USA and India who might be described as having a negative interest in Myanmar, ie: they are only interested in it for the sake of blocking China.  Were it not for China’s interest in Myanmar they would have little interest. As indeed they were very disinterested throughout all the years when China was too weak to draw Myanmar into its orbit.
So, China is the most important relationship for Myanmar today as it is the relationship which offers the best hope of development without compromising unity. How Myanmar manages this relationship and balances both international and intranational forces will have geopolitical significance. China has few allies in its region and a friendship between China and Myanmar could serve both countries very well.