Myanmar (formerly Burma) is not often mentioned in the press as a geostrategic country but the rise of China has made it so. Myanmar’s importance to China lies in the fact that it can provide an overland link to the Indian Ocean that saves China from having to ship goods through the contentious South China Sea and Malacca Straits choke point. The Chinese have just opened a pipeline to carry crude oil from Myanmar’s port of Sittwe to Kunming in China’s Southwest. A similar pipeline has already been carrying natural gas along the same route since 2013.
Given this investment in infrastructure it is clear that links between Myanmar and China are already developing. To some this might seem strange as it has been alleged that several of the ethnic armies which operate along the Myanmar-China border have in the past been sponsored by China. Indeed, some would see Myanmar’s former (and partly continuing) isolationist policy as an attempt to protect itself and its national unity from the meddling of its powerful neighbours. Clearly, though, Myanmar has decided to abandon isolationism. Realising that their neighbours have all been developing at a faster rate, Myanmar’s government has decided to reconnect to the world before it becomes too weak relative to its strengthening neighbours. This seems like a wise move. Normally when a country is worried about powerful neighbours stirring up trouble and secessionist movements on their borders they would look to make an alliance with a powerful country that does not share a border with them. One would think that the United States would fit that bill perfectly and there certainly have been signs that Myanmar would like to be better friends with the US. At the end of the day, however, Myanmar has not taken this route and is unlikely to given that the USAs ‘human rights’ agenda, if implemented, would severely restrict the central government’s ability to deal with its myriad ethnic independence movements. Indeed, many governers of Myanmar see national disintegration in the policy advice of western governments. Take for example the Western media and diplomatic pressure to be nicer to the ‘Rohinga minority’. From the Burmese perspective, their Buddhist country is being invaded by Muslim Bangladeshi’s spilling over the border from over-populated Bangladesh while the western governments tell them they should give the invaders more rights. Myanmar’s population is roughly 54 million; Bangladesh with only a third of Myanmar’s area has 151 million. The discouraging of muslim immigration from their neighbour is a matter that many in Myanmar see as a matter of national survival. No wonder that Aung San Su Kyi, who perhaps even owes her life to the human rights agendas of western governments, has, now that she is in power, not been willing to raise her voice in support of protecting the Rohingas. Given, the current ideologies of western governments, it is not surprising that the government of Myanmar sees them as more of a threat to their national unity than either India or China. Therefore, Myanmar looks for development aid from its neighbours and given that predicament it is not surprising that it is currently favouring China. Myanmar is only of interest to India for the purposes of blocking China. If China did not have interests in Myanmar then India would have little interest in it either. China, however, is interested in Myanmar for what it can offer in terms of access to the Indian Ocean, consequently Myanmar does have leverage against the Chinese in a bilateral relationship. Now that the pipelines are built Myanmar can threaten to close them if the ethnic groups along the Chinese border become restive, giving China an incentive to act with the government in Napydaw in suppressing any independence movements. So, Myanmar’s geopolitical hand is improving. The advancing technology of pipelines has made it useful to an ‘almost superpower’ in a way it never has been before and it can leverage this usefulness to help build its own national strength. At the same time Myanmar still faces a number of difficulties. It has many ethnic minorities along its borders that have formed guerrilla armies and make the rule of the central government weak in their areas of strength. It is also surrounded by dangerous neighbours: China and India are both too large for Myanmar to ever win a war against; Bangladesh is dangerous for reasons already mentioned, and; even the fellow Buddhist country of Thailand is an historic rival against whom Myanmar has fought many wars throughout the ages. In Myanmar’s favour, though, is the fact that its central Burmese core is a very strong and a natural national unit occupying a large area of extremely productive farmland with the economic gift of a large and navigable river flowing through it. As a former colony of Britain, Myanmar’s history of English language use also make it a place where modern industries and services could set up shop more easily than in other low-wage countries, and its proximity to both China and India as well as the important sea lanes of the Indian Ocean mean that it has relatively easy access to large markets. Other Positives Mostly tropical but with a temperate region in the far north Myanmar stretches from the warm waters of the Andaman Sea to the frozen heights of the tail end of the Himalayas giving it a climatic range that is useful for agriculture. Being a relatively large country it also has a good variety of natural resources and a relatively large population, though no-where near as crowded as most of its neighbours. Mighty rivers, fertile plains, jungle clad hills and ice-capped mountains with a kaleidoscope of ethnic groups could also make Myanmar a great tourist destination. In conclusion Myanmar has since its independence been at great risk of losing territory to secessionist movements. So far it has held together and the country has great potential. When all things are considered it is not surprising that the government in Napydaw currently sees China, with its lack of concern for a country’s ‘human rights’ record, as the friendliest power. At least China has a positive interest in Myanmar, unlike the USA and India who might be described as having a negative interest in Myanmar, ie: they are only interested in it for the sake of blocking China. Were it not for China’s interest in Myanmar they would have little interest. As indeed they were very disinterested throughout all the years when China was too weak to draw Myanmar into its orbit. So, China is the most important relationship for Myanmar today as it is the relationship which offers the best hope of development without compromising unity. How Myanmar manages this relationship and balances both international and intranational forces will have geopolitical significance. China has few allies in its region and a friendship between China and Myanmar could serve both countries very well. Your comment will be posted after it is approved.
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The AuthorThe author, Gavin Hickey, has lived in Indonesia, The United Kingdom and France and currently resides in his native Australia. He has been a lifelong student of global history. Archives
March 2024
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