Various journalists have been describing the recent statements and actions of President Erdogan, jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, and the main legal, pro-Kurdish party, the People's Democratic Party, as 'inconsistent'. And so they may appear to many in Turkey as well as Western observers. However there is an explanation which fits all of the recent discordant announcements together.

Turkey has reached a crossroads in its modern history. A crossroad that exemplifies the limits of ethnic nationalism. If Turkey wishes to become a true regional hegemon the Turkish state must abandon its ethnic Turkish nationalism as a state legitimiser. Neighbouring populations of Arabs and Kurds will never warm to being dominated by another race. The Kurds who already live within the borders of Turkey have demonstrated this quite eloquently over the years. However, if the Turkish state can decouple itself from ethnicity and become a Pan-Ethnic state as the Ottomans before them succeeded in doing then the state apparatus that currently rules the core region of Turkey could expand to hold sway over a much increased territory and the Turks themselves would as a people once again become first among equals in a multiethnic empire.

The reason why Turkey's need for a shift in emphasis is more apparent now than it ever has been before is simply because with the two states to its south, Syria and Iraq, having fallen apart and having remained un-unified and largely ungovernable for some years now the region is quite literally calling out for some strong and benign power to intervene. Secondly, amidst all this chaos it is clear that one group at least will benefit and that group is the Kurds. The Kurds have already established quasi-independent states in both Iraq and Syria and it is clear their tide is rising. Erdogan has no doubt already done the calculus and he knows that there are only two good ways forward from here.
To keep repressing the Kurds in the south-west quarter of Turkey while they gain independence in the states just over the border is a no-win situation. It can be done, but it is certainly not going to create a greater or happier nation. The two options that would better Turkey's position are to either cut the Kurds loose and let them have independence or recreate the state in a way that Kurds will feel they are equal partners in it.
A Turks only Turkey
If Turkey did choose to let the Kurds have independence and let the south-west corner of their country break away it would still have a bright future. A Turkey without the Kurds would still be a large and powerful state. With its internal cohesion and human rights record improving as a result of the loss of the insurgent Kurds one could expect Turkey to become more wealthy and well governed and consequently even more powerful than it is now. It might even be allowed to join the European Union, presuming that were still desirable, and certainly would be seen by Europeans as a valuable, enlightened buffer between them and the unruly rest of the near east. In this scenario Turkey would still have influence in the Middle East as an example that other peoples would like to emulate, but not to join. And though powerful the Turkish state would know that it's power would never grow much beyond its defined borders.

The Ottoman Empire Re-Created
The second beneficial path that is open to Turkey is to abandon its ethnic Turkish nationalism and convert itself into a state which derives its legitimacy from its good governance and ability to provide protection and prosperity to its citizens and which also allows its citizens to express a variety of ethnic identities. Some might say that it would be difficult for Turkey to perform such a transition and this is true, but It could be done. The Kurds of Iraq already look to Turkey as their best friend in the neighbourhood. Turkey conspired with the government of Arbil to transport oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan via a pipeline against the will of the Iraqi government in Bagdad. This has earnt Turkey a lot of good will from the Iraqi Kurds. It is also the case that many Turkish diplomats have already been working to improve relations with the Kurds in neighbouring states because of the inevitable calculus that if Turkey is to compete with Iran regionally then it needs good relations with the Kurds. If Turkey could win the Kurds to it then in addition to having strong bases of influence in both of the disintegrating countries to its south it would also have a fifth column inside Iran by virtue of that country's own sizeable Kurdish population.
To change Turkey in the ways that are required will be difficult; even the country's name is a nationalist statement and would probably need to be changed, however, recent events and the desire of politicians and peoples to become more powerful suggest that Erdogan is already trying to move his country in the desired direction. His recent statement that "There is no Kurdish problem," and the recent loosening of control in the Kurdish regions can be seen in this light. Far more important though was Erdogan's recent visit to the jailed Kurdish leader Ocalan's cell. Most successful national leaders are aware of the big geopolitical picture surrounding their people and so Erdogan may well have found, ironically, that there was no one more capable of understanding his situation and his aspirations than Ocalan. To judge from Ocalan's subsequent call for the Kurds in Turkey to lay down their arms he has also judged that for the Kurds to be equal players in a mighty pan-ethnic state might serve their interests better than being an independent but poor state surrounded by powerful neighbours. Certainly, the Kurds have little to lose by starting along this journey to a pan-ethnic state with Erdogan. If things go well, all will be well, and if things don't go we'll then the Kurds will probably find themselves in an even better position to push for independence. Right now, Erdogan needs the Kurds if he is to realise the dream of turning Turkey into a powerful regional hegemon so the Kurds will have the ability to direct the nature of the state's transformation to their benefit.
Erdogan is also favoured in embarking on this project at this moment by the fact that the Kurds know that they can gain much by alliance with Turkey. The Kurdish enclave of Kobani would have fallen to the Islamic State recently if Turkey had not opened its border to allow Kurdish fighters from other regions to reinforce it. On a larger scale the Kurdish region of Iraq could greatly use Turkish support if it is to hold off the forces of Bagdad and Iran's Shia allies.
The Kurds are also a people who have experienced success in pan-ethnic states in the past, going all the way back to Saladin, the Kurdish ruler of a caliphate that led the resistance to the crusaders.

