It would seem to me that if Russia is intending to install its own government in Ukraine then the man they would choose to lead it would ideally be Viktor Yanucovich. Viktor Yanukovich is the democratically elected leader of Ukraine who was ousted in a coup in 2014. He has been living in Russia ever since. If he is the man that they put in charge of whatever is left of Ukraine at the end of this war, then it would allow the Russians to undercut all of the criticisms that have been leveled at them in terms of an 'unprovoked attack'. If they can claim that they are restoring a democratically elected leader then it would certainly give their invasion legitimacy in many eyes.
The greatest problem with this strategy, however, may well be Viktor Yanukovich himself, I have no knowledge of whether he would agree to be re-installed as President of the Ukraine. Particularly, if it is over a partitioned Ukraine. I believe he has previously spoken of trying to get Russia to return The Crimea, so he may not be willing to go along with what may be Putin's current plans for the Ukraine.
Further evidence that the re-installation of Yanukovich is unlikely is the fact that we have not heard Russia saying that this is what it is doing. This might, however, be because they wanted to keep their real intentions unknown to this point, or it could be that Putin is waiting to see how well his invasion goes before choosing his end goal and he is not yet sure that he will choose the one in which Yanukovich would be helpful.

Some Carrots in the Pot.
There were many notable things about Putin's speech yesterday (Australian East Coast Time) which ended in his recognition of the independence of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk(see attached link www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrGLhhTtxFU). One of the things which struck me though is that when he spoke about how the Bolsheviks, when they created the Soviet state of Ukraine, were too generous with its borders, he not only says that 'historically Russian lands' were given to it, but also that 'historically Hungarian' and historically Polish' lands were also given to it. Such an admission leaves the door open to future negotiations with Hungary and Poland about a future carve-up of current Ukrainian territory. Indeed, I would guess that the Hungarians have long had their eye on just such a redrawing of their border with Ukraine and their pro-Russian attitudes over recent years have been, at least in part, a preparing of the ground for just such a negotiation, where they barter their support for Russian moves into Ukraine in return for a renegotiation of their border with The Ukraine, in the event that Russia does come to control it. Given that the Hungarian speaking section of Ukraine is only a small sliver of territory immediately adjacent to the current border and on the western side of the Carpathian mountains it would seem to be an exchange that Putin may well be willing to contemplate.

Hungary is already in the Russian camp. Poland, however, is completely another matter. Poland has led the European resistance to Russian actions in The Ukraine and they have been The Ukraine's strongest supporter. They have also done their best to pull Belarus away from its links to Russia, and they have worked to block Russian influence in Lithuania and increase their own.

This advocacy is not entirely based on a fear of Russia, as some claim. Poland also has an historical claim on all of these states having ruled them during the 15th and 16th centuries. As well as during a brief period in the 20th century, between the world wars.  Poland is a true historical competitor to Russia in these territories and as such it would seem unlikely that their hostility to Russia could be altered. However, Putin's recent reference to 'historically Polish lands' suggests that he might be amenable to giving some of Ukraine 'back' to Poland, if he gained control of it, and that thought will now be firmly lodged in the back of many Polish nationalists minds. Perhaps in the future, Polish resistance to the Russian occupation of The Ukraine might be turned to support by the negotiated return of some 'historically Polish lands'. And I am sure, if such negotiations ever did take place then Poland's leaving NATO and signing a security treaty with Russia would also be on the table.

Putin's potential undermining of NATO did not stop there, however, at the same time as talking about Polish lands being given to Ukraine he also spoke of 'historically German lands' being given to Poland. What if Putin told Poland that he would give them their 'historical lands' only if they agreed to give half as much land area back to Germany. Would this be enough to lure an already wobbly Germany out of NATO?

Putin's speech has already shaken Europe for reasons not mentioned here. However, Putin chooses his words carefully, and various nationalist leaders in Hungary, Poland and Germany will have heard the suggestion that some of their dearly held goals might be achieved through an alliance with Russia.