Erdogan may not yet be sure just how he is going to change Turkey. Ever since he and his Justice and Development (AK) party took power there has been a move toward regional leadership based on pan-islamism. Certainly an Islamic state has much broader regional appeal than one based on a particular nationality, but even pan-Islamism is limiting. There are large regions of both Syria and Iraq that would be alienated by a Sunni Islamic power. Religion is in itself a sort of ethnicity. Ideally, to have the greatest chance of dominating the Middle East the new Turkey would need to be both non-ethnic and non-religious. Perhaps, however, this is a step too far for Erdogan, particularly when most Kurds and most Arabs would identify as being Sunni Moslems. At the very least, however, the new Turkey must be a state in which men like Ocalan feel they could themselves become president and consequently rule over both Kurds and Turks. That is the sort of carrot which could attract the political leadership of the Kurds and other ethnicities into welcoming the expansion of a state based on the same core territory as the former Ottoman Empire.

So, if some journalist are confused that the Turkish government is getting less liberal, but the Kurds seem to be moving closer to a rapprochement it is because they are used to seeing ethnic relations only progress in terms of a dominant ethnicity granting more rights and liberties to members of minorities. What they are failing to see is that there is a new game in town; one that changes everything. Right now the two men who are the most influential leaders of the Turks and the Kurds are talking of the creation of a state in which both ethnicities will be equal parties. Greater liberalism is no longer needed, and indeed can even be inconvenient if you suddenly find yourself a member of the ruling class.

By launching direct military action against the Houthi/Saleh forces in Yemen the Saudis are taking a long term risk.  Though they might be by far the stronger party at the moment it is conceivable that they might meet strong resistance.  It is hard to subdue people who have nothing to lose and the Yemenis are very poor.  They also live in extremely difficult terrain.  Until now the Houthis were respecting the Saudi border.  Now that the Saudis have attacked them they will have no qualms about operating in Saudi territory.  Given there is significant Yemeni/Houthi population in the regions of Saudi Arabia which border Yemen's northern border, the Saudis are leaving themselves open to a war which could end up being fought on their own soil.  The Saudis may rationalise that if the Houthis gain complete control of Yemen they will, given past history, be after their southern regions next anyway.  This may be true, but the international community would have been virtually unified in opposing one country attacking another.  By Saudi Arabia attacking first they have forfeited this moral high ground.
The Saudis do already have the support, perhaps even the encouragement, of the United States of America in their attack and perhaps they believe that this is the only voice in the international court of public opinion that matters so why not invade.  This is a fair point, but America's priorities might change in the future while Yemen''s position on the southern border of Saudi Arabia will not and now that the Saudis have broken the peace I am sure the Houthis will be eager to take the fight into Saudi territory whenever they can.

26-3-2015 
It has been an interesting day for two reasons.
1. Events in Yemen.
Suddenly the Al-Houthi's supported by forces loyal to the former President appear to be on the verge of taking control of Aden the former Capital of South Yemen.  Given that many pundit have been predicting the imminent break up of Yemen into its former independent parts of North Yemen and South Yemen this is a very significant development.  Particularly significant is the involvement of the former unifying president Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Now, while I do not put myself forward as an expert on Ali Abdullah Saleh, I will say that in unifying North and South Yemen to create one  nation Saleh achieved a feat which makes him one of the most successful national leaders of the twentieth century.  I note that Yemen's current troubles started while Saleh was seriously ill.  If Saleh is back in control of himself, and today's events suggest to me that he is, then those who are saying that 'there is no one who can pull Yemen back together,' might find that they are mistaken.  
Though if Saleh comes back to influence through the aid of his former adversaries, the Houthi's it could well spell worrying times for Saudi Arabia.
2. The Ukrainian President has sacked the powerful oligarch Igor Kolomoisky from the post of Governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region.  Given that Kolomoisky is seen as the man who was most influential in ensuring that Dnipropetrovsk did not join the pro-Russian separatist movement this rift between himself and the Ukrainian government presided over by fellow/rival oligarch Petro Poroschenko is very significant indeed.