Over the past several months, Putin has been gathering his ingredients. Today he threw in the salt. Now he will slowly bring the pot to the boil.

​This may not be a very professional sounding analysis, but it is what is in my mind.

So, in my last hurried post I said I would explain my reasoning for why I think Putin will go into Ukraine. I have left it late enough, so I had better explain myself now before events overtake the need for any prediction.
Now, I am by no means a military expert, so my predictions are based on political calculations rather than any specialised knowledge of troop deployments and such like.
So, some reasons why I think Putin will go into The Ukraine:
Firstly, it is not primarily about NATO. If his stated demands were met, Putin would probably be happy and might put off the invasion for now, but I think that primarily his goal in going into The Ukraine would be the hope of reuniting the Russians. Putin considers Ukrainians to be Russians. Kiev was the capital of the first Russian state. Most of the Ukraine has been part of Russia for hundreds of years and the only reason it was part of a different state to Russia under the Soviet Union, in Putin's thinking, I presume, was because the Russians wanted to make the Soviet Union look like it was an International Union rather than just a Greater Russia, so they generously gave a bit of Russian territory to create some states like Belarus, which had never previously existed and The Ukraine, which had only existed when the Nazi's had control of the territory. The Russians had thought that Belarus and The Ukraine would always be under the control of the Soviet Politburo so there was no problem with calling these regions independent states. They had never imagined that their creations might actually become independent !! They even added the Crimea to The Ukraine in 1954. Thinking like this you can see that Putin, a strong nationalist, might want to correct the 'geopolitical tragedy' of the collapse of the Soviet Union and bring at least these, formerly Russian, states back into Russia. In Belarus it appears Putin has achieved this aim relatively peacefully (There is a 'Union State' agreement by which Russia and Belarus  are essentially merging). He must have thought he was on the way to achieving the same with the Ukraine when Viktor Yanukovych was elected President. He was hoping to get The Crimea back into Russia even more quickly with Yanukovych scheduling a referendum to be held in Crimea in 2014 to let the Crimea decide between the Ukraine, Russia and Independence. When Yanukovych was undemocratically overthrown Putin's strategy for peacefully reintegrating The Ukraine took a significant hit, though, I would assume. 
So, Putin's sense of grievance over The Ukraine is pretty strong. He believes The West underhandedly stole The Ukraine away from him by overthrowing a democratically elected President. He would also see an invasion as a noble effort to reunite his people. So his motivations to take control of the Ukraine are far stronger than some concerns about an aggressive foreign alliance structure. Geo-strategically there is a lot to gain as well, many analysts talk about Russia's declining population, extremely long borders, and open, easy-to-invade geography. Adding the Ukraine to Russia would add 40 plus million people while shortening their border and putting that border on an easily defensible mountain chain.
So, Putin has a lot to gain from bringing Ukraine back into the Russian fold. Not to mention, entry into the pantheon of Russian greats, if he pulls it off. And the greater the gain; the greater the risk one is willing to take to obtain it.

So, why now? Why during this particular standoff?
Well:

• Given that the West has started arming Ukraine, if he backs off now he will have incurred a price for his build up of troops (the better arming of Ukraine and the uniting of NATO) without having achieved any gain. Given that a price has already been paid Putin will not want to walk away.
• If Putin waits till next year Ukraine will only be better armed
• Right now, many European countries have a large dependency on Russian gas and oil and so are not very motivated to stop trading with Russia. In a year's time these countries might have diversified their economies away from Russian commodities.
• Right now, many in the American administration see China as America's biggest concern and so their attention is divided. In a year's time, China might have been laid low by a financial crises, causing the US administration to start rating Russia as their strongest competitor.
• Given that the US has at no point said they will help defend Ukraine militarily, the one card that might really dissuade Putin has not been played.

Given all of the above, it is my prediction that Putin will act rather than back down.
One way or the other, we will soon know.